Country Survey I–Military Spending in India 1

After a brief survey of the Indian economy, we survey the supply and demand of military expenditures in India over the last four decades. The causes of military expenditures appear to include regional rivalries and protracted conflicts, but it has proven difficult to delineate these with empirical models. The effects of military spending in India on economic growth appear to be benign, despite much speculation to the contrary. However, the opportunity costs of defence spending are shown to be considerable. We conclude with speculation about the role of debt and debt servicing in retarding future economic growth in India. We also speculate about the potential for the creation of a war economy in India.     

EDITOR'S NOTE

This article offers a survey of risks that might arise for strategic stability (defined as a situation with a low probability of major-power war) with the reduction of US and Russian nuclear arsenals to “low numbers” (defined as 1,000 or fewer nuclear weapons on each side). These risks might include US anti-cities targeting strategies that are harmful to the credibility of extended deterrence; renewed European anxiety about a US-Russian condominium; greater vulnerability to Russian noncompliance with agreed obligations; incentives to adopt destabilizing “launch-on-warning” strategies; a potential stimulus to nuclear proliferation; perceptions of a US disengagement from extended deterrence; increased likelihood of non-nuclear arms competitions and conflicts; and controversial pressures on the UK and French nuclear forces. Observers in North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) states who consider such risks significant have cited four possible measures that might help to contain them: sustained basing of US nonstrategic nuclear weapons in Europe; maintaining a balanced US strategic nuclear force posture; high-readiness means to reconstitute US nuclear forces; and enhanced US and allied non-nuclear military capabilities. These concrete measures might complement the consultations with the NATO allies that the United States would in all likelihood seek with respect to such important adjustments in its deterrence and defense posture.     

EDITOR'S NOTE

The Nonproliferation Review (NPR) recently interviewed Ambassador Sergio de Queiroz Duarte of Brazil, who presided over the 2005 Seventh Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Ambassador Duarte discussed his views on the outcome of the conference and the future of the treaty. He provided NPR with valuable insights into the outcome of the conference and also shared his thoughts on some of the most pressing issues confronting the NPT today, including the Middle East, nuclear terrorism, elimination of the threat of highly enriched uranium in the civilian nuclear sector, proposals to limit access to the nuclear fuel cycle, nuclear disarmament, and negative security assurances. Blaming the failed conference on a general lack of political commitment among states parties and their unwillingness to negotiate common solutions, Ambassador Duarte stressed that “the conference should face squarely its own failure without my attempting to disguise or sugarcoat the deep differences of view, which must be resolved with courage and determination by the states parties if they want the treaty to remain effective.”?He emphasized that if states fail to act on their overriding interest in upholding the NPT, especially if states parties continue to ignore or disregard their nonproliferation and nuclear disarmament obligations, some states might come to believe that their security interests are no longer served by the treaty. The future prospects of the NPT would then “look dire indeed.”     

CONTRIBUTORS

Conventional wisdom states that the stability-instability paradox does not explain the effect of nuclear proliferation on the conflict propensity of South Asia, and that nuclear weapons have had a different and more dangerous impact in South Asia than Cold War Europe. I argue that the paradox explains nuclear South Asia; that the similarities between nuclear South Asia and Cold War Europe are strong; and that conventional instability does not cause revisionist challenges in the long run. I develop and probe a psychological causal mechanism that explains the impact of nuclear weapons on Cold War Europe and South Asia. Following the ten-month mobilized crisis in 2002, Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf may have adopted a more moderate foreign policy toward India after experiencing fear of imminent nuclear war, as Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev did forty years earlier. I argue that the stability-instability paradox explains Cold War Europe and nuclear South Asia and will, conditional on Iranian and North Korean revisionism, predict the impact of nuclear weapon development on these states' conflict propensities.     

Partial input to output impacts in DEA: Production considerations and resource sharing among business subunits

Data envelopment analysis (DEA) is a methodology for evaluating the relative efficiencies of peer decision‐making units (DMUs), in a multiple input/output setting. Although it is generally assumed that all outputs are impacted by all inputs, there are many situations where this may not be the case. This article extends the conventional DEA methodology to allow for the measurement of technical efficiency in situations where only partial input‐to‐output impacts exist. The new methodology involves viewing the DMU as a business unit, consisting of a set of mutually exclusive subunits, each of which can be treated in the conventional DEA sense. A further consideration involves the imposition of constraints in the form of assurance regions (AR) on pairs of multipliers. These AR constraints often arise at the level of the subunit, and as a result, there can be multiple and often inconsistent AR constraints on any given variable pair. We present a methodology for resolving such inconsistencies. To demonstrate the overall methodology, we apply it to the problem of evaluating the efficiencies of a set of steel fabrication plants. © 2013 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2013     

Statistical equivalency and optimality of simple step‐stress accelerated test plans for the exponential distribution

Accelerated life testing (ALT) is commonly used to obtain reliability information about a product in a timely manner. Several stress loading designs have been proposed and recent research interests have emerged concerning the development of equivalent ALT plans. Step‐stress ALT (SSALT) is one of the most commonly used stress loadings because it usually shortens the test duration and reduces the number of required test units. This article considers two fundamental questions when designing a SSALT and provides formal proofs in answer to each. Namely: (1) can a simple SSALT be designed so that it is equivalent to other stress loading designs? (2) when optimizing a multilevel SSALT, does it degenerate to a simple SSALT plan? The answers to both queries, under certain reasonable model assumptions, are shown to be a qualified YES. In addition, we provide an argument to support the rationale of a common practice in designing a SSALT, that is, setting the higher stress level as high as possible in a SSALT plan. © 2012 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2013