全文获取类型
收费全文 | 658篇 |
免费 | 10篇 |
专业分类
668篇 |
出版年
2021年 | 6篇 |
2019年 | 15篇 |
2018年 | 10篇 |
2017年 | 16篇 |
2016年 | 12篇 |
2015年 | 12篇 |
2013年 | 124篇 |
2011年 | 6篇 |
2010年 | 6篇 |
2009年 | 7篇 |
2008年 | 7篇 |
2007年 | 8篇 |
2006年 | 8篇 |
2005年 | 11篇 |
2004年 | 12篇 |
2003年 | 7篇 |
2002年 | 8篇 |
2001年 | 6篇 |
2000年 | 11篇 |
1999年 | 9篇 |
1998年 | 8篇 |
1997年 | 13篇 |
1996年 | 15篇 |
1995年 | 10篇 |
1994年 | 15篇 |
1993年 | 10篇 |
1992年 | 12篇 |
1991年 | 20篇 |
1990年 | 13篇 |
1989年 | 14篇 |
1988年 | 9篇 |
1987年 | 17篇 |
1986年 | 13篇 |
1985年 | 16篇 |
1984年 | 11篇 |
1983年 | 9篇 |
1982年 | 9篇 |
1981年 | 11篇 |
1980年 | 13篇 |
1979年 | 7篇 |
1978年 | 9篇 |
1977年 | 8篇 |
1976年 | 11篇 |
1975年 | 8篇 |
1974年 | 13篇 |
1973年 | 11篇 |
1972年 | 10篇 |
1971年 | 13篇 |
1969年 | 9篇 |
1968年 | 6篇 |
排序方式: 共有668条查询结果,搜索用时 0 毫秒
31.
The bounded interval generalized assignment model is a “many-for-one” assignment model. Each task must be assigned to exactly one agent; however, each agent can be assigned multiple tasks as long as the agent resource consumed by performing the assigned tasks falls within a specified interval. The bounded interval generalized assignment model is formulated, and an algorithm for its solution is developed. Algorithms for the bounded interval versions of the semiassignment model and sources-to-uses transportation model are also discussed. 相似文献
32.
33.
Todas information and communication network requires a design that is secure to tampering. Traditional performance measures of reliability and throughput must be supplemented with measures of security. Recognition of an adversary who can inflict damage leads toward a game‐theoretic model. Through such a formulation, guidelines for network designs and improvements are derived. We opt for a design that is most robust to withstand both natural degradation and adversarial attacks. Extensive computational experience with such a model suggests that a Nash‐equilibrium design exists that can withstand the worst possible damage. Most important, the equilibrium is value‐free in that it is stable irrespective of the unit costs associated with reliability vs. capacity improvement and how one wishes to trade between throughput and reliability. This finding helps to pinpoint the most critical components in network design. From a policy standpoint, the model also allows the monetary value of information‐security to be imputed. © 2009 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2009 相似文献
34.
Chen and Bhattacharyya [Exact confidence bounds for an exponential parameter under hybrid censoring, Commun Statist Theory Methods 17 (1988), 1857–1870] considered a hybrid censoring scheme and obtained the exact distribution of the maximum likelihood estimator of the mean of an exponential distribution along with an exact lower confidence bound. Childs et al. [Exact likelihood inference based on Type‐I and Type‐II hybrid censored samples from the exponential distribution, Ann Inst Statist Math 55 (2003), 319–330] recently derived an alternative simpler expression for the distribution of the MLE. These authors also proposed a new hybrid censoring scheme and derived similar results for the exponential model. In this paper, we propose two generalized hybrid censoring schemes which have some advantages over the hybrid censoring schemes already discussed in the literature. We then derive the exact distribution of the maximum likelihood estimator as well as exact confidence intervals for the mean of the exponential distribution under these generalized hybrid censoring schemes. © 2004 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2004 相似文献
35.
36.
37.
We examine two key stochastic processes of interest for warranty modeling: (1) remaining total warranty coverage time exposure and (2) warranty load (total items under warranty at time t). Integral equations suitable for numerical computation are developed to yield probability law for these warranty measures. These two warranty measures permit warranty managers to better understand time‐dependent warranty behavior, and thus better manage warranty cash reserves. © 2005 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2005. 相似文献
38.
Allocation of scarce common components to finished product orders is central to the performance of assembly systems. Analysis of these systems is complex, however, when the product master schedule is subject to uncertainty. In this paper, we analyze the cost—service performance of a component inventory system with correlated finished product demands, where component allocation is based on a fair shares method. Such issuing policies are used commonly in practice. We quantify the impact of component stocking policies on finished product delays due to component shortages and on product order completion rates. These results are used to determine optimal base stock levels for components, subject to constraints on finished product service (order completion rates). Our methodology can help managers of assembly systems to (1) understand the impact of their inventory management decisions on customer service, (2) achieve cost reductions by optimizing their inventory investments, and (3) evaluate supplier performance and negotiate contracts by quantifying the effect of delivery lead times on costs and customer service. © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 48:409–429, 2001 相似文献
39.
40.
A. Garnaev 《海军后勤学研究》2007,54(1):109-114
This paper deals with a two searchers game and it investigates the problem of how the possibility of finding a hidden object simultaneously by players influences their behavior. Namely, we consider the following two‐sided allocation non‐zero‐sum game on an integer interval [1,n]. Two teams (Player 1 and 2) want to find an immobile object (say, a treasure) hidden at one of n points. Each point i ∈ [1,n] is characterized by a detection parameter λi (μi) for Player 1 (Player 2) such that pi(1 ? exp(?λixi)) (pi(1 ? exp(?μiyi))) is the probability that Player 1 (Player 2) discovers the hidden object with amount of search effort xi (yi) applied at point i where pi ∈ (0,1) is the probability that the object is hidden at point i. Player 1 (Player 2) undertakes the search by allocating the total amount of effort X(Y). The payoff for Player 1 (Player 2) is 1 if he detects the object but his opponent does not. If both players detect the object they can share it proportionally and even can pay some share to an umpire who takes care that the players do not cheat each other, namely Player 1 gets q1 and Player 2 gets q2 where q1 + q2 ≤ 1. The Nash equilibrium of this game is found and numerical examples are given. © 2006 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2007 相似文献