日本预防街头犯罪对策与启示

在剖析解读日本街头犯罪＂预防对策＂的基础上,提出日本警察运用简单手段取得社会治安的理想效果。预防犯罪,在理念上把警方全包全责调整向组织牵头、协调联动和指导督促;在实践上完善警察牵头,以警察、政府相关部门、生产相关企业、新闻媒体和普通民众等广泛参与为基础的联动群防机制;在落实上不断加强高技术手段与原始方法相互补充的立体防范环境建设;在过程中尽量贴近现实需要,以完整的系统来控制街头犯罪,是降低预防犯罪成本、提高预防犯罪效率的捷径之一。     

RAISING THE COST OF REBELLION: THE ROLE OF THIRD‐PARTY INTERVENTION IN INTRASTATE CONFLICT

This paper presents a simple model to characterize explicitly the role that an intervening third party plays in raising the cost of rebellion in an intrastate conflict. Extending the Gershenson‐Grossman (2000 Gershenson, D. and Grossman, H.I. 2000. Civil conflict: ended or never ending?. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 44(6): 807–821.  [Google Scholar]) framework of conflict in a two‐stage game to the case involving outside intervention in a three‐stage game as in Chang et al. (2007b Chang, Y.‐M., Potter, J. and Sanders, S. 2007b. War and peace: third‐party intervention in conflict. European Journal of Political Economy, 23(4): 954–974.  [Google Scholar]), we examine the conditions under which an outside party optimally intervenes such that (i) the strength of the rebel group is diminished or (ii) the rebellion is deterred altogether. We also find conditions in which a third party optimally intervenes but at a level insufficient to deter rebellion. Such behavior, which improves the incumbent government’s potential to succeed in conflict, is overlooked in some conflict studies evaluating the effectiveness of intervention. One policy implication of the model is that an increase in the strength of inter‐governmental trade partnerships increases the likelihood that third‐party intervention deters rebellion.     

无线网络控制系统一致性研究

通过构建李雅普诺夫函数,对具有不同拓扑结构的无线网络控制系统的一致性问题进行了研究。利用网络结构的邻接矩阵对网络拓扑结构进行描述,同时构造系统的延迟矩阵,结合复杂网络理论中的聚类系数、耦合强度的概念,对系统进行建模。针对复杂网络中常用的两种结构,构建不同的邻接矩阵和延迟矩阵,利用线性矩阵不等式的方法,给出使系统稳定的一般性条件。最后仿真结果验证了方法的有效性。     

基于遗传算法的雷达管控问题

通过对雷达组网系统责任区保障问题的深入研究,以完成对责任区的保障任务为目的,使责任区各个高度层均满足一定联合探测概率和雷达覆盖系数为约束条件,以雷达网整体工作代价最小为目标函数,构建了有干扰情形对雷达的管理和控制(以下简称雷达管控)数学模型。运用改进的遗传算法对雷达管控模型进行求解,通过设定保护概率保存了最优个体的遗传性,通过合理的算法参数设置改善了算法的性能。仿真算例和实际应用结果表明,雷达管控达标率由管控前的36.54%上升到63.46%,达到100%,雷达管控结果符合管控要求,且雷达开机数量较少,采取的抗干扰措施合理,验证了模型和方法的有效性。     

基于Bootstrap方法的舰空导弹武器系统制导精度评定

针对靶场进行导弹武器系统制导精度评定试验样本少的问题,提出了一种通过仿真提高试验结果评估置信度的数据融合评估方法。对舰空导弹武器系统制导误差产生的原因、误差分布规律进行了分析,给出了基于Bootstrap的制导精度评定方法。     

倾斜微型桩桩身参数敏感性有限元分析

基于有限元强度折减法,结合工程实例,利用软件ANSYS对不同倾角微型桩加固边坡以及倾斜微型桩的设桩位置、锚固深度和桩排距等桩身参数对边坡稳定性的影响进行了数值模拟分析。结果表明:微型桩加固边坡较优的倾斜角度为60°;随着设桩位置离坡顶距离的增加,边坡的稳定系数先增大后减小,当设桩位置距坡顶的相对位置为0.58~0.66,边坡的稳定系数较高;当桩排距为9倍桩径,边坡的稳定系数较高。研究结果为倾斜微型桩的设计与工程应用提供了理论依据,具有一定的普遍意义。     

