PEACE PROCESSES AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN THE HORN OF AFRICA

Conflict resolution processes must meet certain prerequisites and conditions. Unless the warring parties or the mediators meet, it will be difficult to find lasting and just solutions to the conflicts in the Horn (Djibouti, Eritrea and Ethiopia, and Somalia). Most of these conflicts have ethnic or religious components and also have a lot do with the nature of the government institutions and the power distribution among the communities within these states. Identifying the main causes of the conflict and the issues involved in each country is a very necessary first step toward peace. Secondly, conditions have to be identified that would make the current peace agreements work. This includes identifying the specific problems faced by the parties involved; ascertaining the validity of the mechanisms through which the problems will be overcome; and planning how the agreements will be maintained. The knowledge that mediators have about the conflict is often as important as the actual meeting of parties at the negotiation table. This article also evaluates the peace initiatives underway in the Horn and attempts to identify the apparent reasons that prevented their implementation.     

Africa Watch

This is the first of a new series of articles in the African Security Review which will focus on specific current issues of importance in Africa. To make sense of events, it is necessary to include some background information in order to contextualise them. As countries are revisited in the series, the background information will become less extensive, and readers will be referred to earlier pieces. Apart from providing an explanatory narrative of emerging situations, an attempt will be made to identify the issues likely to attract attention in the near future, and account for their salience.     

EXPORT CONTROLS AND INTERNATIONAL SAFEGUARDS

Export controls and international safeguards are central to ensuring international confidence in the peaceful uses of nuclear materials and technologies and to achieving adequate oversight on the transfer and use of nuclear materials, technology, and equipment required for the development of proliferation-sensitive parts of the nuclear fuel cycle. Although the independent strengths of export controls and international safeguards rely largely on universal adherence, there may be opportunities to exploit the shared strengths of these systems. This article provides background information on the separate evolution of export controls and international safeguards, considers how these two elements of the nonproliferation regime interact, and identifies some possible avenues that could, over time, lead to wholly integrated activities.     

Counter‐punching on the Mudzi: D Company, 1st Rhodesian African Rifles,on operation ‘Mardon’ 1 November 1976

Designed to harrass and weaken Ian Smith's principal enemy, Robert Mugabe, in his safe haven of Mozambique, Operation ‘Mardon’ involved co‐ordinated incursions over the Rhodesian border on a wide front. The secondary purpose was to persuade the African nationalist insurgents to abandon their incursion routes in the north‐east and south‐east in favour of those from the east where the mountainous terrain favoured their interception. Although other Rhodesian units wreaked more physical damage, D Company, 1st Battalion, the Rhodesian African Rifles, inflicted the heaviest casualties in their classic infantry attack on Mudzi Camp.¹     

Uncovering foreign military innovation

An analysis of US assessments of Germany's development of armored warfare illustrates the problems that intelligence agencies face as they attempt to understand military innovation. The covert nature of German Army's tank research in the years immediately following World War I limited the number of indicators of Berlin's interest in armored warfare. Similarly, the United States possessed at best a fragmentary picture of German experimentation with armor. By the outbreak of World War II, however, US military attaches had nonetheless developed an accurate understanding of German concepts of armored warfare. If the United States is to avoid strategic surprise in the future, it must cultivate intelligence sources and employ considerably different methods from those of the Cold War.