Reconstruction,the Long Tail and Decentralisation: An Application to Iraq and Afghanistan

In this paper, we examine the current state of knowledge in the economics literature on the conduct of reconstruction activities in Iraq and Afghanistan. As stabilisation and reconstruction missions grow in importance for units deployed to these regions, it becomes more important to understand what activities can promote economic growth at the local level. While military operations focus on interdicting the insurgency, successful counter-insurgency campaigns have typically addressed the conditions conducive to the insurgency. Mitigating the incentives for individuals to participate in an insurgency is imperative. Well-crafted and timed reconstruction activities can, we argue, attenuate these incentives.     

Can we negotiate with the Taliban?

The belief that the insurgency in southern Afghanistan is a singular entity and the assumption that negotiations with that entity can bring an end to the conflict are simplistic and do not take into account the other insurgent partners, nor the role of local power brokers. Care must be taken when providing advice in the public domain on how to end or limit conflict in Afghanistan.     

The European community's recognition of new states in Yugoslavia: The strategic implications

The EC's recognition of new states in former Yugoslavia is considered by most analysts to have seriously aggravated the conflict in the region. This article challenges the conventional wisdom and argues that the strategic effects of recognition have been largely overstated. The prospect of recognition played no significant role in the Slovene determination to sustain their campaign for independence and therefore bears little responsibility for the first phase of the war. In Croatia, recognition ‐ together with the deployment of UN peacekeepers ‐ may even have had a mitigating effect. Only in Bosnia is there any correlation between recognition and an intensification of hostilities but it is doubtful whether non‐recognition would have prevented the eruption of violence since Bosnian Serb aspirations for an ethnically homogeneous state entity could not be realised without resort to war. The real relevance of recognition lies with the opportunities for more effective international action which it created. It was the failure to seize these opportunities, rather than the strategic effects of recognition, which better explains the tragic events that ensued.     

Book reviews

John Lawrence Tone, The Fatal Knot: The Guerrilla War in Navarre and the Defeat of Napoleon in Spain. Chapel Hill and London; The University of North Carolina Press 1994. Pp.vii + 239, 1 map, biblio., index. $34.95 (cloth). ISBN 0–8078–2169–1.

Robert Holland (ed), Emergencies and Disorder in the European Empires after 1945. London: Frank Cass, 1994. Pp.x + 256; index. £32 (cloth); £15 (paper). ISBN 0–7146–4516–8 and 4109 X

Deborah L. Norden, Military Rebellion in Argentina: Between Coups and Consolidation. Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 1996. Pp.242, index, $35/$17.50 (paper). ISBN 0–8032–8369–5.

William M. Minter, Apartheid's Contras: An Inquiry into the Roots of War in Angola and Mozambique. London and Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Zed Books Ltd; Johannesburg: Witwatersrand University Press, 1994. Pp. xii +308, 3 maps, biblio., index. $69.95/£39.95 (cloth); $29.95/£16.95(paper). ISBN 1–85649–266–4 and 266–4.     

Demand forecasting by temporal aggregation

Demand forecasting performance is subject to the uncertainty underlying the time series an organization is dealing with. There are many approaches that may be used to reduce uncertainty and thus to improve forecasting performance. One intuitively appealing such approach is to aggregate demand in lower‐frequency “time buckets.” The approach under concern is termed to as temporal aggregation, and in this article, we investigate its impact on forecasting performance. We assume that the nonaggregated demand follows either a moving average process of order one or a first‐order autoregressive process and a single exponential smoothing (SES) procedure is used to forecast demand. These demand processes are often encountered in practice and SES is one of the standard estimators used in industry. Theoretical mean‐squared error expressions are derived for the aggregated and nonaggregated demand to contrast the relevant forecasting performances. The theoretical analysis is supported by an extensive numerical investigation and experimentation with an empirical dataset. The results indicate that performance improvements achieved through the aggregation approach are a function of the aggregation level, the smoothing constant, and the process parameters. Valuable insights are offered to practitioners and the article closes with an agenda for further research in this area. © 2013 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 60: 479–498, 2013     

Feeding Bread to the Luddites: The Radical Fundamentalist Islamic Revolution in Guerrilla Warfare

This study examines the war that the United States has waged since September 2001 as a global counterinsurgency. Placing the war against al-Qaeda and its allied groups and organizations in the context of a global insurgency also presents implications for doctrine, interagency coordination and military cultural change. The first part of the article offers a distilled analysis of al-Qaeda and its associated networks. The second section examines the US military in the context of the Western way of war, with the attendant military-cultural impediments to adapting to an enemy who embraces a very different approach to war. The third section aims to define and describe the nature of the war that America and its coalition partners are trying to wage. The concluding section offers the most value as it refines and distills the work of several international security and military thinkers to arrive at some imperatives for successfully prosecuting this type of war to its end.     

A Clash of Wills: Hizballah's Psychological Campaign Against Israel in South Lebanon

This article analyzes Hizballah's war against Israel in south Lebanon as a psychological contest where public opinion, perception, and persuasion were the real determinants of victory. Hizballah successfully mobilized popular support for its war by communicating nationalist and religious themes to different sectarian groups in Lebanon. At the same time, it used classic guerrilla warfare as a carefully calibrated psychological tool to erode the morale of Israeli forces, their Lebanese allies, and the Israeli public's support for the war. Hizballah's sophisticated media capability, particularly combat video footage aired on its satellite TV station and the Internet, played a critical role in amplifying the effects of its attrition campaign. By orchestrating information-age media and guerrilla tactics, this strategy has important implications for the future of irregular warfare.     

An American Trojan horse? Eisenhower,Latin America,and the development of us internal security policy 1954–1960

Perceptions of Third World nations as susceptible to communist subversion and revolutionary warfare led the Eisenhower administration to formulate a coordinated internal security strategy known simply as ‘1290d’. Later renamed the Overseas Internal Security Program (OISP), this policy initiative sought to strengthen host‐nation security forces, judicial systems, and public information media in an effort to combat indirect communist intervention strategies. Implementing OISP policy in Latin America proved difficult. In Congress, the administration was criticised for colluding with dictatorial regimes, while Latin Americans feared that the new program would be used as a ‘Trojan Horse’ to penetrate their security structures. After the Cuban Revolution, however, OISP policies developed under Eisenhower came to dominate US‐Latin American security relations for the remainder of the Cold War.