Optimizing submarine berthing with a persistence incentive

Submarine berthing plans reserve mooring locations for inbound U.S. Navy nuclear submarines prior to their port entrance. Once in port, submarines may be shifted to different berthing locations to allow them to better receive services they require or to make way for other shifted vessels. However, submarine berth shifting is expensive, labor intensive, and potentially hazardous. This article presents an optimization model for submarine berth planning and demonstrates it with Naval Submarine Base, San Diego. After a berthing plan has been approved and published, changed requests for services, delays, and early arrival of inbound submarines are routine events, requiring frequent revisions. To encourage trust in the planning process, the effect on the solution of revisions in the input is kept small by incorporating a persistence incentive in the optimization model. © 1997 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 44: 301–318, 1997.     

Demand shuffle—A method for multilevel proportional lot sizing and scheduling

This contribution acquaints the reader with a model for multilevel single-machine proportional lot sizing and scheduling problems (PLSPs) that appear in the scope of short-term production planning. It is one of the first articles that deals with dynamic capacitated multilevel lot sizing and scheduling, which is of great practical importance. The PLSP model refines well-known mixed-integer programming formulations for dynamic capacitated lot sizing and scheduling as, for instance, the DLSP or the CSLP. A special emphasis is given on a new method called demand shuffle to solve multilevel PLSP instances efficiently but suboptimally. Although the basic idea is very simple, it becomes clear that in the presence of precedence and capacity constraints many nontrivial details are to be concerned. Computational studies show that the presented approach decidedly improves recent results. © 1997 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 44: 319–340, 1997     

Average-case analysis of the bin-packing problem with general cost structures

We consider a version of the famous bin-packing problem where the cost of a bin is a concave function of the number of items in the bin. We analyze the problem from an average-case point of view and develop techniques to determine the asymptotic optimal solution value for a variety of functions. We also describe heuristic techniques that are asymptotically optimal. © 1997 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 44: 673–686, 1997     

On the set of (perfect) equilibria of a bimatrix game

This article provides a new approach to the set of (perfect) equilibria. With the help of an equivalence relation on the strategy space of each player. Nash sets and Selten sets are introduced. The number of these sets is finite and each of these sets is a polytope. As a consequence the set of (perfect) equilibria is a finite union of polytopes. © 1994 John Wiley & Sons. Inc.     

On the timing of adoption of multiproduct technologies

This article examines a game of multiproduct technology adoption. We consider a duopoly model in which firms choose when to switch from a traditional single-product technology to a more flexible and more expensive multiproduct technology. The multiproduct technology allows a firm to invade the other firm's market, creating a more competitive environment and reducing profits. We analyze this investment decision as a game of timing using two different equilibrium concepts. First, we utilize the “silent” equilibrium concept, where firms commit at time zero to a switching time. This concept would be applicable to situations where firms cannot observe each other's actions, or when the implementation of the technology requires long lead times and the investment decision is private information. Using this notion we find that both firms adopt the multiproduct technology simultaneously within a certain time interval. We then characterize this time interval in terms of cost and demand conditions. We also derive conditions under which sequential adoption of the multiproduct technology occurs. The second concept used is that of noisy equilibrium, where firms cannot precommit themselves to an adoption time. This concept is appropriate when investment decisions are common knowledge. In this case a firm can credibly threaten to immediately follow suit if the other firm decides to adopt. This threat is sufficient to ensure the collusive outcome where neither firm adopts the flexible technology. © 1994 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.     

A penalty for concave minimization derived from the tuy cutting plane

A wide variety of optimization problems have been approached with branch-and-bound methodology, most notably integer programming and continuous nonconvex programming. Penalty calculations provide a means to reduce the number of subproblems solved during the branch-and-bound search. We develop a new penalty based on the Tuy cutting plane for the nonconvex problem of globally minimizing a concave function over linear constraints and continuous variables. Computational testing with a branch-and-bound algorithm for concave minimization indicates that, for the problems solved, the penalty reduces solution time by a factor ranging from 1.2 to 7.2. © 1994 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.