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131.
132.
Robert J. Bunker 《Small Wars & Insurgencies》2013,24(1):114-121
During the Nigerian Civil War (1967–1970), France chose to support Biafra, but only on a limited scale, providing mercenaries and obsolete weaponry to Ojukwu's regime. General Charles de Gaulle's assistance to Ojukwu was conditioned by the French military drawdown after 1961, the increased power of French secret services on the continent, and the interventions in Katanga (1960–1963), Gabon (1964) and Chad (1968–1972). France supported Biafra primarily to protect its former colonies from Nigeria, stop Soviet subversion and acquire an economic foothold in the oil-rich Niger Delta. De Gaulle chose a limited strategy for two reasons. If Biafra won the war, France would be Biafra's greatest ally. If Nigeria won the war, France could extricate itself from the situation relatively easily and re-establish relations with the Nigerian government, which is what ultimately occurred. 相似文献
133.
Demand forecasting performance is subject to the uncertainty underlying the time series an organization is dealing with. There are many approaches that may be used to reduce uncertainty and thus to improve forecasting performance. One intuitively appealing such approach is to aggregate demand in lower‐frequency “time buckets.” The approach under concern is termed to as temporal aggregation, and in this article, we investigate its impact on forecasting performance. We assume that the nonaggregated demand follows either a moving average process of order one or a first‐order autoregressive process and a single exponential smoothing (SES) procedure is used to forecast demand. These demand processes are often encountered in practice and SES is one of the standard estimators used in industry. Theoretical mean‐squared error expressions are derived for the aggregated and nonaggregated demand to contrast the relevant forecasting performances. The theoretical analysis is supported by an extensive numerical investigation and experimentation with an empirical dataset. The results indicate that performance improvements achieved through the aggregation approach are a function of the aggregation level, the smoothing constant, and the process parameters. Valuable insights are offered to practitioners and the article closes with an agenda for further research in this area. © 2013 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 60: 479–498, 2013 相似文献
134.
Robert M. Cassidy 《Small Wars & Insurgencies》2013,24(3):334-359
This study examines the war that the United States has waged since September 2001 as a global counterinsurgency. Placing the war against al-Qaeda and its allied groups and organizations in the context of a global insurgency also presents implications for doctrine, interagency coordination and military cultural change. The first part of the article offers a distilled analysis of al-Qaeda and its associated networks. The second section examines the US military in the context of the Western way of war, with the attendant military-cultural impediments to adapting to an enemy who embraces a very different approach to war. The third section aims to define and describe the nature of the war that America and its coalition partners are trying to wage. The concluding section offers the most value as it refines and distills the work of several international security and military thinkers to arrive at some imperatives for successfully prosecuting this type of war to its end. 相似文献
135.
Frederic M. Wehrey 《Small Wars & Insurgencies》2013,24(3):53-74
This article analyzes Hizballah's war against Israel in south Lebanon as a psychological contest where public opinion, perception, and persuasion were the real determinants of victory. Hizballah successfully mobilized popular support for its war by communicating nationalist and religious themes to different sectarian groups in Lebanon. At the same time, it used classic guerrilla warfare as a carefully calibrated psychological tool to erode the morale of Israeli forces, their Lebanese allies, and the Israeli public's support for the war. Hizballah's sophisticated media capability, particularly combat video footage aired on its satellite TV station and the Internet, played a critical role in amplifying the effects of its attrition campaign. By orchestrating information-age media and guerrilla tactics, this strategy has important implications for the future of irregular warfare. 相似文献
136.
Robert Tomes 《Small Wars & Insurgencies》2013,24(1):37-56
This article examines the concept of ‘shock and awe’ in US military thought. It argues that the term derives from two main sources in defense thinking: rapidity in operations and overwhelming military superiority and is reflected in the concept of ‘full spectrum dominance’. However, the concept is not well attuned to fighting net-based counter insurgency war in a terrain such as Iraq which depends upon both intelligence gathering and adaptive military organizations. The article concludes that US military thinking should be more attuned to the effects of military force especially on political processes and the capacity of insurgents to mobilize popular support. 相似文献
137.
138.
Dennis M. Rempe 《Small Wars & Insurgencies》2013,24(1):34-64
Perceptions of Third World nations as susceptible to communist subversion and revolutionary warfare led the Eisenhower administration to formulate a coordinated internal security strategy known simply as ‘1290d’. Later renamed the Overseas Internal Security Program (OISP), this policy initiative sought to strengthen host‐nation security forces, judicial systems, and public information media in an effort to combat indirect communist intervention strategies. Implementing OISP policy in Latin America proved difficult. In Congress, the administration was criticised for colluding with dictatorial regimes, while Latin Americans feared that the new program would be used as a ‘Trojan Horse’ to penetrate their security structures. After the Cuban Revolution, however, OISP policies developed under Eisenhower came to dominate US‐Latin American security relations for the remainder of the Cold War. 相似文献
139.
Robert H. Dorff 《Small Wars & Insurgencies》2013,24(3):62-81
Given the challenges posed by failed and failing states, and the likelihood that such failure will continue well into the new millennium, the need for a strategic approach appears evident. Should we respond? If so, how and with what expectations? Answers to such questions require an underlying set of strategic guidelines. This article contributes to developing that strategy by examining common manifestations of state failure and some possible response objectives. It concludes by arguing that careful and tough analysis must guide our choices about where and when to respond, and how ambitiously we set our objectives. 相似文献
140.
Yasmine M. Abdelfattah Aamer S. Abu-Qarn Shadwa Zaher 《Defence and Peace Economics》2014,25(3):231-245
Egypt plays a pivotal role in the security of the Middle East as the doorway to Europe and its military expenditure reflects its involvement in the machinations of such an unstable region, showing considerable variation over the last 40?years. These characteristics make it a particularly interesting case study of the determinants of military spending. This paper specifies and estimates an econometric model of the Egyptian demand for military spending, taking into account important strategic and political factors. Both economic and strategic factors are found to play a role in determining military burden/spending, with clear positive effects of lagged military burden, suggesting some sort of institutional inertia, plus negative output and net exports effects. The strategic effect as a result of the impact of Israel’s military burden is mostly positive and significant, though its impact is reduced when the impact of important strategic events are taken into account. The military spending of Egypt’s allies Jordan and Syria generally seems to have had no effect on Egypt’s spending. These results are consistent over a range of econometric techniques. 相似文献