Estimating negative binomial demand for retail inventory management with unobservable lost sales

The importance of effective inventory management has greatly increased for many major retailers because of more intense competition. Retail inventory management methods often use assumptions and demand distributions that were developed for application areas other than retailing. For example, it is often assumed that unmet demand is backordered and that demand is Poisson or normally distributed. In retailing, unmet demand is often lost and unobserved. Using sales data from a major retailing chain, our analysis found that the negative binomial fit significantly better than the Poisson or the normal distribution. A parameter estimation methodology that compensates for unobserved lost sales is developed for the negative binomial distribution. The method's effectiveness is demonstrated by comparing parameter estimates from the complete data set to estimates obtained by artificially truncating the data to simulate lost sales. © 1996 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.     

Nuclear deterrence and cyber warfare: coexistence or competition?

Nuclear deterrence and cyber war seem almost antithetical in their respective intellectual pedigrees. Nuclear weapons are unique in their ability to create mass destruction in a short time. Information or “cyber” weapons, at least for the most part, aim at sowing confusion or mass disruption instead of widespread physical destruction. Nevertheless, there are some intersections between cyber and nuclear matters, and these have the potential to become troublesome for the future of nuclear deterrence. For example, cyber attacks might complicate the management of a nuclear crisis. As well, information attacks on command-control and communications systems might lead to a mistaken nuclear launch based on false warnings, to erroneous interpretations of data or to panic on account of feared information blackout. It is not inconceivable that future nuclear strike planning will include a preliminary wave of cyber strikes or at least a more protracted “preparation of the battlefield” by roaming through enemy networks to plant malware or map vulnerabilities.     

Military Power: A Reply

This article argues that the prewar planning process for postwar Iraq was plagued by myriad problems, including a dysfunctional interagency process, overly optimistic assumptions, and a lack of contingency planning for alternative outcomes. These problems were compounded by a lack of civilian capacity during the occupation period, which led to a complicated and often uncoordinated relationship with the military authorities who found themselves taking the lead in many reconstruction activities. Taken together, these mistakes meant that US success on the battlefield was merely a prelude to a postwar insurgency whose outcome remains very much in doubt more than three years later.     

The financial performance of aircraft manufacturers during world war II: the vicissitudes of war

Controversy has long surrounded the role and profitability of US defense contractors. From a financial perspective the question becomes whether defense contractors earn greater profits and investor returns than other companies during military conflicts. We explore this question by examining the accounting profitability and investor returns of US aircraft manufacturers before, during, and after World War II and compare them to a sample of non-defense firms. We also examine the reactions of aircraft stock prices to important political and military events of the time. We find that (1) aircraft stocks exhibited positive abnormal returns around events associated with defense buildups and outbreaks of hostile action and negative returns around events signaling an end to hostilities, (2) the company’s accounting returns improved during the war but these higher accounting returns did not translate into higher stock returns for the shareholders, and (3) investors could have earned higher stock returns had they switched out of aircraft stocks after Pearl Harbor and reinvested the proceeds in the overall market.     

Controlled warfare: how directed-energy weapons will enable the US Military to fight effectively in an urban environment while minimizing collateral damage

US military operations are increasingly conducted within urban environments and with these operations come the risk of increasing the number of civilian casualties and infrastructure damage. The use of non-lethal weaponry, such as directed-energy weapons, is one method for minimizing collateral damage. This method enables US military forces to effectively fight within urban environments through force escalation capabilities. Using a series of historical examples and future scenarios for urban warfare, this article highlights deficiencies affecting military capabilities in military urban operations, addresses the consequences of collateral damage, assesses the effectiveness of directed-energy weapons in military urban operations and encourages further funding, research and integration of non-lethal weaponry, such as directed-energy weapons, within the US military.     

Service design at diagnostic service centers

We study a service design problem in diagnostic service centers, call centers that provide medical advice to patients over the phone about what the appropriate course of action is, based on the caller's symptoms. Due to the tension between increased diagnostic accuracy and the increase in waiting times more in‐depth service requires, managers face a difficult decision in determining the optimal service depth to guide the diagnostic process. The specific problem we consider models the situation when the capacity (staffing level) at the center is fixed, and when the callers have both congestion‐ and noncongestion‐related costs relating to their call. We develop a queueing model incorporating these features and find that the optimal service depth can take one of two different structures, depending on factors such as the nurses' skill level and the maximum potential demand. Sensitivity analyses of the two optimal structures show that they are quite different. In some situations, it may (or may not) be optimal for the manager to try to expand the demand at the center, and increasing skill level may (or may not) increase congestion. © 2012 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2012     

Putin and Russia in retro and forward: the nuclear dimension

Deterioration in security relations as between NATO and Russia reached boiling point in the aftermath of Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 and its subsequent destabilization of Eastern Ukraine. As a result, some voices in the West look forward to the departure of Vladimir Putin from power, and others to the possible disintegration of Russia as a unitary state. However, both the departure of Putin and the collapse of Russia have a nuclear dimension. Putin has issued pointed reminders of Russia’s status as a nuclear great power, and Russian military doctrine allows for nuclear first use in the event of a conventional war with extremely high stakes. Beyond Putin, a breakup of Russia would leave political chaos in Eastern Europe, Central Asia and elsewhere, inviting ambiguous command and control over formerly Russian nuclear forces.