Force-annihilation conditions for variable-coefficient lanchester-type equations of modern warfare

This paper develops a mathematical theory for predicting force annihilation from initial conditions without explicitly computing force-level trajectories for deterministic Lanchester-type “square-law” áttrition equations for combat between two homogeneous forces with temporal variations in fire effectivenesses (as expressed by the Lanchester attrition-rate coefficients). It introduces a canonical auxiliary parity-condition problem for the determination of a single parity-condition parameter (“the enemy force equivalent of a friendly force of unit strength”) and new exponential-like general Lanchester functions. Prediction of force annihilation within a fixed finite time would involve the use of tabulations of the quotient of two Lanchester functions. These force-annihilation results provide further information on the mathematical properties of hyperbolic-like general Lanchester functions: in particular, the parity-condition parameter is related to the range of the quotient of two such hyperbolic-like general Lanchester functions. Different parity-condition parameter results and different new exponential-like general Lanchester functions arise from different mathematical forms for the attrition-rate coefficients. This theory is applied to general power attrition-rate coefficients: exact force-annihilation results are obtained when the so-called offset parameter is equal to zero; while upper and lower bounds for the parity-condition parameter are obtained when the offset parameter is positive.     

Optimizing submarine berthing with a persistence incentive

Submarine berthing plans reserve mooring locations for inbound U.S. Navy nuclear submarines prior to their port entrance. Once in port, submarines may be shifted to different berthing locations to allow them to better receive services they require or to make way for other shifted vessels. However, submarine berth shifting is expensive, labor intensive, and potentially hazardous. This article presents an optimization model for submarine berth planning and demonstrates it with Naval Submarine Base, San Diego. After a berthing plan has been approved and published, changed requests for services, delays, and early arrival of inbound submarines are routine events, requiring frequent revisions. To encourage trust in the planning process, the effect on the solution of revisions in the input is kept small by incorporating a persistence incentive in the optimization model. © 1997 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 44: 301–318, 1997.     

Compromise allocation in multivariate stratified sampling: An integer solution

The problem of determining the sample sizes in various strata when several characteristics are under study is formulated as a nonlinear multistage decision problem. Dynamic programming is used to obtain an integer solution to the problem. © 1997 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.     

Incorporating learning curve costs in acquisition strategy optimization

Each year, the U.S. Army procures billions of dollars worth of weapons and equipment. The process of deciding what to buy, when to buy, and in what quantities is extremely complex, requiring extensive analysis. Two techniques used in this analysis are mathematical programming and cost estimation. Although they are related through constraints on available procurement funds, the use of nonlinear cost learning curves, which better represent system costs as a function of quantity produced, have not been incorporated into the mathematical programming formulations that compute the quantities of items to be procured. As a result, the solutions obtained could be either suboptimal, or even infeasible with respect to budgetary limitations. In this paper we present a piecewise linear approximation of the learning curve costs for a more accurate portrayal of budgetary constraints used in a mixed integer linear programming for acquisition strategy optimization. In addition, implementation issues are discussed, and performance results are given. © 1999 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 46: 255–271, 1999     

The individual station technique for the analysis of cyclic polling systems

Polling systems are used to model a wide variety of real-world applications, for example, telecommunication and material handling systems. Consequently, there is continued interest in developing efficient algorithms to analyze the performance of polling systems. Recent interest in the optimization of these systems has brought up the need for developing very efficient techniques for analyzing their waiting times. This article presents the Individual Station technique for cyclic polling systems. The technique possesses the following features: (a) it allows the user to compute the mean waiting time at a selected station independent of the mean waiting time computations at other stations, and (b) its complexity is low and independent of the system utilization. In addition the technique provides explicit closed-form expressions for (i) the mean waiting times in a system with 3 stations, and (ii) the second moment of the waiting times in a system with 2 stations, for an exhaustive service system. © 1996 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.     

Multilinear extensions and quotients of simple games

Studied here is the problem of evaluating the formation of coalitions in cooperative games by considering its internal and external effects. Our analysis is based upon a formal theory of the quotient game and the use of multilinear extensions to compute the Shapley value and the coalitional value. When it applies to simple games, a series of interesting results is obtained. © 1996 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.     

How long until midnight? Intelligence-policy relations and the United States response to the Israeli nuclear program, 1959–1985

Why did the United States fail to stop Israeli acquisition of nuclear weapons? Existing research argues that patrons such as the U.S. should have an easy time halting proliferation by militarily and economically vulnerable clients. Nevertheless, Israel acquired nuclear weapons with relatively little American opposition. Utilizing extensive primary source research, we argue that problematic intelligence-policy relations hindered U.S. efforts to arrest Israeli proliferation as (1) policymakers often gave mixed guidance to the intelligence community, resulting in (2) limited information on Israeli efforts that reinforced policy ambiguity. The results carry implications for understanding the dynamics of nuclear proliferation and intelligence-policy relations.     

Constant risk aversion in stochastic contests with exponential completion times

This article analyzes a class of stochastic contests among multiple players under risk‐averse exponential utility. In these contests, players compete over the completion of a task by simultaneously deciding on their investment, which determines how fast they complete the task. The completion time of the task for each player is assumed to be an exponentially distributed random variable with rate linear in the player's investment and the completion times of different players are assumed to be stochastically independent. The player that completes the task first earns a prize whereas the remaining players earn nothing. The article establishes a one‐to‐one correspondence between the Nash equilibrium of this contest with respect to risk‐averse exponential utilities and the nonnegative solution of a nonlinear equation. Using the properties of the latter, it proves the existence and the uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium, and provides an efficient method to compute it. It exploits the resulting representation of the equilibrium investments to determine the effects of risk aversion and the differences between the outcome of the Nash equilibrium and that of a centralized version.© 2016 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 66:4–14, 2019     

Aggregating courier deliveries

We consider the problem of efficiently scheduling deliveries by an uncapacitated courier from a central location under online arrivals. We consider both adversary‐controlled and Poisson arrival processes. In the adversarial setting we provide a randomized (3βΔ/2δ ? 1) ‐competitive algorithm, where β is the approximation ratio of the traveling salesman problem, δ is the minimum distance between the central location and any customer, and Δ is the length of the optimal traveling salesman tour overall customer locations and the central location. We provide instances showing that this analysis is tight. We also prove a 1 + 0.271Δ/δ lower‐bound on the competitive ratio of any algorithm in this setting. In the Poisson setting, we relax our assumption of deterministic travel times by assuming that travel times are distributed with a mean equal to the excursion length. We prove that optimal policies in this setting follow a threshold structure and describe this structure. For the half‐line metric space we bound the performance of the randomized algorithm in the Poisson setting, and show through numerical experiments that the performance of the algorithm is often much better than this bound.     

Tripwires and free-riders: Do forward-deployed U.S. troops reduce the willingness of host-country citizens to fight for their country?

This article investigates the relationship between U.S. overseas troops and the willingness of the citizens of host states to fight for their country. The study joins the long-running debate about burden-sharing and free-riding among U.S. allies. Unlike most previous empirical studies, we focus on non-material or intangible measures of the underlying concepts. Our dependent variable estimates the proportion of citizens expressing a willingness to fight for their country. Scores at the aggregate-national as well as the individual level are shaped by the presence of U.S. military forces, which act as a “tripwire” signaling credible security commitments. This increases opportunities of (non-material) free-riding. We present both bivariate and multivariate analyses covering the period 1981–2014 to test this supposition. Findings indicate that once U.S. troop levels reach a certain threshold (between 100 and 500 troops), citizens’ willingness to fight drops significantly. This likely reflects non-material free-riding.