首页 | 本学科首页   官方微博 | 高级检索  
文章检索
  按 检索   检索词:      
出版年份:   被引次数:   他引次数: 提示:输入*表示无穷大
  收费全文   658篇
  免费   10篇
  668篇
  2021年   6篇
  2019年   15篇
  2018年   10篇
  2017年   16篇
  2016年   12篇
  2015年   12篇
  2013年   124篇
  2011年   6篇
  2010年   6篇
  2009年   7篇
  2008年   7篇
  2007年   8篇
  2006年   8篇
  2005年   11篇
  2004年   12篇
  2003年   7篇
  2002年   8篇
  2001年   6篇
  2000年   11篇
  1999年   9篇
  1998年   8篇
  1997年   13篇
  1996年   15篇
  1995年   10篇
  1994年   15篇
  1993年   10篇
  1992年   12篇
  1991年   20篇
  1990年   13篇
  1989年   14篇
  1988年   9篇
  1987年   17篇
  1986年   13篇
  1985年   16篇
  1984年   11篇
  1983年   9篇
  1982年   9篇
  1981年   11篇
  1980年   13篇
  1979年   7篇
  1978年   9篇
  1977年   8篇
  1976年   11篇
  1975年   8篇
  1974年   13篇
  1973年   11篇
  1972年   10篇
  1971年   13篇
  1969年   9篇
  1968年   6篇
排序方式: 共有668条查询结果,搜索用时 0 毫秒
31.
The bounded interval generalized assignment model is a “many-for-one” assignment model. Each task must be assigned to exactly one agent; however, each agent can be assigned multiple tasks as long as the agent resource consumed by performing the assigned tasks falls within a specified interval. The bounded interval generalized assignment model is formulated, and an algorithm for its solution is developed. Algorithms for the bounded interval versions of the semiassignment model and sources-to-uses transportation model are also discussed.  相似文献   
32.
33.
Todas information and communication network requires a design that is secure to tampering. Traditional performance measures of reliability and throughput must be supplemented with measures of security. Recognition of an adversary who can inflict damage leads toward a game‐theoretic model. Through such a formulation, guidelines for network designs and improvements are derived. We opt for a design that is most robust to withstand both natural degradation and adversarial attacks. Extensive computational experience with such a model suggests that a Nash‐equilibrium design exists that can withstand the worst possible damage. Most important, the equilibrium is value‐free in that it is stable irrespective of the unit costs associated with reliability vs. capacity improvement and how one wishes to trade between throughput and reliability. This finding helps to pinpoint the most critical components in network design. From a policy standpoint, the model also allows the monetary value of information‐security to be imputed. © 2009 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2009  相似文献   
34.
Chen and Bhattacharyya [Exact confidence bounds for an exponential parameter under hybrid censoring, Commun Statist Theory Methods 17 (1988), 1857–1870] considered a hybrid censoring scheme and obtained the exact distribution of the maximum likelihood estimator of the mean of an exponential distribution along with an exact lower confidence bound. Childs et al. [Exact likelihood inference based on Type‐I and Type‐II hybrid censored samples from the exponential distribution, Ann Inst Statist Math 55 (2003), 319–330] recently derived an alternative simpler expression for the distribution of the MLE. These authors also proposed a new hybrid censoring scheme and derived similar results for the exponential model. In this paper, we propose two generalized hybrid censoring schemes which have some advantages over the hybrid censoring schemes already discussed in the literature. We then derive the exact distribution of the maximum likelihood estimator as well as exact confidence intervals for the mean of the exponential distribution under these generalized hybrid censoring schemes. © 2004 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2004  相似文献   
35.
36.
37.
We examine two key stochastic processes of interest for warranty modeling: (1) remaining total warranty coverage time exposure and (2) warranty load (total items under warranty at time t). Integral equations suitable for numerical computation are developed to yield probability law for these warranty measures. These two warranty measures permit warranty managers to better understand time‐dependent warranty behavior, and thus better manage warranty cash reserves. © 2005 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2005.  相似文献   
38.
Allocation of scarce common components to finished product orders is central to the performance of assembly systems. Analysis of these systems is complex, however, when the product master schedule is subject to uncertainty. In this paper, we analyze the cost—service performance of a component inventory system with correlated finished product demands, where component allocation is based on a fair shares method. Such issuing policies are used commonly in practice. We quantify the impact of component stocking policies on finished product delays due to component shortages and on product order completion rates. These results are used to determine optimal base stock levels for components, subject to constraints on finished product service (order completion rates). Our methodology can help managers of assembly systems to (1) understand the impact of their inventory management decisions on customer service, (2) achieve cost reductions by optimizing their inventory investments, and (3) evaluate supplier performance and negotiate contracts by quantifying the effect of delivery lead times on costs and customer service. © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 48:409–429, 2001  相似文献   
39.
40.
This paper deals with a two searchers game and it investigates the problem of how the possibility of finding a hidden object simultaneously by players influences their behavior. Namely, we consider the following two‐sided allocation non‐zero‐sum game on an integer interval [1,n]. Two teams (Player 1 and 2) want to find an immobile object (say, a treasure) hidden at one of n points. Each point i ∈ [1,n] is characterized by a detection parameter λi (μi) for Player 1 (Player 2) such that pi(1 ? exp(?λixi)) (pi(1 ? exp(?μiyi))) is the probability that Player 1 (Player 2) discovers the hidden object with amount of search effort xi (yi) applied at point i where pi ∈ (0,1) is the probability that the object is hidden at point i. Player 1 (Player 2) undertakes the search by allocating the total amount of effort X(Y). The payoff for Player 1 (Player 2) is 1 if he detects the object but his opponent does not. If both players detect the object they can share it proportionally and even can pay some share to an umpire who takes care that the players do not cheat each other, namely Player 1 gets q1 and Player 2 gets q2 where q1 + q2 ≤ 1. The Nash equilibrium of this game is found and numerical examples are given. © 2006 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2007  相似文献   
设为首页 | 免责声明 | 关于勤云 | 加入收藏

Copyright©北京勤云科技发展有限公司  京ICP备09084417号