On equivalence between the proportionate flow shop and single‐machine scheduling problems

We derive sufficient conditions which, when satisfied, guarantee that an optimal solution for a single‐machine scheduling problem is also optimal for the corresponding proportionate flow shop scheduling problem. We then utilize these sufficient conditions to show the solvability in polynomial time of numerous proportionate flow shop scheduling problems with fixed job processing times, position‐dependent job processing times, controllable job processing times, and also problems with job rejection. © 2015 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 62: 595–603, 2015     

Nicholas John Spykman,the Balance of Power,and International Order

Nicholas John Spykman was probably America’s finest geopolitical theorist of the twentieth century, even though he was an active participant over the course only of five years (1938–43). He is rightly viewed as a worthy intellectual successor to Sir Halford Mackinder in Britain. Spykman originated the (Eurasian) Rimland concept, which is of continuing political and strategic utility today. He was controversial and notably outspoken while his writings make it quite clear that his concern with the acquisition of power was contextualised by serious concerns for world order.     

Scheduling research and the first decade of NRLQ: A historical perspective

It is generally recognized that the first model involving job scheduling was presented by Selmer Johnson and published in the inaugural issue of Naval Research Logistics Quarterly (NRLQ) in 1954. NRLQ also published another seminal scheduling paper by Wayne E. Smith a short time later. In the present paper, we discuss the contribution of NRLQ and the role of the Office of Naval Research in the development of the scheduling literature during the first decade (1954–1963). We also provide a critical analysis of the papers by Johnson and Smith. © 2015 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 62: 335–344, 2015     

Framing Protest and Insurgency: Boko Haram and MASSOB in Nigeria

Why do some protest movements erupt into rebellion, whereas others protest peacefully under similar circumstances? Addressing this question, this paper investigates the cases of Boko Haram (rebellion) and MASSOB (non-violent protest) in contemporary Nigeria. Conventional explanations of rebellion focusing on opportunity, inequality, and repression cannot explain why these movements have pursued different protest strategies. This paper tries to explain this puzzle by investigating the signifying work and meaning construction of both movements drawing on the framing approach from social movement studies. The framing analysis shows that the different protest behavior largely results from the differing cultural context of both movements, from the agency of the framers, and from successful frame alignment, which results in frame resonance and, thereby, the successful mobilization for collective action.     

China's Nuclear Forces and Their Significance to India

The Indian nuclear program is a response to a perceived politico-strategic threat from China as opposed to a military-operational one that New Delhi began after perceiving an “ultimatum” from China in 1965. Consequently, India is in the process of acquiring an assured second-strike capability vis-à-vis China to meet the requirements of general deterrence. While India has always been concerned about the Sino-Pakistani nuclear/missile nexus, China has become wary of the growing military ties between the United States and India in recent years, especially because of the military implications of the US-India civil nuclear deal. Given the growing conventional military gap between the two states, India is not lowering its nuclear threshold to meet the Chinese conventional challenge. Instead, India is upgrading its conventional military strategy from dissuasion to deterrence against China. While the overall Sino-Indian nuclear relationship is stable, it will be challenged as China acquires advanced conventional weapons that blur the distinction between conventional and nuclear conflict.     

“Disarmament Market” Effects of Information Disclosures

In yet another wave of discussion on nuclear disarmament among political scientists and practitioners, one of the topical issues concerns the problem of transparency, its mechanisms, costs, and benefits. Numerous—though often abstract—calls for greater transparency of nuclear arsenals and postures when promoting the idea of nuclear disarmament, however, do not give a clear rationale for states possessing nuclear weapons to pursue greater transparency. Meanwhile, many other research fields—such as economics and psychology—attempt to address problems related to the lack of exact information on the counterpart's activities and intentions. Economics offers one probable analog for the transparency problem: the issue of information asymmetry and its consequences. This article is an attempt to apply the classical model of a market with information asymmetry to the analysis of the transparency problem within the nuclear disarmament process. Such an approach could help pave the way for closer cooperation between economic and political scientists in the nuclear disarmament field.     

Whither the Iraqi Insurgency: Prospects for Counterinsurgent Success

The 2003 conflict between Iraq and the US-led Coalition resulted in liberation for the country, enabling its citizens to experience freedom they have not had for decades. While the US-led operation was successful, insurgent movements have hindered the reconstruction efforts and the rebuilding of the government in Iraq. The tactics used by these insurgent groups are not that of 'traditional' warfare, therefore the US and Coalition forces adapted their tactics to respond to this new threat. It is argued that with the application of the Manwaring Paradigm (also known as the SWORD Model), the US and Coalition forces successfully responded to the insurgent movements during the period leading up to the Iraqi elections in January 2005.     

Modeling multiple stage manufacturing systems with generalized costs and capacity issues

This study introduces one modeling methodology that describes a broad range of multiple stage production planning issues, including multiple limited resources with setup times and joint fixed cost relationships. An existing production system is modeled in this fashion, creating a new set of 1350 highly generalized benchmark problems. A computational study is conducted with the 1350 benchmark problems introduced in this paper and 2100 benchmark problems, with more restrictive assumptions, from the existing literature. The relative merits of a decomposition‐based algorithm and a neighborhood search technique known as NIPPA, or the Non‐sequential Incremental Part Period Algorithm, are assessed. NIPPA is generally the more successful of the two techniques, although there are specific instances in which the decomposition‐based algorithm displayed a distinct advantage. © 2005 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2005     

A robust policy for serial agile production systems

One of the major problems in modeling production systems is how to treat the job arrival process. Restrictive assumptions such as Markovian arrivals do not represent real world systems, especially if the arrival process is generated by job departures from upstream workstations. Under these circumstances, cost‐effective policies that are robust with respect to the nature of the arrival process become of interest. In this paper, we focus on minimizing the expected total holding and setup costs in a two‐stage produce‐to‐order production system operated by a cross‐trained worker. We will show that if setup times are insignificant in comparison with processing times, then near‐optimal policies can be generated with very robust performances with respect to the arrival process. We also present conditions under which these near‐optimal policies can be obtained by using only the arrival and service rates. © 2004 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2005.