Partial input to output impacts in DEA: Production considerations and resource sharing among business subunits

Data envelopment analysis (DEA) is a methodology for evaluating the relative efficiencies of peer decision‐making units (DMUs), in a multiple input/output setting. Although it is generally assumed that all outputs are impacted by all inputs, there are many situations where this may not be the case. This article extends the conventional DEA methodology to allow for the measurement of technical efficiency in situations where only partial input‐to‐output impacts exist. The new methodology involves viewing the DMU as a business unit, consisting of a set of mutually exclusive subunits, each of which can be treated in the conventional DEA sense. A further consideration involves the imposition of constraints in the form of assurance regions (AR) on pairs of multipliers. These AR constraints often arise at the level of the subunit, and as a result, there can be multiple and often inconsistent AR constraints on any given variable pair. We present a methodology for resolving such inconsistencies. To demonstrate the overall methodology, we apply it to the problem of evaluating the efficiencies of a set of steel fabrication plants. © 2013 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2013     

Book reviews

Norman Cigar, Genocide in Bosnia: The Policy of “Ethnic Cleansing”. College Station, Texas: Texas A&M University Press, 1995. Pp.xiv + 247; app., map, notes, cartoon.

Maria Jose Moyano, Argentina's Lost Patrol: Armed Struggle, 1969–1979. New Haven: Connecticut Yale University Press, 1995. Pp.xiii + 226, biblio., abbreviations, 10 figures, 1 map, tables, index; $25/£16.95. ISBN 0–300–01622–6.

Donald E. Schulz and Deborah Sundloff Schulz, The United States, Honduras, and the Crisis in Central America, Westview Thematic Studies in Latin America, Boulder, Co: Westview, 1994. Pp.368, map, figure, select biblio., abbreviations, index. $52.50/£37.50; (cloth) $17.95/£11.95 (paper). ISBN 0–8133–1324–4 and 1323–6.

Joseph H. Alexander and Merrill L. Bartlett, Sea Soldiers in the Cold War: Amphibious Warfare 1945–1991. Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 1995. Pp.iii + 178, 1 map, 29 illus, biblio, index. $32.95. ISBN

Gary P. Cox, The Halt in the Mud: French Strategic Planning from Waterloo to Sedan. Westview Press, 1994. Pp.258, maps, notes, biblio, index. £33.50. ISBN 0–133–1536–0.     

Webs of Smoke: Drugs and Small Wars

War and drugs share many characteristics – both are destructive of human life, highly profitable to some, and efforts to regulate them have failed. In fact, at various times throughout history, war and drugs have been intertwined, prolonging human suffering, bedeviling political leaders and enriching a select few. The pernicious role of drugs in organized political violence is often overlooked. Drugs have been the cause of war, the funding for military operations, used by combatants and a part of the post-war political landscape. The insidious nature of drugs is especially visible in a certain type of war – small wars – yet is virtually unexamined by scholars and decision-makers.     

Winning the ‘War on Terror’? Roy Mason's Contribution to Counter-Terrorism in Northern Ireland

Roy Mason's tenure as Northern Ireland Secretary marked a watershed, yet it has provoked little analysis. Contrary to his popular image, security policy under Mason remained within the limits that had determined the formulation of British counter-terrorism ever since 1972. It was precisely because of this strategic environment that Mason's contribution was little more than a change in rhetoric, the implications of which were contradictory. Likewise, his key political idea of promoting ‘constitutional security’ negated its stated purpose by furthering instability, and – in the longer term – by making Dublin's permanent inclusion in the government of the province a political imperative.     

Between Man and Nature: The Enduring Wisdom of Sir Halford J. Mackinder

This article argues for the continued relevance of the work and theories of the British Geostrategist Sir Halford J. Mackinder (1861-1947). It asserts that commentators and scholars who seek to marginalise Mackinder have too often dismissed his theories without setting them in the context of their continued endorsement in crucial areas of the globe. After 1945, despite his theories being tainted by association with Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan, both Moscow and Washington recognised the utility of Mackinder’s work and tailored policy accordingly. The end of Cold War saw Mackinder fall out of favour as his model was deemed unsuitable for policy analysis by a number of influential thinkers. It is argued here that, in recent years, the arena of international politics has seen a rehabilitation of Mackinder, accompanied by a resurgence of interest in Geopolitics. Finally, the piece examines those areas of the contemporary globe where Mackinder’s influence is greatest.     

ON RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY AND THE STUDY OF TERRORISM

When rational choice theory is applied to the study of terrorism, it is important that attention be given to the derived principles of constrained utility maximization. Particularly useful is the Slutsky equation, which rigorously analyzes the quantity response in one activity to a price change in another. By directing attention to assumptions and/or information about compensated cross price elasticities, expenditure shares, and income elasticities, the Slutsky equation can provide critical guidance in both theoretical and empirical analysis.     

THE REGIONAL ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF MILITARY BASE REALIGNMENTS AND CLOSURES IN GERMANY

We identify the causal effect of a reduction in military personnel on a number of socioeconomic indicators within the peripheries of military bases. The base realignments and closures in Germany are used as an exogenous source of variation that allows us to identify the effect of a demand shock on household income, output, unemployment, and tax revenue within a specified buffer zone around each base. The analysis covers 298 communities for the period 2003–2007. Consistent with evidence found elsewhere, we find that these base adjustments have only a marginal impact on the local community in which the bases are located.     

Country Survey I–Military Spending in India 1

After a brief survey of the Indian economy, we survey the supply and demand of military expenditures in India over the last four decades. The causes of military expenditures appear to include regional rivalries and protracted conflicts, but it has proven difficult to delineate these with empirical models. The effects of military spending in India on economic growth appear to be benign, despite much speculation to the contrary. However, the opportunity costs of defence spending are shown to be considerable. We conclude with speculation about the role of debt and debt servicing in retarding future economic growth in India. We also speculate about the potential for the creation of a war economy in India.     

FOOD AID

Abstract

This paper seeks to critically appraise Africa's position within the United Nations Security Council from the inception of the UN in 1945 until the end of 2010, spanning the entire history of the world body. A few factors make such an appraisal a useful exercise. These include the ongoing debates about the reform of the Council in particular and the UN as a whole, and the growing interest that many African students and observers of and actors in international relations seem to have developed in recent years in the working of the world body. In this appraisal, emphasis will be placed on the origin and rationale behind the establishment of the Security Council as well as the use of the veto power by its permanent members, with a special reference to Africa.     

CONTRIBUTORS

Conventional wisdom states that the stability-instability paradox does not explain the effect of nuclear proliferation on the conflict propensity of South Asia, and that nuclear weapons have had a different and more dangerous impact in South Asia than Cold War Europe. I argue that the paradox explains nuclear South Asia; that the similarities between nuclear South Asia and Cold War Europe are strong; and that conventional instability does not cause revisionist challenges in the long run. I develop and probe a psychological causal mechanism that explains the impact of nuclear weapons on Cold War Europe and South Asia. Following the ten-month mobilized crisis in 2002, Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf may have adopted a more moderate foreign policy toward India after experiencing fear of imminent nuclear war, as Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev did forty years earlier. I argue that the stability-instability paradox explains Cold War Europe and nuclear South Asia and will, conditional on Iranian and North Korean revisionism, predict the impact of nuclear weapon development on these states' conflict propensities.