Some properties of optimal control policies for entry to an M/M/1 queue

Customers served by an M/M/1 queueing system each receive a reward R but pay a holding cost of C per unit time (including service time) spent in the system. The decision of whether or not a customer joins the queue can be made on an individual basis or a social basis. The effect of increasing the arrival rate on the optimal policy parameters is examined. Some limiting results are also derived.     

Multilateral Counter-Insurgency Networks

Postmodern terrorism presents a significant challenge to global security and law enforcement institutions. Non-state actors operating across international borders, engaged in an apparent global insurgency of extremism that transects the traditional boundaries of crime and war, pose significant challenges to both intelligence and law enforcement agencies. These networked global insurgents blend political and religious fanaticism with criminal enterprises to challenge the rule of law and pose an epochal shift in the structures and relations among states. Negotiating this epochal shift requires traditional organs of national security (the diplomatic, military and intelligence services) to forge new partnerships with police and public safety organizations at the state and local (sub-national), as well as transnational levels. Significant operational, policy and cultural challenges must be overcome to forge an effective multi-lateral global network to counter global terrorism and insurgency.     

Technical note: Traffic intensity estimation

This note examines estimation of the traffic intensity in an M/G/1 queue. We show that the ratio of sample mean service times to the sample mean interarrival times has undesirable sampling properties. To remedy this, two alternative estimators are introduced. © 2009 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 2009     

Explaining US and British performance in complex expeditionary operations: The civil-military dimension

A nation's structure and culture of civil-military relations are important and largely overlooked factors in explaining the performance of armed forces involved in complex expeditionary operations. The US model of ‘Huntingtonian’, divided civil-military structures and poor interagency cooperation, makes the US military less suited for complex expeditionary operations. British civil-military relations involve a Defence Ministry that conscientiously integrates military and civilian personnel, as well as extensive interagency cooperation and coordination. This ‘Janowitzean’, integrated form of civil-military relations makes the British military more likely to provide for the planning and implementation of comprehensive campaigns that employ and coordinate all instruments of power available to the state, as well as troops in the field displaying the flexibility and cultural and political understanding that are necessary in complex expeditionary operations.     

Beyond Fire and Movement: Command,Control and Information in the German Blitzkrieg 1

It is common to attribute the operational difficulties faced by post-Napoleonic armies to an increase in defensive firepower. In fact, the immense ‘mass armies’ of the day also suffered from problems of command, control and information that ultimately worked to their undoing. The German achievement in the interwar period went beyond tanks and aircraft. It also involved harnessing the radio to the service of the field army. Radio made it possible to coordinate mobile masses of men and equipment and to process the huge amounts of information they generated. The smooth flow of information was key to the Wehrmacht's revival of decisive battlefield victory in 1939–40.     

Unconventional warfare philosophers

The philosophies of unconventional warfare philosophers can be divided into four schools. The classicists, or early school, represented by Sun Tzu and his ‘indirect approach’, have existed for thousands of years. Marxist‐Leninist revolutionaries gave new emphasis to unconventional warfare as a vehicle for revolution. The theories of these philosophers of the middle school were opposed by those of counterrevolutionaries. With the end of the Cold War, a new strategic environment is emerging, giving rise to new school philosophers reacting to that challenge. They include both those who seek to undermine the nation‐state and those, who, like the earlier counter‐revolutionaries, seek to defend and promote its interests.