Efficient distributions of arms‐control inspection effort

A rule that constrains decision‐makers is enforced by an inspector who is supplied with a fixed level of inspection resources—inspection personnel, equipment, or time. How should the inspector distribute its inspection resources over several independent inspectees? What minimum level of resources is required to deter all violations? Optimal enforcement problems occur in many contexts; the motivating application for this study is the role of the International Atomic Energy Agency in support of the Treaty on the Non‐Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Using game‐theoretic models, the resource level adequate for deterrence is characterized in a two‐inspectee problem with inspections that are imperfect in the sense that violations can be missed. Detection functions, or probabilities of detecting a violation, are assumed to be increasing in inspection resources, permitting optimal allocations over inspectees to be described both in general and in special cases. When detection functions are convex, inspection effort should be concentrated on one inspectee chosen at random, but when they are concave it should be spread deterministicly over the inspectees. Our analysis provides guidance for the design of arms‐control verification operations, and implies that a priori constraints on the distribution of inspection effort can result in significant inefficiencies. © 2003 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2004.     

Political Scientists and Historians in Search of the Bomb

Britain's failure to cut military commitments in spite of escalating defence costs was not the result of blocking policies by disgruntled services. Rather, there was no determination among Whitehall's political departments to cut commitments even before the service departments could obstruct a decision on force levels. The Conservative governments under Macmillan and Douglas‐Home showed a propensity for substantial force reductions in Europe rather than in out‐of NATO areas. This remained London's long‐term aim even after it had been accepted to build up British troops in Europe to agreed force levels. During Alec Douglas‐Home's premiership Britain's global military role, especially east of Suez, gained a greater significance. An Anglo‐American military axis operating in the Far East and the Indian Ocean became a prominent feature. Ultimately, Anglo‐American military interdependence outside NATO was to ensure that Britain would be able to pursue a policy with more room for independent action.     

The cost of production breaks

Disruptions in the production process can have a serious impact on production costs. Most of the previous literature which addresses the cost impact of production breaks attributes the observed increase in costs solely to “loss of learning.” We develop a mathematical model which implies that breaks in the unit learning curve can occur because of a production break, even under the assumption of no forgetting. In such cases, increases in unit cost can be caused by decreasing returns as the amount of time available to meet the delivery schedule decreases due to the production break.     

A differential equation model of search for randomly arriving and departing targets

In this paper we analyze optimal search strategies in an environment in which multiple, independent targets arrive and depart at random. The analysis revolves around a continuous time differential equation model which captures the time dependent nature of the search process. We explore the impact on optimal strategies of nonzero travel times between regions as well as differing target arrival rates. We derive simple closed form expressions for determining if only one region should be searched.