On the manipulation of transfer prices in a static environment

In a static environment, J. Hirschleifer's marginal cost solution to the transfer pricing problem is commonly accepted as analytically correct. However, actual pricing practice within Western corporations and socialist-planned economies generally deviates from marginal cost pricing. Some form of average cost pricing is more commonly chosen. Recently in this journal, H. Enzer has claimed to show that some form of average cost pricing is indeed the analytically correct solution to the transfer pricing problem when choice of technique and manipulation are allowed. Enzer claims that optimal decisions made by each of two divisions according to their individual self-interests are made compatible with overall firm optimization when the transfer price assigned to the internally-transferred commodity is any form of average cost. We show that the marginal cost solution is correct for Enzer's problem in the absence of manipulation by either division. Indeed, this was all that Hirschleifer claimed. In the process, we uncover a fundamental mathematical error in Enzer's argument. When manipulation of the transfer price by divisions is allowed, we demonstrate the faults with Enzer's average cost solution and conclude Hirschleifer's original statements on manipulation to be correct even in Enzer's environment. A final section briefly indicates the importance to the transfer pricing problem of a growing body of economic literature on incentive structures.     

Product moments of order statistics from the doubly truncated exponential distribution

Recurrence relations for the product moments of order statistics from a doubly truncated exponential distribution are obtained. These relations allow us to evaluate the product moments for all sample sizes.     

A procedure for generating time-dependent arrivals for queueing simulations

This paper presents a method for modeling cyclic inputs to a congested system in a discrete event digital simulation. Specifically, we express the mean of the interarrival time conditional on the last arrival as a linear combination of harmonic components whose coefficients can be determined by stepwise regression. We also assume that the conditional interarrival time normalized by its corresponding mean follows a distribution that is independent of time. The result can, in turn, be used to generate the desired input for a simulation, An example based on a set of actual data is used to illustrate the process of parameter estimation for the model.     

Information in two-stage programming under uncertainty

The random variables in two-stage programming under uncertainty are generally treated in a passive manner in that no information regarding the random variables or the process generating the random variables may be obtained. This paper develops the economics of information for the case in which the probability distributions are discrete. A multinomial process is assumed to generate the random variables, and the parameter vector of that process is assumed to be unknown. A Dirichlet prior distribution on the parameter vector is used, and the computation of the value of information thus involves a Dirichlet-multinomial distribution on the random variables. An example involving producing to meet uncertain demands is presented.     

Toward a study of bidding processes part IV - games with unknown costs

This paper represents a continuation of three previous papers [1-.3] in the study of competitive bidding processes. It treats the case where a bidder's knowledge of his competitor's cost i s given by a probability distribution over a certain interval. The results obtained extend the work of Vickrey [4] to the case where the cost intervals a r e not necessarily symmetric.     

Use of dimensionless ratios to determine minimum-cost inventory quantities

The iteration usually necessary for simultaneous determination of minimum-cost order quantity and reorder point in (Q, r) inventory systems may be eliminated by a graphical technique employing dimensionless ratios. This technique is illustrated for three different types of stock-out penalty.     

Book reviews

Export or Die: Britain's Defence Trade with Iran and Iraq. by Davina Miller, London: Cassell, 1996, ISBN 0-304-33852-4 (hbk), £40.00, 04-33853-2 (pbk), £11.99.

The Storm Passed By: Ireland and the Battle of the Atlantic, 1940-1941. by Trevor Allen, Dublin: Irish Academic Press, 1996, ISBN 0-7165-2616-6, (hbk) £17.50.

Arms Control Toward the 21st Century. by Jeffrey A. Larsen and Greqory J. Rattray (eds). Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1996.

Asia-Pacific Security, Less Uncertainty, New Opportunities. Edited by Gary Klintworth. Melbourne: Addison Wesley Longman, 1996, ISBN 0-582-80321-7, £24.99.

Masters of War, Military Dissent and Politics in the Vietnam Era. by Robert Buzzanco, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996, ISBN 0-521-48046-9 (hbk), £29.95

Controlling the Arms Trade: the West Versus the Rest. By Paul Cornish, London: Bowerdean Publishing Co., 1996, ISBN 0-906097-44-4 (pbk), £9.99.

Secret Agencies: US Intelligence in a Hostile World. by Loch K. Johnson, London: Yale University Press, 1997, ISBN 0-300-06611-2 (hbk), £22.50.     

Landmarks in Defense Literature

Men at War by Ernest Hemingway (Ed), New York: Crown Publishers, (1942).     

Economic impact and the notion of compensated procurement

The paper consists essentially of two parts. In the first part a linear economic impact model is presented whose structure is based on subcontracting flows. The structural coefficients are defined in terms of flows per area. The model is derived from two identities that are analogous to the income and expenditure identities of national income accounting. The parameters are prime contracts and when one or several of the prime contracts are changed, the model determines the impacts of such changes on the various regions that have been selected. The impacts can be combined with regional multipliers to derive changes in regional income and regional employment. Fragmentary data for this kind of model have been collected on a one-time basis by DOD in 1965 and some results based on the data are presented. The second part of the paper is concerned with normative economics. A scheme is suggested, called compensated procurement, that outlines how the Department of Defense might employ the impact model in a macroeconomic setting. The basic idea is that a stabilization fund be established to finance an array of potential projects which are contracted for to balance sudden shifts in defense demand. Only short-run stabilization is advocated.