Threshold incentives over multiple periods and the sales hockey stick phenomenon

In this article, we study threshold‐based sales‐force incentives and their impact on a dealer's optimal effort. A phenomenon, observed in practice, is that the dealer exerts a large effort toward the end of the incentive period to boost sales and reach the threshold to make additional profits. In the literature, the resulting last‐period sales spike is sometimes called the hockey stick phenomenon (HSP). In this article, we show that the manufacturer's choice of the incentive parameters and the underlying demand uncertainty affect the dealer's optimal effort choice. This results in the sales HSP over multiple time periods even when there is a cost associated with waiting. We then show that, by linking the threshold to a correlated market signal, the HSP can be regulated. We also characterize the variance of the total sales across all the periods and demonstrate conditions under the sales variance can be reduced. © 2010 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2010     

Strategic dynamic sourcing from competing suppliers with transferable capacity investment

We study the supplier relationship choice for a buyer that invests in transferable capacity operated by a supplier. With a long‐term relationship, the buyer commits to source from a supplier over a long period of time. With a short‐term relationship, the buyer leaves open the option of switching to a new supplier in the future. The buyer has incomplete information about a supplies efficiency, and thus uses auctions to select suppliers and determine the contracts. In addition, the buyer faces uncertain demand for the product. A long‐term relationship may be beneficial for the buyer because it motivates more aggressive bidding at the beginning, resulting a lower initial price. A short‐term relationship may be advantageous because it allows switching, with capacity transfer at some cost, to a more efficient supplier in the future. We find that there exists a critical level of the switching cost above which a long‐term relationship is better for the buyer than a short‐term relationship. In addition, this critical switching cost decreases with demand uncertainty, implying a long‐term relationship is more favorable for a buyer facing volatile demand. Finally, we find that in a long‐term relationship, capacity can be either higher or lower than in a short‐term relationship. © 2009 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 2009     

A multi-item EOQ model with inventory cycle balancing

This article concerns a multi-item, infinite-horizon, lot-sizing problem, where the objective is to minimize a total cost function made up of reordering cost, holding cost, and a cost determined by peak inventory levels. By spreading inventory replenishments over the reordering cycle, the peak inventory level can be reduced. The model permits the derivation of simultaneously optimal solutions for the length of the cycle and the individual item replenishment times within the cycle. An alternative formulation, in which total storage capacity is modeled as a constraint, is also solved.     

Client‐contractor bargaining on net present value in project scheduling with limited resources

The client‐contractor bargaining problem addressed here is in the context of a multi‐mode resource constrained project scheduling problem with discounted cash flows, which is formulated as a progress payments model. In this model, the contractor receives payments from the client at predetermined regular time intervals. The last payment is paid at the first predetermined payment point right after project completion. The second payment model considered in this paper is the one with payments at activity completions. The project is represented on an Activity‐on‐Node (AON) project network. Activity durations are assumed to be deterministic. The project duration is bounded from above by a deadline imposed by the client, which constitutes a hard constraint. The bargaining objective is to maximize the bargaining objective function comprised of the objectives of both the client and the contractor. The bargaining objective function is expected to reflect the two‐party nature of the problem environment and seeks a compromise between the client and the contractor. The bargaining power concept is introduced into the problem by the bargaining power weights used in the bargaining objective function. Simulated annealing algorithm and genetic algorithm approaches are proposed as solution procedures. The proposed solution methods are tested with respect to solution quality and solution times. Sensitivity analyses are conducted among different parameters used in the model, namely the profit margin, the discount rate, and the bargaining power weights. © 2009 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2009     

A lagrangean relaxation algorithm for the constrained matrix problem

We present variants of a convergent Lagrangean relaxation algorithm for minimizing a strictly convex separable quadratic function over a transportation polytope. The algorithm alternately solves two “subproblems,” each of which has an objective function that is defined by using Lagrange multipliers derived from the other. Motivated by the natural separation of the subproblems into independent and very easily solved “subsubproblems,” the algorithm can be interpreted as the cyclic coordinate ascent method applied to the dual problem. We exhibit our computational results for different implementations of the algorithm applied to a set of large constrained matrix problems.     

复杂形状薄壁零件加工的综合质量控制

首先分析了加工时零件表面热量场和加工参数、余量场之间的关系;利用数字扫描及滤波的方法建立起复杂形面零件的数学模型;以此为基础,在加工过程中,对零件的几何质量和表面层质量进行了综合控制。研究表明,该方法是提高飞行器发动机中高负载复杂形状薄壁零件可靠性和寿命的有效新途径。     

The traveling salesman problem: An update of research

During the course of the last few years, attacks on the traveling salesman problem have resulted in a variety of often innovative and rather powerful computational procedures. In this article, we present a review of these results for problems defined on weighted and unweighted graphs. Some account of computational behavior for exact algorithms is provided; however, the primary coverage deals with the strategy of particular procedures. In addition, we include some aspects of nonexact algorithms with major interest confined to the establishment of worst-case bounds.