The myth of Afghan electoral democracy: the irregularities of the 2014 presidential election

ABSTRACT

This article systematically assesses the 2014 Afghanistan Presidential Election, the first transfer of power from President Hamid Karzai to an elected successor, using provincial voting data as well as explicit data from polling centers. The analysis finds unusual voting results in the April election, where no candidate received 50%+1 votes required by the Afghan constitution, versus the voting results realized for the June ‘runoff election.’ As in other Afghan voting analyses, this article finds voting based on ethno-linguistic preferences, and interestingly found Dr. Ashraf Ghani receiving almost all the swing votes in the runoff election even though the other leading candidate from the April election all endorsed Dr. Abdullah Abdullah. More importantly, however, the research presented here clearly finds extremely strange voting patterns. For example, the polling data center analysis finds 606 polling places where Ghani received all 600 votes and Abdullah received none and another 900 polling centers that gave virtually all its votes to Ghani. These results in combination with other analyses raise the very real possibility that the election results were illegitimate. The article concludes with a discussion of the implications of the research to future Afghan elections and their processes as well as to the long-standing conflict in the country.     

The Nineteenth Century Origins of Counterinsurgency Doctrine

Abstract

In counterinsurgency, the population is the center of gravity. This insight has become a key doctrinal tenet of modern armed conflict. But where does it come from? The razzia, a tactic introduced by the French in North Africa around 1840, first thrust tribal populations into the focus of modern operational thinking. Soon the pioneering bureaux arabes added an administrative, civil, and political element. Eventually, in the 1890s, French operations in Madagascar gave rise to a mature counterinsurgency doctrine. David Galula, a French writer who heavily influenced the American Counterinsurgency manual, is merely the joint that connects the nineteenth century to the twenty-first.     

Antelope,Poseidon or a Hybrid: The Upgrading of the British Strategic Nuclear Deterrent, 1970–1974

It is the purpose of this article to illustrate how the British government reached its decision to upgrade the Polaris strategic nuclear deterrent in 1973. Using British and American documentation it is demonstrated that the strategic imperatives for upgrading Polaris were fundamental to the project. Existing accounts of the Polaris Improvement Project, however, have not given the appropriate attention to the wider US–UK political differences in this period. By doing so it is shown how in addition to the wider economic, strategic and political factors, this was of paramount significance in the Heath government opting for the ‘Super Antelope’ method in upgrading Polaris.1 ¹‘Super Antelope’ was the codename for the upgrade of Polaris. This was eventually changed to ‘Chevaline’. Peter Hennessy, Cabinets and the Bomb (Oxford: OUP 2007), 28–9. View all notes     

The failure of defense planning in European Post-Communist Defense Institutions: ascertaining causation and determining solutions

By any objective measure, defense institutions in Central and Eastern Europe have all but universally been incapable of producing viable defense plans that are based on objective costing and operational planning data. This situation exists in spite the provision of considerable Western advice and assistance, let alone reporting to and receiving assessments by NATO’s International Staff under Partnership for Peace, as well as via the integrated defense planning and reporting systems. An explanation for this systematic failure across European post-Communist defense institutions can be found in the continued slow development of an over-arching policy framework which directs and approves all activities of the armed forces, as well as the de-centralization of financial decision-making down to capability providers. The essay ends with an examination of the adverse effects of the early introduction of planning programming, budgeting system (PPBS), have had on the development of effective policy and planning capabilities within these defense institutions.     

Interpreting the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty

Interpreting the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, by Daniel H. Joyner. Oxford University Press, 2011. 192 pages, $100.     

Contents and Author Index,Volume 20, 2013

The United States has multiple nuclear detection initiatives to secure against a terrorist nuclear attack, including the Container Security Initiative, installation of radiation detectors at U.S. border points of entry, and establishment of the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO). The current nuclear detection system architecture falls short of being able to reliably catch fissile nuclear material in transit, specifically shielded Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) and Plutonium (Pu), both within the US and abroad. Checkpoints at border crossings can be circumvented, and no adequate system is under development to deter the transport of fissile materials. Using nuclear link-budget calculations, we show why a network relying primarily on handhelds, fixed detectors, and portals is not sufficient. We examine the technical, economic, and operational feasibility of a comprehensive national network incorporating in-vehicle detectors to reliably detect and deter the transport of fissile material inside the vehicle itself.     

TURKEY AND MULTILATERAL NUCLEAR APPROACHES IN THE MIDDLE EAST

As many states in the Middle East are considering whether to embark on nuclear power programs, there is an urgent need to develop confidence-building measures to reassure states in the region that the programs are peaceful. One possible path would be to consider multilateral approaches to the fuel cycle in order to foster nuclear cooperation between states in the region, instead of each state going it alone, which would likely increase suspicions and the risk of a cascade of nuclear proliferation. With its policy of “zero problems with neighbors,” strategic connection to the West, and long-standing experience in the nuclear field, Turkey would be well-placed to take the lead on such a nuclear confidence-building agenda. Over time and under the right political conditions, Turkey could initiate or participate in measures including cooperation on nuclear education, safety and security, research and development, and joint fuel cycle facilities such as a regional fuel fabrication center.     

Pool it,share it,or lose it: an economical view on pooling and sharing of European military capabilities

In a general and economical view, this article analyzes methods and mechanisms for the pooling and sharing of military forces and weapons inside the European Union (EU) in times of scarcity. Pooling and sharing could improve the EU military capabilities significantly if differences in location factors were taken into account and all states would focus on their respective strengths. More competition and less concentration are the keys to ensuring guaranteed access to military assets. Pooling and sharing are likely to be successful only if large states enhance their emphasis on collective defense by mutual aid and self-help, and reduce particularistic and parochial interests of local gain. The realm of personnel has the most potential for improvement but any change is likely to generate policy implications.     

Emotions,Risk Perceptions and Precautionary Actions of Citizens During a Military Operation Using a New Defence Technology: The Israeli Case of the Iron Dome

Abstract

The current field study used unique data collected in Israel in July 2014, during a military operation that the Israel Defence Forces (I.D.F.) conducted in the Gaza Strip, in reaction to the thousands of missiles launched from there into Israel. During this operation, the new Iron Dome anti-missile defence system was used to protect Israelis exposed to missile attacks. The study examined factors that correlate with decisions to comply with I.D.F. defence instructions regarding behaviour during missile attacks. In addition, the study examined the relationship between attitudes towards the Iron Dome technology and emotions, risk perceptions, and the decision to comply with I.D.F. defence instructions. The results indicate that stronger positive opinions towards Iron Dome were correlated with lower levels of fear and anger, and beliefs that participant’s chances of being injured by a missile were lower than they had been during previous military operation. In addition, better compliance with I.D.F. defence instructions correlated with being more fearful, angrier at Hamas, living closer to Gaza Strip, and having more positive opinions about Iron Dome. The findings also indicate gender differences with respect to factors correlated with risk perceptions, opinions regarding Iron Dome, and precautionary actions during attacks.