Single machine sequencing with random processing times and random due-dates

A single machine scheduling problem in which both the processing times and due-dates of the jobs awaiting servicing are random variables is analyzed. It is proved that the properties of the shortest processing time rule and the due-date rule which are known for the deterministic situation also hold in the probabilistic environment when they are suitably, and reasonably, refined for this context.     

Interchange fees for bank ATM networks

Banks have found it advantageous to connect their Automated Teller Machines (ATMs) in networks so that customers of one bank may use the ATMs of any bank in the network. When this occurs, an interchange fee is paid by the customer's bank to the one that owns the ATM. These have been set by historic interbank negotiation. The paper investigates how a model based on n-player game theory concepts of Shapley value and nucleolus could be used as an alternative way of setting such fees. © 1998 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 45: 407–417, 1998     

On the inspection game

The Inspection Game is a multistage game between a customs inspector and a smuggler, first studied by Melvin Dresher and Michael Maschler in the 1960s. An extension allowing the smuggler to act more than once, treated by Sakaguchi in a special case, is solved. Also, a more natural version of Sakaguchi's problem is solved in the special case where the smuggler may act at each stage. © 1998 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 45: 327–334, 1998     

Weak order stability under risk

The assessment of a Bernoulli utility function is often accomplished by an approximation process which makes use of ever more information on the preference as it is elicited from a decision maker. Simultaneous approximations of the utility function and the underlying distributions are generally not sufficient for the expectations to converge to the expected value of the respective limits. We give various sufficient stability conditions for the expected utility. All these conditions contain some “uniformness”. © 1995 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.     

When is model complexity too much? Illustrating the benefits of simple models with Hughes' salvo equations

The simulations that many defense analysts rely upon in their studies continue to grow in size and complexity. This paper contrasts the guidance that the authors have received—from some of the giants of military operations research—with the current practice. In particular, the analytic utility of Hughes' simple salvo equations is compared with that of the complex Joint Warfighting System (JWARS), with respect to JWARS' key performance parameters. The comparison suggests that a family of analytic tools supports the best analyses. It follows that smaller, more agile, and transparent models, such as Hughes' salvo equations, are underutilized in defense analyses. We believe that these models should receive more attention, use, and funding. To illustrate this point, this paper uses two very simple models (by modern standards) to rapidly generate insights on the value of information relative to force strength. © 2003 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2003     

The solution to an open problem for a caching game

In a caching game introduced by Alpern et al. (Alpern et al., Lecture notes in computer science (2010) 220–233) a Hider who can dig to a total fixed depth normalized to 1 buries a fixed number of objects among n discrete locations. A Searcher who can dig to a total depth of h searches the locations with the aim of finding all of the hidden objects. If he does so, he wins, otherwise the Hider wins. This zero‐sum game is complicated to analyze even for small values of its parameters, and for the case of 2 hidden objects has been completely solved only when the game is played in up to 3 locations. For some values of h the solution of the game with 2 objects hidden in 4 locations is known, but the solution in the remaining cases was an open question recently highlighted by Fokkink et al. (Fokkink et al., Search theory: A game theoretic perspective (2014) 85–104). Here we solve the remaining cases of the game with 2 objects hidden in 4 locations. We also give some more general results for the game, in particular using a geometrical argument to show that when there are 2 objects hidden in n locations and n→∞, the value of the game is asymptotically equal to h/n for h≥n/2. © 2016 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 63: 23–31, 2016     

Network design for time‐constrained delivery

To meet customer demand, delivery companies are offering an increasing number of time‐definite services. In this article, we examine the strategic design of delivery networks which can efficiently provide these services. Because of the high cost of direct connections, we focus on tree‐structured networks. As it may not be possible to identify a tree‐structured network that satisfies all of the delivery guarantees, we allow these guarantees to be violated but seek to minimize the sum of the violations. We establish the complexity of the problem and exploit an empirically identified solution structure to create new neighborhoods which improve solution values over more general neighborhood structures. © 2008 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2008