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401.
Recent supply‐chain models that study competition among capacity‐constrained producers omit the possibility of producers strategically setting wholesale prices to create uncertainty with regards to (i.e., to obfuscate) their production capacities. To shed some light on this possibility, we study strategic obfuscation in a supply‐chain model comprised of two competing producers and a retailer, where one of the producers faces a privately‐known capacity constraint. We show that capacity obfuscation can strictly increase the obfuscating producer's profit, therefore, presenting a clear incentive for such practices. Moreover, we identify conditions under which both producers' profits increase. In effect, obfuscation enables producers to tacitly collude and charge higher wholesale prices by moderating competition between producers. The retailer, in contrast, suffers a loss in profit, raises retail prices, while overall channel profits decrease. We show that the extent of capacity obfuscation is limited by its cost and by a strategic retailer's incentive to facilitate a deterrence. © 2014 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 61: 244–267, 2014  相似文献   
402.
Piracy in international waters is on the rise again, in particular off the coast of Somalia. While the dynamic game between pirates, ship-owners, insurance firms and the military seems to have reached some kind of equilibrium, piracy risks generating significant negative externalities to third parties (e.g. in terms of environmental hazards and terrorism), justifying attempts to contain it. We argue that these attempts may benefit from a look back – through the analytical lens of rational choice theory – to the most successful counterpiracy campaign ever undertaken, namely, the one led by the Roman general Gnaeus Pompeius Magnus (Pompey the Great) in 67 BC.  相似文献   
403.
We study a supply chain in which a manufacturer relies on a salesperson to sell the products to the consumers. The sales outcome is determined by a random market condition and the salesperson's service level, both of which are privately observed by the salesperson. Apart from them, there are two types of resellers: a knowledgeable reseller observes the market condition, whereas a diligent reseller can monitor the service level. While delegating to a reseller enhances information acquisition, it may also result in double marginalization and inefficiency. We identify several operating regimes in which double marginalization can be eliminated via simple contracts and establish the benefit of monitoring the salesperson over monitoring the market. Our dominance result is not prone to our model characteristics regarding the complementarity of market condition and sales effort, the relative importance of adverse selection and moral hazard, and the contract form. We then generalize our model and re‐establish the dominance result in the presence of reseller's risk aversion or private monitoring expertise. We also quantify the performance gaps among different selling schemes under various scenarios. © 2011 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2011  相似文献   
404.
We consider a class of facility location problems with a time dimension, which requires assigning every customer to a supply facility in each of a finite number of periods. Each facility must meet all assigned customer demand in every period at a minimum cost via its production and inventory decisions. We provide exact branch‐and‐price algorithms for this class of problems and several important variants. The corresponding pricing problem takes the form of an interesting class of production planning and order selection problems. This problem class requires selecting a set of orders that maximizes profit, defined as the revenue from selected orders minus production‐planning‐related costs incurred in fulfilling the selected orders. We provide polynomial‐time dynamic programming algorithms for this class of pricing problems, as well as for generalizations thereof. Computational testing indicates the advantage of our branch‐and‐price algorithm over various approaches that use commercial software packages. These tests also highlight the significant cost savings possible from integrating location with production and inventory decisions and demonstrate that the problem is rather insensitive to forecast errors associated with the demand streams. © 2011 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2011  相似文献   
405.
We consider three network disconnection problems in a centralized network where a source node provides service to the other nodes, called demand nodes. In network disconnection problems, each demand node gets a certain benefit when connected to a source node and a network attacker destroys edges to prevent demand nodes from achieving benefits. As destroying edges incurs expenses, an attacker considers the following three different strategies. The first is to maximize the sum of benefits of the disconnected nodes while keeping the total edge destruction cost no more than a given budget. The second is to minimize the total destruction cost needed to make a certain amount of benefits not accomplished. The last is to minimize the ratio of the total destruction cost to the benefits not accomplished. In this paper, we develop exact algorithms to solve the above three problems. © 2007 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2007  相似文献   
406.
We consider a dynamic lot‐sizing model with production time windows where each of n demands has earliest and latest production due dates and it must be satisfied during the given time window. For the case of nonspeculative cost structure, an O(nlogn) time procedure is developed and it is shown to run in O(n) when demands come in the order of latest production due dates. When the cost structure is somewhat general fixed plus linear that allows speculative motive, an optimal procedure with O(T4) is proposed where T is the length of a planning horizon. Finally, for the most general concave production cost structure, an optimal procedure with O(T5) is designed. © 2007 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2007  相似文献   
407.
We formulate exact expressions for the expected values of selected estimators of the variance parameter (that is, the sum of covariances at all lags) of a steady‐state simulation output process. Given in terms of the autocovariance function of the process, these expressions are derived for variance estimators based on the simulation analysis methods of nonoverlapping batch means, overlapping batch means, and standardized time series. Comparing estimator performance in a first‐order autoregressive process and the M/M/1 queue‐waiting‐time process, we find that certain standardized time series estimators outperform their competitors as the sample size becomes large. © 2007 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2007  相似文献   
408.
We study the optimal contracting problem between two firms collaborating on capacity investment with information asymmetry. Without a contract, system efficiency is lost due to the profit‐margin differentials among the firms, demand uncertainty, and information asymmetry. With information asymmetry, we demonstrate that the optimal capacity level is characterized by a newsvendor formula with an upward‐adjusted capacity investment cost, and no first‐best solution can be achieved. Our analysis shows that system efficiency can always be improved by the optimal contract and the improvement in system efficience is due to two factors. While the optimal contract may bring the system's capacity level closer to the first‐best capacity level, it prevents the higher‐margin firm from overinvesting and aligns the capacity‐investment decisions of the two firms. Our analysis of a special case demonstrates that, under some circumstances, both firms can benefit from the principal having better information about the agent's costs. © 2007 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 54:, 2007  相似文献   
409.
We consider a manufacturer (i.e., a capacitated supplier) that produces to stock and has two classes of customers. The primary customer places orders at regular intervals of time for a random quantity, while the secondary customers request a single item at random times. At a predetermined time the manufacturer receives advance demand information regarding the order size of the primary customer. If the manufacturer is not able to fill the primary customer's demand, there is a penalty. On the other hand, serving the secondary customers results in additional profit; however, the manufacturer can refuse to serve the secondary customers in order to reserve inventory for the primary customer. We characterize the manufacturer's optimal production and stock reservation policies that maximize the manufacturer's discounted profit and the average profit per unit time. We show that these policies are threshold‐type policies, and these thresholds are monotone with respect to the primary customer's order size. Using a numerical study we provide insights into how the value of information is affected by the relative demand size of the primary and secondary customers. © 2007 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2007  相似文献   
410.
Consider a set of product variants that are differentiated by some secondary attributes such as flavor, color, or size. The retailer's problem is to jointly determine the set of variants to include in her product line (“assortment”), together with their prices and inventory levels, so as to maximize her expected profit. We model the consumer choice process using a multinomial logit choice model and consider a newsvendor type inventory setting. We derive the structure of the optimal assortment for some important special cases, including the case of horizontally differentiated items, and propose a dominance relationship for the general case that simplifies the search for an optimal assortment. We also discuss structural properties of the optimal prices. Finally, motivated by our analytical results, we propose a heuristic solution procedure, which is shown to be quite effective through a numerical study. © 2007 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2007  相似文献   
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