Country survey XVII: New zealand's defence policy

New Zealand's current defence strategy, first expressed in NZ Government (1991), is one of "self-reliance in partnership". We outline the country's defence policy in historical context, examine its current defence expenditure and capabilities, and document the genesis of recent major changes in security policy. We pay particular attention to the role of explicit economic analysis and advice in the formation of these policy changes.     

The Keynesian IS-MR Model and Military Spending

The issue of guns or butter is one of the most fundamental economic questions, yet there is no consensus on a theoretical framework for examining it. Over the last decade, a version of a simple Keynesian macroeconomic model has been applied a number of times to examining the link between defence spending and economic growth in a range of countries. There are reasons for doubting the soundness of this model as a basis for empirical work.     

Political influence on civil war mortality rates: The electoral college as a battlefield

This paper employs public choice analysis to explain certain kinds of military decision‐making during the Civil War. Specifically, the political costs and benefits which may have influenced policy with respect to casualty rates in the Union army are considered. A primary empirical finding is that electoral votes per capita are a strong explainer of casualties across Union states, all else equal.     

Insurance type item provisioning guidelines

Policy decisions for insurance type items, where zero or one unit is maintained at the depot, are more difficult and more critical than decisions for common supply items. This report presents results of developing initial provisioning guidelines for insurance type items. The guidelines are based on examination of lifetime costs and benefits. Costs of stocking an item as compared with not stocking are developed through a sinking fund annual payment formulation. Benefits of stocking are developed as stationary reduction in time weighted backorders experienced. A resource allocation formulation yields an optimal policy for allocating a fixed budget. The guideline is presented with refinements based on a sample of items. A figure of merit is calculated for each item, and if it is large the item is stocked while if small it is not stocked. Empirical definitions for large and small are developed based on sample data. Estimation techniques are discussed for deriving all of an item's parameters needed to compute its figure of merit. A Bayes procedure is suggested based on family group Experienced Demand Replacement Factors. This and other techniques are discussed.     

Systems defense games: Colonel blotto,command and control

The classical “Colonel Blotto” games of force allocation are generalized to include situations in which there are complementarities among the targets being defended. The complementarities are represented by means of a system “characteristic function,” and a valuation technique from the theory of cooperative games is seen to indicate the optimal allocations of defense and attack forces. Cost trade-offs between systems defense and alternative measures, such as the hardening of targets, are discussed, and a simple example is analyzed in order to indicate the potential of this approach.     

An approach to the allocation of common costs of multi-mission systems

Many Naval systems, as well as other military and civilian systems, generate multiple missions. An outstanding problem in cost analysis is how to allocate the costs of such missions so that their true costs can be determined and resource allocation optimized. This paper presents a simple approach to handling this problem for single systems. The approach is based on the theory of peak-load pricing as developed by Marcel Boiteux. The basic principle is that the long-run marginal cost of a mission must be equal to its “price.” The implication of this is that if missions can cover their own marginal costs, they should also be allocated some of the marginal common costs. The proportion of costs to be allocated is shown to a function of not only the mission-specific marginal costs and the common marginal costs, but also of the “mission price.” Thus, it is shown that measures of effectiveness must be developed for rational cost allocation. The measurement of effectiveness has long been an intractable problem, however. Therefore, several possible means of getting around this problem are presented in the development of the concept of relative mission prices.