The equivalence of general set-covering and implicit integer programming formulations for shift scheduling

In a recent article we demonstrated that implicit optimal modeling for shift scheduling (P2) has inherent size and execution time advantages over the general set-covering formulation for shift scheduling (P1) [11, 13]. We postulated that the absence of extraordinary overlap (EO) was a requirement for the equivalence of P1 and P2. We have defined EO as the condition in which the earliest and latest starts for a break in one shift are earlier and later than the earliest and latest starts for a break in any other shift(s). In this article, we prove that our earlier postulate was accurate. Additionally, we discuss research extensions and note other scheduling problems for which implicit modeling may be appropriate. © 1996 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.     

How Is a Man to Decide? Unjust Combatants,Duress and McMahan’s Killing in War

Jeff McMahan’s much-discussed work Killing in War is an important part of the revisionist school of just war studies. This paper avoids discussion of McMahan’s use of human rights and examines the practical consequences of his argument about duress on soldiers to fight an unjust war. These arguments are found to be wanting and to be impractical ones that do not fit battlefield realities. The importance of the Law of Armed Conflict and the legal equality of combatants that is part of it is emphasised and accepted as the most practical way of regulating battlefield behaviour and saving lives. It is concluded that attempts to tell soldiers what to do when they may be fighting an unjust war add to their burdens and are misplaced.     

Beyond the Double Game: Lessons from Pakistan’s Approach to Islamist Militancy

States commonly take one of three approaches to militant groups on their soil: collaboration; benign neglect; or belligerence. All three approaches are present in Pakistan, where some groups also move back and forth among these categories. I employ the term “coopetition” to capture this fluidity. The dynamic nature of militancy in Pakistan makes the country an excellent laboratory for exploring a state’s assessment of the utility an Islamist militant group offers, and the threat it poses relative to other threats informs the state’s treatment of that group. In this article, I put forward a typology that situates Islamist militants in Pakistan in one of the above four categories. I also illustrate how a group’s identity, objectives, and alliances inform assessments of its utility and threat relative to other threats. In addition to enhancing our understanding of militant–state dynamics, this taxonomy builds on and helps to unify earlier typologies of Pakistani militancy.     

The strategic effects of a merger upon supplier interactions

We consider how a merger between two naturally differentiated dealers affects their interactions with a common supplier and identify conditions under which the merger can increase or decrease the combined net worth of the two firms. Among other things, we find that the attractiveness of merging depends upon the extent to which end demand can be stimulated by either an upstream supplier or the dealers. Specifically, the greater the supplier's ability to invest in stimulating end demand, the more likely it is that the naturally differentiated firms will be better off operating independently than merging. On the other hand, if the greatest opportunities for stimulating demand are through the service that is provided by the dealers, then merging their operations will be more attractive. © 2006 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2007     

The Gaullists,the French army and Algeria before 1958: Common cause or marriage of convenience?

Though the Gaullists and the officer class shared a common view of France's military, diplomatic and operational weaknesses during the Algerian War they did not always share ideas on solutions to the problem. The Gaullists were fixated on France's declining world status and were prepared to act opportunistically to halt it, thereby making a French Algeria expendable. The military, on the other hand, believed that keeping Algeria French was axiomatic in avoiding further national humiliation. The coming together of Gaullists and the Army in May 1958 was therefore only a shortterm alliance, which quickly crumbled.     

Airpower in the Mau Mau conflict: the government's chief weapon

Strategists are currently debating the efficacy airpower provides in counterinsurgency operations. Through the lens of Colonel John Warden's theory of systemic paralysis, this essay reveals the truth about how airpower was employed in the Mau Mau conflict – a subject that has, until now, been both shrouded in mystery and inaccurately reported. It reveals that the use of airpower in a conflict occurring almost 60 years ago proffers a number of lessons for its use in counterinsurgencies today. Moreover, it discovers that although useful in many respects, Warden's model is somewhat limited for analysing the true use of airpower in counterinsurgencies today and consequently, a more appropriate model is offered for airpower strategists to use in such conflicts.