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241.
Irrespective our views on the rationality of our opponent's continuing to conduct operations against us, unless utterly extirpated, he retains a vote on when and how conflict will end. This is because war is about power — compelling another actor to do something he would not otherwise do, or to cease doing something he would otherwise prefer to do. In planning for conflict termination we should account for the peculiarities of opponents who may decide not to quit when we have beat them fair and square. We do not desire that they cease conventional fighting, but that they cease fighting altogether. 相似文献
242.
Allan D. English 《战略研究杂志》2013,36(3):408-431
This article borrows from the work of Clausewitz to posit two general approaches to the pursuit of limitation in war, one being political and the other technical. The political approach seeks to control escalation via consensual arrangements with the adversary, while the technical approach seeks to forestall escalation by peremptorily destroying the enemy's military capability. It is argued that the 'Revolution in Military Affairs' (RMA) instantiates the second, technical, approach to war limitation. By exploiting advanced technology, the US armed forces hope to limit the costs of war by defeating their adversaries in a rapid, decisive manner. The problems associated with this approach are discussed in relation to the nature of the conflicts that the US is likely to face in the foreseeable future. The article concludes by suggesting that such conflicts will require that more attention be paid to the political sources of limitation in war. 相似文献
243.
244.
Stephen Chappell 《Small Wars & Insurgencies》2013,24(3):495-525
Strategists are currently debating the efficacy airpower provides in counterinsurgency operations. Through the lens of Colonel John Warden's theory of systemic paralysis, this essay reveals the truth about how airpower was employed in the Mau Mau conflict – a subject that has, until now, been both shrouded in mystery and inaccurately reported. It reveals that the use of airpower in a conflict occurring almost 60 years ago proffers a number of lessons for its use in counterinsurgencies today. Moreover, it discovers that although useful in many respects, Warden's model is somewhat limited for analysing the true use of airpower in counterinsurgencies today and consequently, a more appropriate model is offered for airpower strategists to use in such conflicts. 相似文献
245.
There have been growing claims in media circles and law-enforcement settings that street gangs and criminal groups are turning to Internet-based social networking sites for various reasons ranging from the showcasing of their images and exploits to the suspected recruitment of members. The present study investigates whether such a trend is, in fact, in place. The presence of street gangs on these Internet sites is referred to as cyberbanging. While there is some anecdotal evidence suggesting that gangs are turning to social networking sites, there is little available research on exactly how street gangs and criminal groups use the Internet. Our main argument is that gang culture is in many ways an individualized phenomenon and this feature ties in directly with recent assessments of the Internet as a setting that is governed by a process of networked individualism. This theoretical link between the individualized gang setting and the presence of gang members on social networking sites helps us understand why recruitment is improbable even in a context where people are openly diffusing their image and exploits to a growing number of Internet users. The empirical segment of this research adds to this general outlook. Based on a keyword search of over 50 street gang names, the three main social networking sites (Twitter, Facebook, and MySpace) were monitored for street gang presence. Results illustrate that gang presence on social networking sites is linked primarily to promoting a general gang or street culture through individual displays. In regard to the visitors to such sites, there is no evidence that they are being tricked or manipulated in any way. They are, however, showing their curiosity in regard to such groups and, for those who share their comments and opinions, signs of support are evident. Thus, whereas criminal gangs are not proactively using the Internet to convert anyone into being gang members, social networking sites are creating a new venue for people who share or are sensitive to the values underlying street gang lifestyle to come together. These sites essentially create a new convergence setting for gang members to interact with a wider number of people who would probably never have been exposed to their lifestyles and exploits through physical interactions. The study's conclusion extends these findings toward further research in this area, as well as outlining the more relevant implications for law-enforcement monitoring of this growing phenomenon. 相似文献
246.
Christopher Davis 《Defence and Peace Economics》2013,24(3):145-177
The Soviet Union was able to develop a large military-industrial complex and become the world's second superpower despite deficiencies in its centrally planned economy because defence was given high priority status and special planning, rationing and administrative mechanisms were used to attain national security objectives. However, in the period 1976-85 the effectiveness of priority protection diminished and defence institutions experienced more of the problems typical of the shortage economic system. The heavy defence burden also created growing difficulties for the civilian economy. The attempts by the Gorbachev government to reform the defence sector and improve defence-economic relationships during perestroika (1985-91) uniformly failed. For most of the transition period, the Russian military-industrial complex has been adversely affected by its low priority status, cuts in defence spending, instability of the hybrid politico-economic system, and negative growth of the economy. The armed forces and defence industry have been reduced in size and their outputs of military services and equipment have fallen to low levels. Nevertheless, the Russian armed forces still have over one million troops, significant stocks of sophisticated conventional weapons, and a large nuclear arsenal. The government of President Putin has raised the priority of the defence sector, increased real defence spending, and adopted ambitious plans to revive Russian military power. It is likely, though, that tight resource constraints will hamper efforts to reform the armed forces and to upgrade weapons. By 2010 Russia will be an important, but not dominant, military power in Eurasia. 相似文献
247.
The Junior Reserve Officers’ Training Corps is a high school program that combines classroom teaching with extracurricular activities. The program is located primarily in inner city schools and serves at‐risk students. Its goals are multidimensional and include military preparation and improving academic achievement. Using High School and Beyond data we find that the program’s effects depend on the timing and intensity of involvement. Test scores, graduation rates, and enlistments are higher for students who participate early in high school and for those who persist in the program. Conversely, we find few effects for students participating in the last two years of high school. 相似文献
248.
Abdullahi D. Ahmed 《Defence and Peace Economics》2013,24(5):485-506
This article empirically explores the relationship between military expenditure, external debts and economic performance in the economies of sub-Saharan Africa using a sample of 25 countries from 1988–2007. In investigating the defence–external debt nexus, we employ three advanced panel techniques of fully modified OLS (FMOLS), Dynamic OLS (DOLS) and dynamic fixed effect (DFE) to estimate our model. We observe that military expenditure has a positive and significant impact on external debt in African countries. Real GDP affects the total debt stock of African countries with a negative relationship. Our empirical results based on long-run elasticities show that a 1% rise in national output leads to a decline in external debt by 1.52%, on average. Policy-wise, the study suggests that African countries need to strengthen areas of fiscal responsibility and pursue models that encourage rational spending, particularly reductions in military expenditure. 相似文献
249.
Bruce G. Linster Richard L. Fullerton Michael Mckee Stephen Slate 《Defence and Peace Economics》2013,24(4):285-302
This paper experimentally tests a number of hypotheses that follow from models of international competition that are based on Tullock style rent‐seeking models. Specifically, we designed and performed experiments to see how variations in the degree of publicness in the prize as well as changes in the values assigned to the prize affect alliances in terms of individual nation contributions, total contributions, burden sharing, and the likelihood of winning the prize. While there was substantial variation in individual behavior, the results of the experiments generally conform to the theoretical predictions of the rent‐seeking model of international competition and alliances. 相似文献
250.
This paper employs public choice analysis to explain certain kinds of military decision‐making during the Civil War. Specifically, the political costs and benefits which may have influenced policy with respect to casualty rates in the Union army are considered. A primary empirical finding is that electoral votes per capita are a strong explainer of casualties across Union states, all else equal. 相似文献