Designing safety space in a supply chain to handle system‐wide disruptions

In some supply chains serious disruptions are system wide. This happens during periods of severe weather, as when storms cause shuttle tankers serving oil platforms in the North Sea to stop movements of crude oil, barges are frozen in the Mississippi, or all airplanes are grounded after a blizzard. Other notable instances of system‐wide disruption happened after the attack on the World Trade Center when all aircraft were grounded and the natural gas and crude‐oil pipelines were tangled by hurricanes in 2005. We model a situation where shutting down supply facilities is very difficult and expensive because of excessive inventory buildup from an inability to move out the production. We present a planning model that balances the cost of spare capacity versus shutting down production when planning for disruptions. The model uses an assignment model embedded in a simulation. © 2006 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2007     

Provocation,war and restraint under the nuclear shadow: The Kargil conflict 1999

ABSTRACT

The Kargil conflict was a limited war between India and Pakistan fought along the Kashmir Line of Control during the spring/summer of 1999. Named for the principal town in the combat zone on the Indian side, it was the first open warfare between India and Pakistan as declared nuclear weapons states and included the first combat employment of the Indian Air Force since 1971. Despite its intensity, it was also characterised by considerable restraint on both sides. The potential for conventional escalation, however, was high and the possibility of nuclear confrontation could not be excluded. It had significant long-term ramifications for both countries and constitutes an important part of the backdrop to their relations today.     

Spies,advisors, and grunts: Film portrayals of counterinsurgency in Vietnam

Vietnam was a complex conflict, which historians and political scientists have struggled to understand. Some of the bitterest disputes in the historiography revolve around the US approach to counterinsurgency in Vietnam. Many different facets of the war have received the attention of filmmakers, and an examination of their work suggests new ways of thinking about the conflict. This article considers film portrayals of three phases of the Vietnam War – firstly, the early period of ‘political action’, then the advisory period, and finally the Americanization of the war after 1965. It suggests that by examining the experiences of participants in each of these phases, Vietnam War cinema helps to illustrate the problems that faced various American approaches to counterinsurgency in the conflict. Combined with the importance of films in determining popular perceptions of both historical conflicts and counterinsurgency in general, it suggests that they are worthy subjects of study and critique.     

The loss‐averse newsvendor problem with supply options

In this article, we consider a loss‐averse newsvendor with stochastic demand. The newsvendor might procure options when demand is unknown, and decide how many options to execute only after demand is revealed. If the newsvendor reserves too many options, he would incur high reservation costs. Yet reserving too few could result in lost sales. So the newsvendor faces a trade‐off between reservation costs and losing sales. When there are multiple options available, the newsvendor has to consider how many units of each to reserve by studying the trade‐off between flexibility and costs. We show how the newsvendor's loss aversion behavior affects his ordering decision, and propose an efficient algorithm to compute his optimal solution in the general case with n options. We also present examples showing how the newsvendor's ordering strategy changes as loss aversion rises. © 2014 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. 62:46–59, 2015     

Predicting older-donor kidneys' post-transplant renal function using pre-transplant data

This paper provides a methodology for predicting post-transplant kidney function, that is, the 1-year post-transplant estimated Glomerular Filtration Rate (eGFR-1) for each donor-candidate pair. We apply customized machine-learning algorithms to pre-transplant donor and recipient data to determine the probability of achieving an eGFR-1 of at least 30 ml/min. This threshold was chosen because there is insufficient survival benefit if the kidney fails to generate an eGFR-1 ≥ 30 ml/min. For some donor-candidate pairs, the developed algorithm provides highly accurate predictions. For others, limitations of previous transplants' data results in noisier predictions. However, because the same kidney is offered to many candidates, we identify those pairs for whom the predictions are highly accurate. Out of 6977 discarded older-donor kidneys that were a match with at least one transplanted kidney, 5282 had one or more identified candidate, who were offered that kidney, did not accept any other offer, and would have had ≥80% chance of achieving eGFR-1 ≥ 30 ml/min, had the kidney been transplanted. We also show that transplants with ≥80% chance of achieving eGFR-1 ≥ 30 ml/min and that survive 1 year have higher 10-year death-censored graft survival probabilities than all older-donor transplants that survive 1 year (73.61% vs. 70.48%, respectively).     

