WHILE WAITING FOR THE PROTOCOL

The Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) regime currently suffers from a lack of effective compliance procedures. Because a legally binding compliance protocol to the BWC is not available, other measures are needed to stabilize the regime against the risk of violations of its rules. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Chemical Weapons Convention, and the experiences of UN inspection teams show that among the necessary components of effective compliance mechanisms are an intermediary level between bilateral consultations of states parties and involvement of the UN Security Council as well as independent assessment capabilities. This article suggests that the UN Secretary General could assume such an intermediary function and, using the authority contained in Article 99 of the UN Charter, could investigate not only alleged use of biological weapons but also alleged breaches of the BWC. A standing expert unit in the Department for Disarmament Affairs could provide the independent expertise necessary for such investigations. Such a compliance mechanism could provisionally help stabilize the BWC regime until a permanent compliance system can be agreed.     

An alliance between Cyprus and Greece: assessing its partners’ relative security contribution

The issue that this paper tackles is the assessment of the relative security benefits that Cyprus and Greece derive in the context of their cooperation on defence matters. This form of cooperation, known as the ‘Integrated Defence Space Doctrine’, aims at defending their interests in the Aegean Sea and the broader East Mediterranean theatre. The paper relies heavily on earlier research on this topic, which deals with the Greek–Cypriot alliance facing an arms race against Turkey, and uses a coefficient especially designed to assess the optimal levels of security and the associated defence expenditure of the two allies. A comparison of the relative security coefficient values for the two allies suggests that the security benefit that Greece derives thanks to its alliance with Cyprus exceeds the corresponding Cypriot benefit by far. Given the importance assigned to human resources by this index, in conjunction with the demographic problems of Greece, this conclusion justifies the recent Greek defence policy revision, emphasizing quality, capital equipment and flexibility of forces. This revision aims at satisfying the security requirements of the alliance and the increasing demands of an arms race against Turkey.     

Progress payments and cost overruns in defence contracts

In recent years military procurement agencies have used “progress payments” in contracting. Although, overall, the adoption of such a policy may well have contributed to a decrease in total costs of procurement, we identify a class of inefficiencies that are likely to have been generated by it.     

Causal analysis of Australian economic growth and military expenditure: A note

Chowdhury (1991) applied Granger causality methods to military expenditure and economic growth series in 55 developing countries. This note applies a similar approach to Australia and finds no causal relationship between military expenditure and growth in either direction.     

The impact of defense and non‐defense public spending on growth in Asia and Latin America∗

For a three‐sector Feder‐Ram framework, we present time‐series, cross‐sectional estimates for two cohorts, consisting of Asian and Latin American countries. The estimates indicate that private investment, and defense and non‐defense public spending are growth promoting for alternative error components representations. For the best error components representation, greater growth enhancement is associated with the two forms of public spending in Asia than in Latin America, while the opposite comparison characterizes private investment. Although defense is growth promoting, an opportunity cost exists insofar as non‐defense spending, financed by defense spending, appears to give a small net boost to growth in Latin America.     

MILITARY EXPENDITURE AND ECONOMIC GROWTH IN MIDDLE EASTERN COUNTRIES: A DYNAMIC PANEL DATA ANALYSIS

Defence expenditures have both costs and benefits to the economy. The costs of defence expenditures are mainly emphasized as opportunity costs. On the other hand, defence spending may have growth‐promoting potential benefits: a rise in defence spending may result in a higher aggregate demand, production and employment. This paper examines empirically the effects of military expenditures on economic growth for Middle Eastern countries and Turkey, for the time‐period 1989–1999. The relationship between military expenditure and economic growth is investigated by using cross‐section and dynamic panel estimation techniques. Empirical analysis indicates that military expenditure enhances economic growth in the Middle Eastern countries and Turkey as a whole.     

ANALYSING THE DETERMINANTS OF TERRORISM IN TURKEY USING GEOGRAPHICALLY WEIGHTED REGRESSION

This paper investigates the determinants of provincial terrorism in Turkey taking spatial dimension into account for the time period 1990–2006. Following a traditional global regression analysis, spatial variations in the relationships are examined with geographically weighted regression (GWR) to obtain locally different parameter estimates. Empirical results indicate that increases in income and schooling ratio tend to reduce the provincial average level of terrorism, whereas an increase in unemployment enhances it. Moreover, GWR results indicate that the provincial effects of per capita income and education are more pronounced for the Eastern and South Eastern provinces compared to the Western provinces.     

Self-Interest versus the Common Cause: Austria,Prussia and Russia against Napoleon

This essay re-examines coalition warfare during the Napoleonic era by looking at the three eastern European powers – Austria, Prussia and Russia – how they interacted over time with France as well as each other, and how they managed French preponderance on the Continent. Before 1812, coalition warfare was dominated by eighteenth-century military and diplomatic attitudes: overall foreign political goals were ill-defined and were characterised by deep mistrust. The result was that the eastern powers pursued their own interests with little regard to coalition cohesion. If the coalition held together in 1813 and 1814, on the other hand, it was largely because individual powers' self-interest coincided with the overall objectives of the coalition – an increased determination to defeat Napoleon – along with a never before seen numerical superiority in allied troops. In this, Austria and especially Chancellor Metternich's role in juggling conflicting interests between the allies so that they could present, for the first time, a united front against France was fundamental.