ACQUIRING FOREIGN NUCLEAR ASSISTANCE IN THE MIDDLE EAST

The United Arab Emirates (UAE) has laid out an ambitious plan to become the first Arab country to possess a civilian nuclear energy program. Central to that effort has been the Emirati government's ability to obtain foreign nuclear assistance. This article traces the UAE's strategies for overcoming the obstacles that stood in the way of nuclear suppliers providing assistance. It examines the approach taken by the UAE to assuage the safety and security concerns of nuclear suppliers, how the UAE leveraged its alliances with France and the United States to obtain their cooperation, and its strategies for engaging domestic interest groups in supplier states. The generalizable elements of the UAE's strategies are discussed and used to provide insight into the prospects for other Middle Eastern states' bids to obtain similar assistance. The article concludes with a discussion of the potentially transformative aspects of the strategies employed by the UAE in shaping other countries' pursuit of nuclear energy in the region.     

Nuclear weapons,existential threats,and the stability–instability paradox

Recent scholarship has largely ignored systematic differences in the existential threats that nuclear-weapon possessors pose to other states. This study theorizes that the capacity to pose existential threats shapes nuclear-armed states’ willingness to use military force against one another. We explore three hypotheses regarding how nuclear-based existential threats can deter conflict or encourage it, including under the conditions proposed by the stability–instability paradox. We rely on a statistical analysis of nuclear-armed dyads from 1950 to 2001 and employ the Nuclear Annihilation Threat (NAT) Index to capture variation in the existential threats nuclear-armed states pose to one another. We find that being able to pose an existential threat to another state emboldens potential initiators to use military force but does not deter attacks. The emboldening effects are particularly strong under the hypothesized conditions of the stability–instability paradox. Our study provides unique contributions to ongoing debates over the political effects of nuclear weapons.     

Rebellion,Repression and Welfare

I develop a dynamic model of social conflict whereby manifest grievances of the poor generate the incentive of taking over political power violently. Rebellion can be an equilibrium outcome depending on the level of preexisting inequality between the poor and the ruling elite, the relative military capabilities of the two groups and the destructiveness of conflict. Once a technology of repression is introduced, widespread fear reduces the parameter space for which rebellion is an equilibrium outcome. However, I show that repression-driven peace comes at a cost as it produces a welfare loss to society.     

Kurtosis correction method for X̄ and R control charts for long‐tailed symmetrical distributions

This paper proposes a kurtosis correction (KC) method for constructing the X? and R control charts for symmetrical long‐tailed (leptokurtic) distributions. The control charts are similar to the Shewhart control charts and are very easy to use. The control limits are derived based on the degree of kurtosis estimated from the actual (subgroup) data. It is assumed that the underlying quality characteristic is symmetrically distributed and no other distributional and/or parameter assumptions are made. The control chart constants are tabulated and the performance of these charts is compared with that of the Shewhart control charts. For the case of the logistic distribution, the exact control limits are derived and are compared with the KC method and the Shewhart method. © 2007 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2007     

Production-location problems with demand considerations

The production-location problem of a profit maximizing firm is considered. A model is developed for a single firm, facing the joint problems of determining the optimal plant location, the optimal input mix, and the optimal plant size. A homothetic production function is used as the model of the production technologies, and the existence of a sequential “separability” between the production, or input mix, problem and the location problem is demonstrated.