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We consider stochastic scheduling models which have the natural character that jobs improve while being processed, but deteriorate (and may possibly leave the system altogether) while processing is diverted elsewhere. Such restless bandit problems are shown to be indexable in the sense of Whittle. A numerical study which elucidates the strong performance of the resulting index policy is complemented by a theoretical study which demonstrates the optimality of the index policy under given conditions and which develops performance guarantees for the index heuristic more generally. © 2002 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 49: 706–721, 2002; Published online in Wiley InterScience (www.interscience.wiley.com). DOI 10.1002/nav.10036  相似文献   
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In an accumulation game, a HIDER attempts to accumulate a certain number of objects or a certain quantity of material before a certain time, and a SEEKER attempts to prevent this. In a continuous accumulation game the HIDER can pile material either at locations $1, 2, …, n, or over a region in space. The HIDER will win (payoff 1) it if accumulates N units of material before a given time, and the goal of the SEEKER will win (payoff 0) otherwise. We assume the HIDER can place continuous material such as fuel at discrete locations i = 1, 2, …, n, and the game is played in discrete time. At each time k > 0 the HIDER acquires h units of material and can distribute it among all of the locations. At the same time, k, the SEEKER can search a certain number s < n of the locations, and will confiscate (or destroy) all material found. After explicitly describing what we mean by a continuous accumulation game on discrete locations, we prove a theorem that gives a condition under which the HIDER can always win by using a uniform distribution at each stage of the game. When this condition does not hold, special cases and examples show that the resulting game becomes complicated even when played only for a single stage. We reduce the single stage game to an optimization problem, and also obtain some partial results on its solution. We also consider accumulation games where the locations are arranged in either a circle or in a line segment and the SEEKER must search a series of adjacent locations. © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 49: 60–77, 2002; DOI 10.1002/nav.1048  相似文献   
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There are multiple damage functions in the literature to estimate the probability that a single weapon detonation destroys a point target. This paper addresses differences in the tails of four of the more popular damage functions. These four cover the asymptotic tail behaviors of all monotonically decreasing damage functions with well‐behaved hazard functions. The differences in estimates of probability of kill are quite dramatic for large aim‐point offsets. This is particularly important when balancing the number of threats that can be engaged with the chances of fratricide and collateral damage. In general, analysts substituting one damage function for another may badly estimate kill probabilities in offset‐aiming, which could result in poor doctrine. © 2003 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 50: 306–321, 2003.  相似文献   
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We study a multi‐item capacitated lot‐sizing problem with setup times and pricing (CLSTP) over a finite and discrete planning horizon. In this class of problems, the demand for each independent item in each time period is affected by pricing decisions. The corresponding demands are then satisfied through production in a single capacitated facility or from inventory, and the goal is to set prices and determine a production plan that maximizes total profit. In contrast with many traditional lot‐sizing problems with fixed demands, we cannot, without loss of generality, restrict ourselves to instances without initial inventories, which greatly complicates the analysis of the CLSTP. We develop two alternative Dantzig–Wolfe decomposition formulations of the problem, and propose to solve their relaxations using column generation and the overall problem using branch‐and‐price. The associated pricing problem is studied under both dynamic and static pricing strategies. Through a computational study, we analyze both the efficacy of our algorithms and the benefits of allowing item prices to vary over time. © 2009 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2010  相似文献   
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This article examines measures of economic efficiency in aircraft production. In particular, a type of nonlinear frontier estimation is contrasted with more traditional methods for estimating a dynamic cost function. This cost function is grounded in economic theory, and it is consistent with knowledge of the aircraft-production process. The model includes the effects of both learning and production rate on total program costs. The usefulness of the model is demonstrated with an example that relates to the acquisition of military equipment. It is shown through various sensitivity analyses that an alternative procurement policy for an aircraft program could have resulted in increased efficiency and hence a lower total program cost to the government.  相似文献   
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In the mid-2000s, the United States Army was embroiled in counterinsurgency missions in Iraq and Afghanistan that required deeper understanding of local social systems. The Army turned to systems thinking and design thinking to model and understand the world, define problems, and develop approaches to strategic and operational challenges. However, the Army’s approach as expressed in publications and doctrine encourages the development of complicated, unsupported, and unfalsifiable hypotheses. The risk is that the Army will act on incorrect assumptions and develop plans that are fragile.  相似文献   
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