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51.
Thomas Briggs 《Small Wars & Insurgencies》2014,25(1):122-136
This article provides a critical analysis of counterinsurgency in Afghanistan at the tactical level. The efforts of several Naval Special Warfare detachments deployed to Naw Bahar district in Zabul Province, Afghanistan are examined in detail to identify key successes and failures in planning and execution. It defines the operating environment in which the detachments worked and identifies the goals and outcomes of the first and second phases of the counterinsurgency effort. The article concludes by placing the tactical effort in the context of the overall strategy in Afghanistan and suggests that time is the limiting factor to success. 相似文献
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We study the behavior of defense spending in Switzerland over 1975–2001. Our main interest is in determining how neutrality in international affairs (non‐membership in military alliances) affects defense spending. We find that neutrality is associated with a perception of lower levels of external threat; hence it confers economic benefits in the form of a smaller defense burden. However, neutrality does not fully insulate a country from variations in the level of external threat in the global system as perceived by members of military alliances. Swiss defense spending has tracked very closely the spending trends – but at a lower average level – of the United States and other NATO countries. To the extent that post‐Cold War threats, such as international terrorism, materialize primarily in the context of existing security alliances, Swiss military spending patterns observed in 1975–2001 are likely to remain the same in the future. 相似文献
54.
We use the Hsiao–Granger method to test for terrorism–growth causality for seven Western European countries. In bivariate settings, the impact of economic performance on domestic terrorism is very strong. In trivariate settings, the impact of performance on terrorism diminishes. In general, we find that economic performance leads terrorist violence in robust ways only for three out of seven countries. Terrorism is almost never found to causally influence growth in bivariate and trivariate specifications. Our findings indicate that the role of economic performance in determining terrorist violence appears to have been important for some countries, whereas all attacked economies have been successful in adjusting to the threat of terrorism. 相似文献
55.
Thomas R. Mockaitis 《Small Wars & Insurgencies》2013,24(1):132-133
Steven L. Burg and Paul S. Shoup, The War in Bosnia‐Herzegovina: Ethnic Conflict and International Intervention.New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1999. Pp.xviii + 499, maps, tables, notes, biobliog., index. NP. ISBN 1–56324–308–3. 相似文献
56.
Thomas Mockaitis 《Small Wars & Insurgencies》2013,24(1):21-38
Ten days after the attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon US President George W Bush addressed a joint session of Congress. In an emotional speech he declared war on terrorism and vowed that the US would not rest until all of the perpetrators were brought to justice and A1 Qaeda destroyed. In virtually the next breath he hastened to add that the US-led campaign would not be a war on Islam, a promise Muslims might have found more reassuring had the President not sounded so much like a Baptist preacher. Whatever its propaganda value, the speech distorted the reality of the struggle facing the West while tacitly acknowledging an important truth. Since terror is merely a weapon in a larger struggle, there can be no war on terrorism per se. The West faces a counterinsurgency campaign on a global scale. Winning the hearts and minds of disaffected people in lands where terrorism thrives must be central to conducting this campaign. 相似文献
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Thomas A. Marks 《Small Wars & Insurgencies》2013,24(2):339-342
58.
Thomas G. Mahnken 《战略研究杂志》2013,36(4):26-54
An analysis of US assessments of Germany's development of armored warfare illustrates the problems that intelligence agencies face as they attempt to understand military innovation. The covert nature of German Army's tank research in the years immediately following World War I limited the number of indicators of Berlin's interest in armored warfare. Similarly, the United States possessed at best a fragmentary picture of German experimentation with armor. By the outbreak of World War II, however, US military attaches had nonetheless developed an accurate understanding of German concepts of armored warfare. If the United States is to avoid strategic surprise in the future, it must cultivate intelligence sources and employ considerably different methods from those of the Cold War. 相似文献
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Matthew J. Thomas 《Small Wars & Insurgencies》2013,24(3):413-435
On 9 February 2012 the Somali terrorist organization al-Shabaab officially merged with al-Qaeda. While the significance of the merger is highly contested, it does expose internal weaknesses within the two organizations along ideological, clan, and sectarian lines. The article identifies three key weaknesses of the merger and concludes with a discussion of al-Qaeda's growing presence in trans-Saharan Africa. 相似文献