Command Coordination and Tactical Effectiveness in Counter-insurgency Operations: Lessons from the South Korean Campaign

This article analyzes the causes of combat effectiveness of the South Korean security forces through the course of its various counter-insurgency (COIN) operations from 1948 to 1953. We argue that improvements in two interrelated aspects ultimately resulted in higher operational and tactical level performance: unified operational command structure and the subsequent improvements in tactical efficiency under the guidance of the US advisory mission. Through an in-depth case study on how a nascent army improved its capacity in combating homegrown insurgencies, we demonstrate how the actual conduct of operations itself remains just as significant in the assessment of overall COIN outcomes.     

The evaluation of a possible future Sino-Japanese armed conflict through the application of the ACEI-model

There is relatively little formal modeling of the economic effects of armed conflicts even though they have substantial economic effects. We set forth a new model, namely the armed conflict economic impact model – ACEI-Model. The model looks at the economic effects of war in three different stages: (i) pre-conflict stage; (ii) armed conflict stage; and (iii) post-conflict stage. The model is based on economic desgrowth (-δ) and other new conceptual indicators. We evaluate an imaginary armed conflict between China and Japan by applying the ACEI-Model.