Production planning with resources subject to congestion

A fundamental difficulty in developing effective production planning models has been accurately reflecting the nonlinear dependency between workload and lead times. We develop a mathematical programming model for production planning in multiproduct, single stage systems that captures the nonlinear dependency between workload and lead times. We then use outer linearization of this nonlinear model to obtain a linear programming formulation and extend it to multistage systems. Extensive computational experiments validate the approach and compare its results to conventional models that assume workload‐independent planning lead times. © 2009 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2009     

Resource efficiency in aircraft production

This article examines measures of economic efficiency in aircraft production. In particular, a type of nonlinear frontier estimation is contrasted with more traditional methods for estimating a dynamic cost function. This cost function is grounded in economic theory, and it is consistent with knowledge of the aircraft-production process. The model includes the effects of both learning and production rate on total program costs. The usefulness of the model is demonstrated with an example that relates to the acquisition of military equipment. It is shown through various sensitivity analyses that an alternative procurement policy for an aircraft program could have resulted in increased efficiency and hence a lower total program cost to the government.     

A multifaceted heuristic for the orienteering problem

The orienteering problem involves the selection of a path between an origin and a destination which maximizes total score subject to a time restriction. In previous work we presented an effective heuristic for this NP-hard problem that outperformed other heuristics from the literature. In this article we describe and test a significantly improved procedure. The new procedure is based on four concepts—center of gravity, randomness, subgravity, and learning. These concepts combine to yield a procedure which is much faster and which results in more nearly optimal solutions than previous procedures.     

Spaghetti: systems thinking and the US Army

In the mid-2000s, the United States Army was embroiled in counterinsurgency missions in Iraq and Afghanistan that required deeper understanding of local social systems. The Army turned to systems thinking and design thinking to model and understand the world, define problems, and develop approaches to strategic and operational challenges. However, the Army’s approach as expressed in publications and doctrine encourages the development of complicated, unsupported, and unfalsifiable hypotheses. The risk is that the Army will act on incorrect assumptions and develop plans that are fragile.     

Impediments to Fighting the Islamic State: Private Contractors and US Strategy

The United States has returned to Iraq, this time to combat the Islamic State. President Barack Obama’s strategy to ‘degrade, and ultimately destroy the terrorist group’ faces serious problems due to political obstacles in obtaining Congressional Authorization for the Use of Military Force (AUMF) and more importantly because of neglect of the crucial role of private contractors. Although the narrative has changed, and there is no public mention of contractors, they remain central to all that the Department of Defense does in the US and abroad. Suggestions are offered on how their performance can be improved to support President Obama’s strategy.     

China’s Search for a ‘Strategic Air Force’

Once dismissed by many outside observers, the Chinese People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) has undergone an impressive transformation over the past two decades, emerging as one of the world’s premier air forces. As it continues to modernize, it is focused on becoming a ‘strategic air force.’ PLAAF strategists suggest this means it should play a decisive role in protecting Chinese national interests, field modern capabilities commensurate with China’s standing as a major power, and enjoy the institutional status befitting its role as a ‘strategic service,’ an important consideration given the historical dominance of the ground force in China’s military.     

Northern Ireland and minimum force: the refutation of a concept?

The debate over whether there exists a British counter-insurgency tradition of minimum force is one that has been thoroughly discussed. Is there anything left to say? This study suggests there is further insight to be attained if one explicitly evaluates the concept of minimum force in relation to the conduct of the security forces in the years of the Northern Ireland conflict. Through an examination of three key periods in the conflict, it will be shown that while there was invariably an awareness of the need to act with restraint among senior officers at the strategic level, this was often difficult to apply at the tactical level in the heat of confrontation. The argument demonstrates that the British Army, and other instruments of the state, rarely acted in a manner that could be described as ‘minimal’. Instead, it was the broader liberal values of the British state that explains largely the degrees of restraint exhibited by the government and security forces.     

Accreditation Fraud in Brazilian Military Hospitals: Why “Tone at the Top” Matters

This article shows under which circumstances fraudulent accreditation can occur in Brazilian military hospitals, calling attention to the tone at the top as a critical aspect of military fraud deterrence – and hence as a critical aspect of this branch of military ethics. The problems allegedly found in Brazilian military health institutions were revealed through in-depth interviews conducted with 29 professionals who reported to work or have worked in a Brazilian military hospital. These fraud allegations were mostly associated with false documentation and procedures designed to give the appearance that legal requirements for accreditation were met and could be traced back to a weak or corrupt “tone at the top” coming from military higher ranks.