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331.
China’s rapid economic growth is facilitating massive increases in its military spending and causing increased security concerns in Asia and the Western Pacific. But there is uncertainty over how large China’s military spending is relative to other countries, or how fast it is growing in real terms. We address this issue by deriving a relative military cost price index based on the relative unit costs of inputs. We find that China’s real military spending is much larger than suggested by exchange rate comparisons, and even larger than standard purchasing power parity comparisons. We also find, however, that the real growth of China’s military spending has been smaller than conventionally thought. This is due to rapidly growing wages in China and the large share of personnel in China’s military budget. 相似文献
332.
A. S. Andreou ? K. E. Parsopoulos ? M. N. Vrahatis § G. A. Zombanakis 《Defence and Peace Economics》2013,24(5):481-495
The issue that this paper tackles is the assessment of the relative security benefits that Cyprus and Greece derive in the context of their cooperation on defence matters. This form of cooperation, known as the ‘Integrated Defence Space Doctrine’, aims at defending their interests in the Aegean Sea and the broader East Mediterranean theatre. The paper relies heavily on earlier research on this topic, which deals with the Greek–Cypriot alliance facing an arms race against Turkey, and uses a coefficient especially designed to assess the optimal levels of security and the associated defence expenditure of the two allies. A comparison of the relative security coefficient values for the two allies suggests that the security benefit that Greece derives thanks to its alliance with Cyprus exceeds the corresponding Cypriot benefit by far. Given the importance assigned to human resources by this index, in conjunction with the demographic problems of Greece, this conclusion justifies the recent Greek defence policy revision, emphasizing quality, capital equipment and flexibility of forces. This revision aims at satisfying the security requirements of the alliance and the increasing demands of an arms race against Turkey. 相似文献
333.
ANDREA E OSTHEIMER 《African Security Review》2013,22(4):45-58
Guinea-Bissau's transition toward democracy has been violent and disruptive. Despite holding elections and attempts to promote economic and social development, the latest government, under President Yala, is not equipped to bring stability or even a more democratic state. A politicised military, inexperienced opposition and corrupt government officials have contributed to the current poverty and instability. Although unlikely to be deposed by the fragmented opposition, Yala is not secure within his own party and is likely to use his position to weaken his opponents. As a Catholic, Yala has been careful to avoid religious conflict by reassuring Muslim citizens that they will not be marginalised. The economy is precarious and poverty has not been addressed. Guinea-Bissau is dependent on foreign donors for its financial needs. Guinea-Bissau has begun military operations against rebels opposing the Senegalese government and the battles seem likely to continue to cause regional instability. Without external intervention political and economic development looks remote. 相似文献
334.
Stephen I. Schwartz 《The Nonproliferation Review》2013,20(2):205-208
This article offers a survey of risks that might arise for strategic stability (defined as a situation with a low probability of major-power war) with the reduction of US and Russian nuclear arsenals to “low numbers” (defined as 1,000 or fewer nuclear weapons on each side). These risks might include US anti-cities targeting strategies that are harmful to the credibility of extended deterrence; renewed European anxiety about a US-Russian condominium; greater vulnerability to Russian noncompliance with agreed obligations; incentives to adopt destabilizing “launch-on-warning” strategies; a potential stimulus to nuclear proliferation; perceptions of a US disengagement from extended deterrence; increased likelihood of non-nuclear arms competitions and conflicts; and controversial pressures on the UK and French nuclear forces. Observers in North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) states who consider such risks significant have cited four possible measures that might help to contain them: sustained basing of US nonstrategic nuclear weapons in Europe; maintaining a balanced US strategic nuclear force posture; high-readiness means to reconstitute US nuclear forces; and enhanced US and allied non-nuclear military capabilities. These concrete measures might complement the consultations with the NATO allies that the United States would in all likelihood seek with respect to such important adjustments in its deterrence and defense posture. 相似文献
335.
Stephen I. Schwartz 《The Nonproliferation Review》2013,20(1):1-2
The Nonproliferation Review (NPR) recently interviewed Ambassador Sergio de Queiroz Duarte of Brazil, who presided over the 2005 Seventh Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Ambassador Duarte discussed his views on the outcome of the conference and the future of the treaty. He provided NPR with valuable insights into the outcome of the conference and also shared his thoughts on some of the most pressing issues confronting the NPT today, including the Middle East, nuclear terrorism, elimination of the threat of highly enriched uranium in the civilian nuclear sector, proposals to limit access to the nuclear fuel cycle, nuclear disarmament, and negative security assurances. Blaming the failed conference on a general lack of political commitment among states parties and their unwillingness to negotiate common solutions, Ambassador Duarte stressed that “the conference should face squarely its own failure without my attempting to disguise or sugarcoat the deep differences of view, which must be resolved with courage and determination by the states parties if they want the treaty to remain effective.”?He emphasized that if states fail to act on their overriding interest in upholding the NPT, especially if states parties continue to ignore or disregard their nonproliferation and nuclear disarmament obligations, some states might come to believe that their security interests are no longer served by the treaty. The future prospects of the NPT would then “look dire indeed.” 相似文献
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339.
Abstract What are the consequences of military strikes against nuclear facilities? In particular, do they ‘work’ by delaying the target states ability to build the bomb? This article addresses these questions by conducting an analysis of 16 attacks against nuclear facilities from 1942 to 2007. We analyze strikes that occurred during peacetime and raids that took place in the context of an ongoing interstate war. The findings indicate that strikes are neither as uniformly fruitless as the skeptics would suggest, nor as productive as advocates have claimed. There is evidence that the peacetime attacks delayed the target's nuclear program, although the size of this effect is rather modest. The wartime cases were less successful, as attacks often missed their targets either due to operational failure or limited intelligence on the location of critical targets. In our concluding section we show that many of the conditions that were conducive to past success are not present in the contemporary Iran case. Overall, our findings reveal an interesting paradox. The historical cases that have successfully delayed proliferation are those when the attacking state struck well before a nuclear threat was imminent. Yet, this also happens to be when strikes are the least legitimate under international law, meaning that attacking under these conditions is most likely to elicit international censure. 相似文献
340.
Steven E. Lobell 《战略研究杂志》2013,36(6):747-773
This article challenges the conventional wisdom that Neville Chamberlain rejected the British tradition of balance of power in the 1930s. In contrast to balance of power and balance of threat theories, states do not balance against aggregate or net shifts in power. Instead, leaders define threats based on particular elements of a foreign state's power. The import is that different components of power of a foreign state are more or less threatening and aggregate shifts in power alone may not provoke counterbalancing behavior. In the 1930s, Britain balanced against the most threatening components of power: the German Luftwaffe and the threat of a knock-out air assault against the homeland, Japan's Imperial Navy and its threat to Britain's commercial trade routes and the Dominions in East Asia, and the Italian Navy and the threat to Britain's line of communication through the Mediterranean Sea to India and Asia. Given Britain's difficult financial circumstances, all other components of power, such as the army and the land components of power of Germany, Japan, and Italy were ranked as secondary in terms of its rearmament priorities. Thus, London was able to narrow the gap with Berlin in specific components of power of strategic importance such as aircraft production or to exceed Germany in other areas such as the Royal Navy and its battlefleet. 相似文献