碳-酚醛材料烧蚀热解对再入流场特性影响的数值计算

数值模拟存在碳-酚醛材料烧蚀的高超声速再入流场,分析烧蚀和热解对流场热化学参数、电子数密度分布等的影响。采用19组元双温度的热化学模型,耦合热化学非平衡流Navier-Stokes方程组和烧蚀壁面边界条件,进行定常烧蚀流场求解;通过对比无烧蚀、非催化和辐射平衡壁温条件下的流场分析烧蚀的影响;讨论了壁面处碳-酚醛材料热解产物化学组成的确定方法,研究了不同热解率的影响。以RAM-C球锥的两个典型飞行条件(速度7.65km/s、高度61km和71km)为代表的研究表明:最主要的烧蚀热解产物是CO、H2、H,烧蚀产物和烧蚀的影响均局限于边界层内;烧蚀使原子和离子组元含量下降,当离子组元含量峰值出现在边界层内时,烧蚀使电子数密度峰值下降;随热解率增加烧蚀影响程度增强,烧蚀在后身区影响范围大于头部区,随飞行高度增加烧蚀影响范围扩大。     

钢管约束混凝土抗侵彻性能试验

进行了12.7mm穿甲枪弹侵彻钢管约束混凝土和PVC管约束混凝土厚靶试验,建立了硬芯枪弹侵彻深度公式,研究了钢管约束混凝土的抗侵彻性能。结果表明:钢管约束混凝土靶的破坏模式与无约束混凝土靶存在显著不同,其核心混凝土侧面出现了环向裂纹;相对于无约束混凝土靶,钢管约束混凝土靶的抗侵彻能力明显提高,并具有较强的抗多发打击能力。     

Selling to strategic and loss‐averse consumers: Stocking,procurement, and product design policies

Motivated by the presence of loss‐averse decision making behavior in practice, this article considers a supply chain consisting of a firm and strategic consumers who possess an S‐shaped loss‐averse utility function. In the model, consumers decide the purchase timing and the firm chooses the inventory level. We find that the loss‐averse consumers' strategic purchasing behavior is determined by their perceived gain and loss from strategic purchase delay, and the given rationing risk. Thus, the firm that is cognizant of this property tailors its inventory stocking policy based on the consumers' loss‐averse behavior such as their perceived values of gain and loss, and their sensitivity to them. We also demonstrate that the firm's equilibrium inventory stocking policy reflects both the economic logic of the traditional newsvendor inventory model, and the loss‐averse behavior of consumers. The equilibrium order quantity is significantly different from those derived from models that assume that the consumers are risk neutral and homogeneous in their valuations. We show that the firm that ignores strategic consumer's loss‐aversion behavior tends to keep an unnecessarily high inventory level that leads to excessive leftovers. Our numerical experiments further reveal that in some extreme cases the firm that ignores strategic consumer's loss‐aversion behavior generates almost 92% more leftovers than the firm that possesses consumers’ loss‐aversion information and takes it into account when making managerial decisions. To mitigate the consumer's forward‐looking behavior, we propose the adoption of the practice of agile supply chain management, which possesses the following attributes: (i) procuring inventory after observing real‐time demand information, (ii) enhanced design (which maintains the current production mix but improves the product performance to a higher level), and (iii) customized design (which maintains the current performance level but increases the variety of the current production line to meet consumers’ specific demands). We show that such a practice can induce the consumer to make early purchases by increasing their rationing risk, increasing the product value, or diversifying the product line. © 2015 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 62: 435–453, 2015     

Auctions in the post‐change‐order period

A change order is frequently initiated by either the supplier or the buyer, especially when the contract is long‐term or when the contractual design is complex. In response to a change order, the buyer can enter a bargaining process to negotiate a new price. If the bargaining fails, she pays a cancellation fee (or penalty) and opens an auction. We call this process the sequential bargaining‐auction (BA). At the time of bargaining, the buyer is uncertain as to whether the bargained price is set to her advantage; indeed, she might, or might not, obtain a better price in the new auction. To overcome these difficulties, we propose a new change‐order‐handling mechanism by which the buyer has an option to change the contractual supplier after bargaining ends with a bargained price. We call this the option mechanism. By this mechanism, the privilege of selling products or services is transferred to a new supplier if the buyer exercises the option. To exercise the option, the buyer pays a prespecified cash payment, which we call the switch price, to the original supplier. If the option is not exercised, the bargained price remains in effect. When a switch price is proposed by the buyer, the supplier decides whether or not to accept it. If the supplier accepts it, the buyer opens an auction. The option is exercised when there is a winner in the auction. This article shows how, under the option mechanism, the optimal switch price and the optimal reserve price are determined. Compared to the sequential BA, both the buyer and the supplier benefit. Additionally, the option mechanism coordinates the supply chain consisting of the two parties. © 2015 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 62: 248–265, 2015