A theoretical justification for an increasing average failure rate strength distribution in fibrous composites

A general model for the failure of fibrous composite materials is described. It is shown to contain some of the well-known models in the literature. The composite material is viewed as a coherent system of independent identically distributed component strengths. Under the assumption that the applied load is redistributed “homotonically” to the unfailed components upon the failure of a component (an individual fiber segment) and that the distributions of component strengths are IFRA, it is shown that the system (composite) strength distribution is also IFRA. Examples are given using carbon reinforced composite data to illustrate the IFRA property.     

Learning ‘Under Fire’: Israel’s improvised military adaptation to Hamas tunnel warfare

What organisational attributes enhance a military’s ability to effectively adapt on the battlefield? Upon the outbreak of war in July 2014 between Israel and the Palestinian militant group Hamas, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) encountered an expansive network of tunnels from which Hamas was launching large-scale assaults into Israel. This article illustrates that the IDF’s ability to successfully adapt ‘under fire’ to this battlefield surprise was facilitated by several important attributes related to its organisational learning capacity: a dynamic, action-oriented organisational culture, a flexible leadership and command style, specialised commando units which acted as ‘incubators’ for learning and innovation, and a formal system to institutionalise and disseminate lessons learned.     

Optimal control policies in service systems with limited information on the downstream stage

Existing models in multistage service systems assume full information on the state of downstream stages. In this paper, we investigate how much the lack of such information impacts jobs' waiting time in a two‐stage system with two types of jobs at the first stage. The goal is to find the optimal control policy for the server at the first stage to switch between type‐1 and type‐2 jobs, while minimizing the long‐run average number of jobs in the system. We identify control policies and corresponding conditions under which having no or partial information, the system can still capture the most benefit of having full information.     

Graveyard of Analogies: The Use and Abuse of History for the War in Afghanistan

Decades of scholarship have warned against using historical analogies for policymaking. But the Taliban insurgency appears, on the surface, to confirm the usefulness of historical analogies to the British and Soviet wars in Afghanistan. I review the use of analogies for the war in Afghanistan and argue the analogies were historically unsound and strategically unhelpful. In fact, their effect on policy helped create the conditions for the very insurgency policymakers most hoped to avoid. The Taliban insurgency did not occur because of the presence of too many foreign troops and aid workers, but because there were too few.     

Northern Ireland and minimum force: the refutation of a concept?

The debate over whether there exists a British counter-insurgency tradition of minimum force is one that has been thoroughly discussed. Is there anything left to say? This study suggests there is further insight to be attained if one explicitly evaluates the concept of minimum force in relation to the conduct of the security forces in the years of the Northern Ireland conflict. Through an examination of three key periods in the conflict, it will be shown that while there was invariably an awareness of the need to act with restraint among senior officers at the strategic level, this was often difficult to apply at the tactical level in the heat of confrontation. The argument demonstrates that the British Army, and other instruments of the state, rarely acted in a manner that could be described as ‘minimal’. Instead, it was the broader liberal values of the British state that explains largely the degrees of restraint exhibited by the government and security forces.     

Conflict and fiscal capacity

We examine the role of war in retarding state fiscal capacity in developing countries, measured by tax revenue ratios to GDP. We build a simple theoretical model of a factionalized state, where patronage substitutes for common interest public goods, along with violent contestation over a rent or prize. Our dynamic panel empirical analysis applied to 79 developing countries, during 1980–2010, indicates that war, especially civil war, retards fiscal capacity, along with imperfect democracy, political repression, poor governance, and dependence on oil and macroeconomic mismanagement. High intensity conflict is particularly destructive of state capacity. In countries experiencing low intensity wars, other institutional factors may matter more than war. The diminution of fiscal capacity due to war appears less pronounced after the end of the cold war.     

Bayesian inference for a Lanchester type combat model

We undertake inference for a stochastic form of the Lanchester combat model. In particular, given battle data, we assess the type of battle that occurred and whether or not it makes any difference to the number of casualties if an army is attacking or defending. Our approach is Bayesian and we use modern computational techniques to fit the model. We illustrate our method using data from the Ardennes campaign. We compare our results with previous analyses of these data by Bracken and Fricker. Our conclusions are somewhat different to those of Bracken. Where he suggests that a linear law is appropriate, we show that the logarithmic or linear‐logarithmic laws fit better. We note however that the basic Lanchester modeling assumptions do not hold for the Ardennes data. Using Fricker's modified data, we show that although his “super‐logarithmic” law fits best, the linear, linear‐logarithmic, and logarithmic laws cannot be ruled out. We suggest that Bayesian methods can be used to make inference for battles in progress. We point out a number of advantages: Prior information from experts or previous battles can be incorporated; predictions of future casualties are easily made; more complex models can be analysed using stochastic simulation techniques. © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 47: 541–558, 2000     

Asymptotically optimal component assembly plans in repairable systems and server allocation in parallel multiserver queues

T identical exponential lifetime components out of which G are initially functioning (and B are not) are to be allocated to N subsystems, which are connected either in parallel or in series. Subsystem i, i = 1,…, N, functions when at least K_i of its components function and the whole system is maintained by a single repairman. Component repair times are identical independent exponentials and repaired components are as good as new. The problem of the determination of the assembly plan that will maximize the system reliability at any (arbitrary) time instant t is solved when the component failure rate is sufficiently small. For the parallel configuration, the optimal assembly plan allocates as many components as possible to the subsystem with the smallest K_i and allocates functioning components to subsystems in increasing order of the K_i's. For the series configuration, the optimal assembly plan allocates both the surplus and the functioning components equally to all subsystems whenever possible, and when not possible it favors subsystems in decreasing order of the K_i's. The solution is interpreted in the context of the optimal allocation of processors and an initial number of jobs in a problem of routing time consuming jobs to parallel multiprocessor queues. © John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 48: 732–746, 2001