Civil–Military Relations in India: The China Crisis and After

The pattern of civil–military interaction in India is informed by the notion that civilians should refrain from involvement in operational matters. The emergence of this trend can be traced back to the defeat against China in 1962. In its aftermath, the belief that the debacle occurred because of civilian interference took hold. Thereafter, politicians restricted themselves to giving overall directives, leaving operational matters to the military. The Indian ‘victory’ in the subsequent war with Pakistan was seen as vindicating this arrangement. This essay argues that the conventional reading of the China crisis is at best misleading and at worst erroneous. Further, it contends that the subsequent war with Pakistan actually underscores the problems of civilian non-involvement in operational issues. The historical narrative underpinning the norm of civilian abstention is at the very least dubious.     

New Sources on the Role of Soviet Submarines in the Cuban Missile Crisis

Drawing on evidence collected from eyewitness interviews, new Russian secondary sources, as well as recently declassified documents from both sides, the author significantly widens the academic understanding of the maritime dimension of this gravest crisis of the Cold War. Most significant is her conclusion that Soviet commanders were led by complex and challenging tactical circumstances, including unreliable communications and malfunctioning equipment, which might have prompted them to contemplate a resort to tactical nuclear weapons on more than one occasion. Almost as disturbing is the revelation that US forces were not aware of this particular threat. This research reveals how a chain of inadvertent developments at sea could have precipitated global nuclear war, underlining the extreme danger of the crisis.     

Light weight HTPB-clay nanocomposites(HCN)with enhanced ablation performance as inhibition materials for composite propellant

In the present study,organically modified Montmorillonite clay with polar moiety,the Cloisite 30B,is used for preparation of Hydroxyl terminated polybutadiene(HTPB)-clay nanocomposites(HCN)by dispersion of nanoclay in polymer matrix under high shear mixing.The nanocomposites thus prepared are evaluated in composite propellants as inhibitor material for their functional utility.Several inhibition formulations containing 5 wt％-15 wt％of nanoclay,with or without the conventional filler Sb2O3,were prepared.All these formulations were evaluated for their physical,mechanical,thermal,and ablative properties.Ablation rate and density of the compositions containing Cloisite 30B is around 23％and 5％lower respectively in comparison of the base composition.Strain capability of these compositions is twofold higher than that of base composition.These compositions have also been evaluated for their smoke generation tendency by measuring infra red(IR)attenuation in the wavelength range 1.3 μm-5.6 μm and 8 μm-13 μm and thereby compared with the base composition.The corresponding results confirmed that the compositions containing Cloisite 30B as filler have much lower IR attenuation than compositions with conventional filler,Sb2O3.Replacement of 5％Sb2O3 by nanoclay showed 8％reduction in IR attenuation rate which further reduced to 16％on replacement of 15％of Sb2O3.Interfacial bonding of HCN based inhibitors is also comparable or even better than conventional inhibitors.Precisely,the nanoclay composites with Cloisite 30B as filler exhibit all desirable properties of an inhibitor.     

Minimum deterrence and missile defenses: what's new,what's true,what's arguable

Minimum deterrence is a compromise, or halfway house, between nuclear abolition or nearly zero and assured destruction, the dominant paradigm for strategic nuclear arms control during and after the cold war. Minimum deterrence as applied to the current relationship between the United States and Russia would require downsizing the numbers of operationally deployed long-range nuclear weapons to 1000, or fewer, on each side. More drastic bilateral Russian–American reductions would require the cooperation of other nuclear weapons states in making proportional reductions in their own arsenals. In addition, US plans for European-based and global missile defenses cause considerable angst in Russia and threaten to derail the Obama “reset” in Russian–American relations, despite the uncertainties about current and plausible future performances of missile defense technologies.