Shifted Roles: Explaining Danish and Norwegian Alliance Strategy 1949–2009

During their 60 years within the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), Denmark and Norway have experienced both high and low standings within the alliance, which can be attributed to both external and internal factors influencing their alliance strategies. During the ‘first’ Cold War and Détente, 1949–79, Danish and Norwegian alliance strategy aimed to simultaneously deter and reassure the Soviet Union. During the ‘second’ Cold War, 1979–89, Danish alliance policy became driven by domestic politics, and the Danish government was forced to formally dissociate the country from NATO's policies. Norway was not uncritical, but held a much lower profile. After the Cold War this situation shifted. Denmark successfully rehabilitated itself as a loyal and dependable ally by responding to the call for focusing on out-of-area operations. Meanwhile, Norway's continued focus on the lingering Russian Threat made the country seem out-of-touch with priorities in the post-Cold War alliance, and domestic politics prevented a more active out-of-area engagement.     

Managing Global Counterinsurgency: The Special Group (CI) 1962–1966

The contemporary American counterinsurgency discourse has emphasised a particular historical narrative of Vietnam to justify large-scale military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Absent from this narrative is any reference to the broader Cold War context in which Vietnam existed alongside numerous other small-scale counterinsurgencies and was therefore the exception, not the rule. This article seeks to redress this shortcoming by examining the way counterinsurgency was conceived and managed at the level of ‘grand strategy.’ Specifically, it focuses on the Special Group (Counterinsurgency) to demonstrate that senior policymakers under Presidents Kennedy and Johnson understood ‘counterinsurgency’ as involving ‘indirect’ assistance to foreign governments, rather than taking ‘direct’ military action with American ground forces.     

Ethnic targeting: A bad idea whose time has come

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Christopher Thorne, Allies of a Kind. The United States, Britain and the war against Japan, 1941–1945. London: Hamish Hamilton, 1978. Pp. xxii + 772; £15.00.

Michael Howard, editor, Restraints on War: Studies in the Limitation of Armed Conflict Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979. Pp. viii + 173; £6.50.

Julian Lider, The Political and Military Laws of War: an Analysis of Marxist‐Leninist Concepts. Farnborough, Hants: Saxon House, 1979. Pp. vii + 266; £12.50.

Klaus‐Jürgen Müller and Eckardt Opitz (editors), Militär und Militarismus in der Weimarer Republik. Düsseldorf: Droste Verlag, 1978. Pp. 304; n.p.

Nicholas Bethell, The Palestine Triangle: The Struggle Between the British, the Jews and the Arabs 1935–1948. London: Steinmatsky's Agency Ltd. in association with Andre Deutsch, 1919. Pp. 384; £7.95.

Sir Maurice Dean, The Royal Air Force and Two World Wars. London: Cassell, 1979. Pp. 349; £8.95.

Wilfred Jay Holmes, Double‐Edged Secrets. Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 1979. Pp. 218, n.p.

S. G. Gorshkov, The Sea Power of the State. Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1979. Pp. 290; £15.00.

Kirk, Grayson and Wessell, N.H. eds., The Soviet Threat: Myths and Realities. New York and London: Praeger, 1978. Pp. 182; £12.00.

Kenneth E. Boulding, Stable Peace. Austin and London: University of Texas Press, 1978. Pp. 155;£2.80.

Kenneth E. Boulding (ed.), Peace and the War Industry. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, and Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1973. Pp. vii + 213; £2.75.     

Analyzing Taliban taranas (chants): an effective Afghan propaganda artifact

This article describes and analyzes a little understood Afghan Taliban propaganda tool: chants or taranas . These melodic refrains effectively use historical narratives, symbology, and iconic portraits. The chants are engendered in emotions of sorrow, pride, desperation, hope, and complaints to mobilize and convince the Afghan population of the Taliban's worldview. The chants represent culturally relevant and simple messages that are communicated in a narrative and poetic form that is familiar to and resonates with the local people. They are virtually impossible for the United States and NATO to counter because of Western sensitivities concerning religious themes that dominate the Taliban narrative space, not to mention the lack of Western linguistic capabilities, including the understanding and mastering the poetic nature of local dialects.