Field test and probabilistic analysis of irregular steel debris casualty risks from a person-borne improvised explosive device

Person-borne improvised explosive devices (PBIEDs) are often used in terrorist attacks in Western countries. This study aims to predict the trajectories of PBIED fragments and the subsequent safety risks for people exposed to this hazard. An explosive field test with a typical PBIED composed of a plastic explosive charge and steel nut enhancements was performed to record initial fragment behaviour, including positions, velocity, and trajectory angles. These data were used to predict the full trajectory of PBIED fragments using a probabilistic analysis. In the probabilistic analyses a probability of fatality or serious injury was computed. Based on the results presented, many practical conclusions can be drawn, for instance, regarding safe evacuation distances if a person were exposed to a suspected PBIED.     

Optimization and mediated bartering models for ground delay programs

The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and the airline community within the United States have adopted a new paradigm for air traffic flow management, called Collaborative Decision Making (CDM). A principal goal of CDM is shared decision‐making responsibility between the FAA and airlines, so as to increase airline control over decisions that involve economic tradeoffs. So far, CDM has primarily led to enhancements in the implementation of Ground Delay Programs, by changing procedures for allocating slots to airlines and exchanging slots between airlines. In this paper, we discuss how these procedures may be formalized through appropriately defined optimization models. In addition, we describe how inter‐airline slot exchanges may be viewed as a bartering process, in which each “round” of bartering requires the solution of an optimization problem. We compare the resulting optimization problem with the current procedure for exchanging slots and discuss possibilities for increased decision‐making capabilities by the airlines. © 2005 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2006     

Plunder or Trade?

Plunder and trade are theoretically and historically entwined in complex ways. This paper examines when rational players will choose one or both by employing a model of plunder within an evolutionary game theoretic framework. Evolutionary stable strategy equilibria are derived and the replicator dynamics are examined for simple two-by-two symmetric games. Not only are positive defense allocations necessary for trade, implying that all trade is of a contested nature, but the defense technology must also exhibit sufficient effectiveness relative to the plunder technology. A continuum of possible exchanges is proposed that is based on the effectiveness of enforcing property claims. For high levels of transactions costs, plunder dominates. As transactions costs decline, mutual trade emerges as one possible exchange mechanism. All market exchange entails some cost of enforcement; it is contested. Insufficient enforcement of property claims produces mutual plunder as the dominant exchange mechanism. Some implications are suggested for institutional evolution. C7 K4 N4     

Book reviews

Jurgen Brauer's comment presents what he calls a replication of an earlier study by Higgs and Kilduff (1993) and uses it to criticize the adequacy of the Higgs‐Kilduff model. In several respects, however, Brauer has not actually performed a replication: he uses different data, a different sample period, and arrives at different results. His criticisms rest on his own setup, not that of Higgs and Kilduff. Therefore they have no strict applicability to the latter. Moreover, Brauer's stepwise model has no bearing on the Higgs‐Kilduff model, as it violates that model's specification requirements.     

The economic effects of international trade in armaments in the major western industrialized and developing countries†

We have used the Michigan Model of World Production and Trade to assess the impact of exports and imports of armaments (based on 1980 data) on sectoral trade and employment and other economic variables in the major Western trading countries. If the United States were to place a unilateral embargo on its arms exports and imports, we calculate that it would experience a comparatively small amount of employment displacement in the aggregate and that most of this displacement would occur in the transport equipment and electric machinery sectors. If all the major Western countries were to place a multilateral embargo on their arms trade, the sectoral effects on the United States would be similarly small. But the sectoral effects in several other industrialized and developing countries measured as a percentage of sectoral employment, would be larger, indicating potential short‐run adjustment problems in labor markets in some cases.     

Force deployment and the production of security: Why is the united states in NATO?

Standard economic concepts of production and cost minimization subject to a production constraint are used to derive the conditions of optimal deployment of home and forward military forces for the production of home security. United States' participation in the NATO alliance is then analyzed in the context of a two‐ally (U.S. and Western Europe) optimal force deployment model of NATO. Next, U.S. force‐basing policy is adduced as an enforcement mechanism for the “transatlantic contract.” Lastly, statistical evidence on burden sharing within Western Europe, and the effectiveness of the U.S. contract enforcement policy, is presented.