WHO IS THE ENEMY?

We examine who benefits when there is a strong leader in place, and who benefits when a situation lacks a proper leader. There are fractious terrorist groups who seek to serve the same people in common cause against a common enemy. The groups compete for rents obtained from the public by engaging in actions against the common enemy. We determine the leadership structure under which each group is better off, as well as the circumstance that the common enemy prefers. We are able to state simple and general conditions for each group and the common enemy to benefit.     

Just How Important Are ‘Hearts and Minds’ Anyway? Counterinsurgency Goes to the Polls

Despite all the talk of ‘hearts and minds’ being the key to counterinsurgency, local public opinion is rarely studied and when it is, it often yields surprising conclusions. Through analyzing polling data from Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan, this article shows that public opinion is less malleable, more of an effect rather than a cause of tactical success, and a poor predictor of strategic victory. As a result, modern counterinsurgency doctrine’s focus on winning popular support may need to be rethought.     

Chinese Theater and Strategic Missile Force Modernization and its Implications for the United States

The People's Republic of China (PRC), no longer content with its longstanding ‘minimalist’ nuclear posture and strategy, is enhancing the striking power and survivability of its theater and strategic missile forces and rethinking its nuclear doctrine in ways that may pose serious challenges for the United States. Although the modernization of Chinese nuclear and missile forces may ultimately result in greater strategic deterrence stability, this change will not come about immediately or automatically. Indeed, it is entirely possible that China's growing missile capabilities could decrease crisis stability under certain circumstances, especially in the event of a US–China conflict over Taiwan.     

Some aspects in estimating warranty and post‐warranty repair demands

When customers buy a product, they are often eligible for free repairs for a certain warranty period. In this article, we study some important aspects, which are often overlooked in the literature but are of interest to the manufacturer, in estimating both warranty and post‐warranty repair demands. We consider that the installed base of the product (i.e., the number of units of the product actually in use) varies with time due to both new sales and units being taken out of service. When estimating warranty and post‐warranty repair demands, we explicitly address the fact that customers may not always request repairs for failed units. For the case where the product failure time distribution is exponential, we derive the closed‐form expressions for both types of repair demands of a single unit and of the time‐varying installed base. The insights into some risk‐related quantities are also presented. Furthermore, the proposed model is extended by considering delayed warranty claims that are frequently seen in practice. Numerical examples illustrate that understanding both types of repair demands and the related decision variables is important for managing the obligatory and profitable repair services. © 2013 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 60: 499–511, 2013     

Economic Competition and Nuclear Cooperation

The number of bilateral nuclear cooperation agreements surged during the “nuclear renaissance” of the past decade. This proliferation is only partially explained by the prevailing approaches that focus on strategic imperatives. To supplement these explanations, this study draws on neoliberal models of economic competition to posit that bilateral agreement negotiations also exhibit conditions of “uncoordinated interdependence” and maneuvering to gain market share. Case evidence suggests the contours of supplier state bids for civilian assistance are determined at least as much by considerations about economic competition as they are by positive strategic goals. In addition, this study identifies several cases of cooperation where there appears to be little or no strategic motive for export agreements. The study concludes that patterns of economic competition and the influence of peers in defined competitive spaces alter material payoffs and impact policies. It also identifies a surprising role for principled restraint in dampening strategic and economic competition in some dyads.     

The Demand for Military Spending in Egypt

Egypt plays a pivotal role in the security of the Middle East as the doorway to Europe and its military expenditure reflects its involvement in the machinations of such an unstable region, showing considerable variation over the last 40?years. These characteristics make it a particularly interesting case study of the determinants of military spending. This paper specifies and estimates an econometric model of the Egyptian demand for military spending, taking into account important strategic and political factors. Both economic and strategic factors are found to play a role in determining military burden/spending, with clear positive effects of lagged military burden, suggesting some sort of institutional inertia, plus negative output and net exports effects. The strategic effect as a result of the impact of Israel’s military burden is mostly positive and significant, though its impact is reduced when the impact of important strategic events are taken into account. The military spending of Egypt’s allies Jordan and Syria generally seems to have had no effect on Egypt’s spending. These results are consistent over a range of econometric techniques.     

A branch and bound algorithm for solving a class of nonlinear integer programming problems

This article presents a branch and bound method for solving the problem of minimizing a separable concave function over a convex polyhedral set where the variables are restricted to be integer valued. Computational results are reported.