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A. Steven Dietz 《Small Wars & Insurgencies》2013,24(2):385-401
The current approach to countering the threat of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in Afghanistan has met with limited success. The relative lack of success may be in part because the current approach is not holistic and discounts the social systems that foster the IEDs. Insurgents are using IEDs as a tool to further their strategic aims, but the coalition and to a lesser extent the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) are attacking the IEDs as if they are an end in and of themselves. Combining network disruption with information change maximizes the opportunities for mitigating the IED threat. More specifically, to mitigate the IED threat requires disrupting the social and economic systems associated with IEDs, and at the same time providing alternative economic opportunities and improving rule of law and governance at the local level. In other words, counter-IED (C-IED) must be Counter-Insurgency (COIN) centric to be successful. This paper reviews the current state of C-IED efforts, identifies five main problems with the current approach, and suggests changes to reduce or mitigate the IED threat in Afghanistan. 相似文献
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Stuart A. Cohen 《战略研究杂志》2013,36(4):78-93
The British provided unprecedented shelter, training and supplies that made possible the revival of a new and better Belgian Army after the crushing German victories in 1940. Starting in Wales in 1940 as a small and disunited group, the Belgians improved more than any of the Allied exile ground forces. By 1944, their independent brigade fought well in Normandy and Belgium, restoring national pride and proving the worth of British help. The parallel and interdependent processes between the British and their Continental guests allows this analysis of the Anglo‐Belgian experience to be useful in considering British Army interactions with the other exiles as well. 相似文献
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Richard Caplan 《战略研究杂志》2013,36(3):24-45
The EC's recognition of new states in former Yugoslavia is considered by most analysts to have seriously aggravated the conflict in the region. This article challenges the conventional wisdom and argues that the strategic effects of recognition have been largely overstated. The prospect of recognition played no significant role in the Slovene determination to sustain their campaign for independence and therefore bears little responsibility for the first phase of the war. In Croatia, recognition ‐ together with the deployment of UN peacekeepers ‐ may even have had a mitigating effect. Only in Bosnia is there any correlation between recognition and an intensification of hostilities but it is doubtful whether non‐recognition would have prevented the eruption of violence since Bosnian Serb aspirations for an ethnically homogeneous state entity could not be realised without resort to war. The real relevance of recognition lies with the opportunities for more effective international action which it created. It was the failure to seize these opportunities, rather than the strategic effects of recognition, which better explains the tragic events that ensued. 相似文献
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J. Brent Wilson Ian F.W. Beckett John T. Fishel Richard Dale 《Small Wars & Insurgencies》2013,24(3):425-432
John Lawrence Tone, The Fatal Knot: The Guerrilla War in Navarre and the Defeat of Napoleon in Spain. Chapel Hill and London; The University of North Carolina Press 1994. Pp.vii + 239, 1 map, biblio., index. $34.95 (cloth). ISBN 0–8078–2169–1. Robert Holland (ed), Emergencies and Disorder in the European Empires after 1945. London: Frank Cass, 1994. Pp.x + 256; index. £32 (cloth); £15 (paper). ISBN 0–7146–4516–8 and 4109 X Deborah L. Norden, Military Rebellion in Argentina: Between Coups and Consolidation. Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 1996. Pp.242, index, $35/$17.50 (paper). ISBN 0–8032–8369–5. William M. Minter, Apartheid's Contras: An Inquiry into the Roots of War in Angola and Mozambique. London and Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Zed Books Ltd; Johannesburg: Witwatersrand University Press, 1994. Pp. xii +308, 3 maps, biblio., index. $69.95/£39.95 (cloth); $29.95/£16.95(paper). ISBN 1–85649–266–4 and 266–4. 相似文献
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John A. Nagl 《Small Wars & Insurgencies》2013,24(3):377-382
Etzioni both exaggerates and minimizes the influence of my book Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife on different components of US military doctrine, mischaracterizes my treatment of the Malayan Emergency, and unfairly denigrates the successes of counterinsurgency in Iraq from 2007 to 2011 while misattributing the reasons for its failures in both Iraq and Afghanistan. 相似文献
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