Research and development activities in a business firm or government laboratory are portrayed as a multi-stage information generation and conversion process. A “basic research” phase generates opportunities, in the form of findings in a set of scientific disciplines, which are available for subsequent exploitation. It is assumed that increments to information in a subject area are stochastic, proportional to the amount of knowledge which already exists in the area, and have values which are randomly distributed. An “exploratory development” phase is viewed as a process of selecting a subset of alternative research opportunities, improving each opportunity in the direction of its applications, estimating the value of the improved opportunity and using these estimates to choose the exploratory development results to be implemented in engineering development. The “engineering development” phase makes the value of exploratory results realizable without changing value or risk. Engineering development costs are assumed to increase as value increases. If exploratory development is not successful, additional costs in engineering development must be incurred to bring the design up to a minimum desirable level. The model is intended as a step toward formulating and analyzing problems in management planning and control of the several interrelated stages of the research and development process. 相似文献
In this article an algorithm for computing upper and lower ? approximations of a (implicitly or explicitly) given convex function h defined on an interval of length T is developed. The approximations can be obtained under weak assumptions on h (in particular, no differentiability), and the error decreases quadratically with the number of iterations. To reach an absolute accuracy of ? the number of iterations is bounded by
Abstract What are the consequences of military strikes against nuclear facilities? In particular, do they ‘work’ by delaying the target states ability to build the bomb? This article addresses these questions by conducting an analysis of 16 attacks against nuclear facilities from 1942 to 2007. We analyze strikes that occurred during peacetime and raids that took place in the context of an ongoing interstate war. The findings indicate that strikes are neither as uniformly fruitless as the skeptics would suggest, nor as productive as advocates have claimed. There is evidence that the peacetime attacks delayed the target's nuclear program, although the size of this effect is rather modest. The wartime cases were less successful, as attacks often missed their targets either due to operational failure or limited intelligence on the location of critical targets. In our concluding section we show that many of the conditions that were conducive to past success are not present in the contemporary Iran case. Overall, our findings reveal an interesting paradox. The historical cases that have successfully delayed proliferation are those when the attacking state struck well before a nuclear threat was imminent. Yet, this also happens to be when strikes are the least legitimate under international law, meaning that attacking under these conditions is most likely to elicit international censure. 相似文献