Complexity and workload considerations in product mix decisions under the theory of constraints

The literature on the product mix decision (or master production scheduling) under the Theory of Constraints (TOC), which was developed in the past two decades, has addressed this problem as a static operational decision. Consequently, the developed solution techniques do not consider the system's dynamism and the associated challenges arising from the complexity of operations during the implementation of master production schedules. This paper aims to address this gap by developing a new heuristic approach for master production scheduling under the TOC philosophy that considers the main operational factors that influence actual throughput after implementation of the detailed schedule. We examine the validity of the proposed heuristic by comparison to Integer Linear Programming and two heuristics in a wide range of scenarios using simulation modelling. Statistical analyses indicate that the new algorithm leads to significantly enhanced performance during implementation for problems with setup times. The findings show that the bottleneck identification approach in current methods in the TOC literature is not effective and accurate for complex operations in real‐world job shop systems. This study contributes to the literature on master production scheduling and product mix decisions by enhancing the likelihood of achieving anticipated throughput during the implementation of the detailed schedule. © 2015 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 62: 357–369, 2015     

Spies,advisors, and grunts: Film portrayals of counterinsurgency in Vietnam

Vietnam was a complex conflict, which historians and political scientists have struggled to understand. Some of the bitterest disputes in the historiography revolve around the US approach to counterinsurgency in Vietnam. Many different facets of the war have received the attention of filmmakers, and an examination of their work suggests new ways of thinking about the conflict. This article considers film portrayals of three phases of the Vietnam War – firstly, the early period of ‘political action’, then the advisory period, and finally the Americanization of the war after 1965. It suggests that by examining the experiences of participants in each of these phases, Vietnam War cinema helps to illustrate the problems that faced various American approaches to counterinsurgency in the conflict. Combined with the importance of films in determining popular perceptions of both historical conflicts and counterinsurgency in general, it suggests that they are worthy subjects of study and critique.     

Inventory financing under Risk-Adjusted-Return-On-Capital criterion

Risk-Adjusted-Return-On-Capital (RAROC) is a loan-pricing criterion under which a bank sets the loan term such that a certain rate of return is achieved on the regulatory capital required by the Basel regulation. Some banks calculate the amount of regulatory capital for each loan under the standardized approach (“standardized banks,” the regulatory capital is proportional to the loan amount), and others under the internal rating-based (IRB) approach (“IRB banks,” the regulatory capital is related to the Value-at-Risk of the loan). This article examines the impact of the RAROC criterion on the bank's loan-pricing decision and the retailer's inventory decision. We find that among the loan terms that satisfy the bank's RAROC criterion, the one that benefits the retailer the most requires the bank to specify an inventory advance rate in addition to the interest rate. Under this loan term, the retailer's inventory level is more sensitive to his asset level when facing an IRB bank compared to a standardized bank. An IRB (standardized) loan leads to higher profit and inventory level for retailers with high (low) asset. For retailers with medium asset, an IRB loan results in a higher retailer profit but a lower consumer welfare. Calibrated numerical study reveals that the benefit of choosing standardized banks (relative to IRB banks) can be as high as 30% for industries with severe capital constraints, volatile demands, and low profit margins, highlighting the importance for retailers to carefully choose the type of banks to borrow from. When the interest rate is capped by regulation, retailers borrowing from a standardized bank are more likely to be influenced by the interest rate cap than those borrowing from an IRB bank. Under strong empire-building incentives (the bank will offer loan terms to maximize the size of the loan), retailers with medium initial asset level shift their preference from IRB banks to standardized banks.     

Signature based analysis of m‐Consecutive‐k‐out‐of‐n: F systems with exchangeable components

In this article, we study reliability properties of m‐consecutive‐k‐out‐of‐n: F systems with exchangeable components. We deduce exact formulae and recurrence relations for the signature of the system. Closed form expressions for the survival function and the lifetime distribution as a mixture of the distribution of order statistics are established as well. These representations facilitate the computation of several reliability characteristics of the system for a given exchangeable joint distribution or survival function. Finally, we provide signature‐based stochastic ordering results for the system's lifetime and investigate the IFR preservation property under the formulation of m‐consecutive‐k‐out‐of‐n: F systems. © 2011 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2011     

Book Reviews

The purpose of this article is to analyse British strategic nuclear targeting between 1974 and 1979, prior to the successful completion of the sophisticated modification to Polaris submarine-missile system codenamed Chevaline. It will use as its starting point the parameters for UK strategic nuclear targeting, and the foundation of the ‘Moscow Criterion’, prior to the deployment of Britain's Polaris submarines which began in 1968. It will then discuss the recommendation by the Chiefs of Staff to retarget Polaris in 1975/76 and the implications of that recommendation in terms of the British approach to strategic nuclear deterrence. The article will conclude with an assessment of these retargeting decisions on the decision to replace Polaris with the US Trident system in 1980.     

Hoping for the Best,preparing for the worst: China's response to US hegemony

In the post-Cold War strategic environment, Beijing could plausibly have opted for Soviet-style geostrategic competition with Washington, but it has not. Chinese leaders have not thus far, and almost certainly will never, amass thousands of nuclear weapons on hair-trigger alert or deploy significant forces to a network of bases spanning the globe. Nevertheless, the below assessment of China's increasing hard and soft power yields the conclusion that a Chinese challenge to US hegemony cannot be ruled out. The United States must prudently maintain military forces appropriate to facing a potential peer competitor. At the same time, however, Washington must engage in a process of creative diplomacy that simultaneously matches China's soft power and engages seriously with Beijing to create areas of consensus and cooperation.     

‘Calmly critical’: Evolving Russian views of US hegemony

Russia has consistently opposed US hegemony since the early 1990s. Moscow has sought to create a world overseen by the UN Security Council and several power centres supporting an anti-hegemonic axis. Until recently, Russia's resources have been very limited. Russian opposition therefore was largely conceptual or a work in progress. Russian policy was largely reactive – and non-confrontational. However, the failure of the Russia-US relationship to develop practically has highlighted negative views of US hegemony, and the greater wealth generated through high energy prices is supporting an increasingly active Russian policy.     

Moral Advantage,Strategic Advantage?

This article argues that Man is a moral being and strategy inherently is a human project. It follows that strategy has to have a moral dimension. All human beings have a moral compass, acquired by social–cultural necessity. The compass has survival value. The problem is that the human race does not possess only one such compass. Since will is key to strategic performance, and because that will requires as fuel a sufficient confidence in the justice of a cause, in principle at least one belligerent's moral armament may be usefully superior to another's. One can claim with confidence that strategic advantage can be secured by some moral advantage.