全文获取类型
收费全文 | 331篇 |
免费 | 4篇 |
出版年
2023年 | 2篇 |
2021年 | 2篇 |
2019年 | 7篇 |
2018年 | 11篇 |
2017年 | 9篇 |
2016年 | 7篇 |
2015年 | 5篇 |
2014年 | 6篇 |
2013年 | 94篇 |
2011年 | 2篇 |
2009年 | 4篇 |
2008年 | 6篇 |
2007年 | 4篇 |
2006年 | 4篇 |
2005年 | 5篇 |
2004年 | 7篇 |
2003年 | 5篇 |
2002年 | 7篇 |
2001年 | 3篇 |
2000年 | 2篇 |
1999年 | 3篇 |
1998年 | 5篇 |
1997年 | 5篇 |
1996年 | 4篇 |
1995年 | 9篇 |
1994年 | 7篇 |
1993年 | 6篇 |
1992年 | 7篇 |
1991年 | 7篇 |
1990年 | 5篇 |
1989年 | 5篇 |
1988年 | 5篇 |
1987年 | 9篇 |
1986年 | 5篇 |
1985年 | 7篇 |
1984年 | 3篇 |
1983年 | 3篇 |
1982年 | 5篇 |
1981年 | 3篇 |
1980年 | 4篇 |
1977年 | 2篇 |
1976年 | 3篇 |
1975年 | 2篇 |
1974年 | 6篇 |
1973年 | 5篇 |
1972年 | 3篇 |
1970年 | 2篇 |
1969年 | 4篇 |
1967年 | 2篇 |
1966年 | 1篇 |
排序方式: 共有335条查询结果,搜索用时 31 毫秒
171.
172.
This article examines the Dhofar campaign in Oman (1965–75), and the role Britain played in assisting the Omani royal government against left-wing insurgents. Using existing secondary sources and declassified British government papers, it reassesses the contribution of British military advisers and special forces to the counter-insurgency (COIN) campaign, the balance between military action and civil affairs, the external dimension of the conflict, and intelligence and covert operations. It concludes by assessing whether the Dhofar War offers any guidance to Western armed forces involved in contemporary COIN campaigns such as those in Afghanistan and Iraq. 相似文献
173.
Thomas C. Bruneau 《战略研究杂志》2013,36(5):638-665
Private security companies (PSCs) currently receive a great deal of attention in the news media, in sensationalist reporting, and increasingly in scholarly books and articles. While the scholarly books and articles make significant contributions to our understanding of this global phenomenon, there are several impediments to analysis that must be recognized and overcome if analysis is to be improved. Three of these impediments are reviewed in this article. The author suggests that US government material is currently available to minimize impediments and offers a framework to make analytical sense of it. Since contracting out is based on contracts, and unless the complexities of awarding and managing contracts are understood, recommendations made to reform the process of contracting out security are unrealistic. 相似文献
174.
Thomas A. Marks 《Small Wars & Insurgencies》2013,24(3):21-45
Evaluating Insurgent/Counterinsurgent Performance ‘starts on the streets’, so to speak. Specifically, the five rules of assessment are common sense: (1) become familiar with the area in question; (2) slice up the analytical target into manageable slices; (3) carry out longitudinal studies; (4) look at the role played by ideas in this political warfare; and (5) assess the relationship between structural and purposive elements. Though various efforts have been made to quantify outcome, these have not been particularly successful and encourage emphasis upon process at the expense of analysis. The most common flaw in assessments is to view insurgency in static perspective. Societal causes are a necessary but not sufficient factor in upheaval. Once the insurgency becomes a going concern, organizational dynamics become important. Similar factors obtain on the counter‐insurgent side. In the end, both compete for domination of human terrain. 相似文献
175.
Major Robert Feldman 《Small Wars & Insurgencies》2013,24(3):356-366
Attempts to disrupt the flow of funds through Africa used to finance terrorism have been hindered by terrorists utilizing satellite telecommunications in conjunction with hawala, an ancient system of fund transfers based on trust. This arrangement leaves few records for tracing transactions, a task made even more difficult by the general paucity of investigators trained in the languages commonly used for hawala. Acquiring personnel with the appropriate linguistic skills is one of the steps agencies can take to reduce the terrorist financing that occurs through this unique blend of an ancient system with modern technology. 相似文献
176.
177.
Thomas H. Johnson 《Small Wars & Insurgencies》2013,24(5-6):1006-1039
ABSTRACTThis article systematically assesses the 2014 Afghanistan Presidential Election, the first transfer of power from President Hamid Karzai to an elected successor, using provincial voting data as well as explicit data from polling centers. The analysis finds unusual voting results in the April election, where no candidate received 50%+1 votes required by the Afghan constitution, versus the voting results realized for the June ‘runoff election.’ As in other Afghan voting analyses, this article finds voting based on ethno-linguistic preferences, and interestingly found Dr. Ashraf Ghani receiving almost all the swing votes in the runoff election even though the other leading candidate from the April election all endorsed Dr. Abdullah Abdullah. More importantly, however, the research presented here clearly finds extremely strange voting patterns. For example, the polling data center analysis finds 606 polling places where Ghani received all 600 votes and Abdullah received none and another 900 polling centers that gave virtually all its votes to Ghani. These results in combination with other analyses raise the very real possibility that the election results were illegitimate. The article concludes with a discussion of the implications of the research to future Afghan elections and their processes as well as to the long-standing conflict in the country. 相似文献
178.
Robert L. Feldman 《Small Wars & Insurgencies》2013,24(2):295-306
Though parts of Somalia appear mired in intractable conflict, both domestic and foreign trade continues. As a result amidst the conflict, corruption, and chaos Somalia's business community is a small force for peace and stability. Thus, efforts directed at enhancing the business community, possibly via the Transitional Federal Government or its successor, could play a small role in improving the situation in this strategically poised country with a very entrepreneurial population. However, such success is far from certain, and numerous other factors besides a strengthened business community would have to occur for Somalia even to begin the journey on the long road to recovery. 相似文献
179.
Thomas Rid 《战略研究杂志》2013,36(5):727-758
Abstract In counterinsurgency, the population is the center of gravity. This insight has become a key doctrinal tenet of modern armed conflict. But where does it come from? The razzia, a tactic introduced by the French in North Africa around 1840, first thrust tribal populations into the focus of modern operational thinking. Soon the pioneering bureaux arabes added an administrative, civil, and political element. Eventually, in the 1890s, French operations in Madagascar gave rise to a mature counterinsurgency doctrine. David Galula, a French writer who heavily influenced the American Counterinsurgency manual, is merely the joint that connects the nineteenth century to the twenty-first. 相似文献
180.
Thomas Robb 《战略研究杂志》2013,36(6):797-817
It is the purpose of this article to illustrate how the British government reached its decision to upgrade the Polaris strategic nuclear deterrent in 1973. Using British and American documentation it is demonstrated that the strategic imperatives for upgrading Polaris were fundamental to the project. Existing accounts of the Polaris Improvement Project, however, have not given the appropriate attention to the wider US–UK political differences in this period. By doing so it is shown how in addition to the wider economic, strategic and political factors, this was of paramount significance in the Heath government opting for the ‘Super Antelope’ method in upgrading Polaris.1 相似文献