Bureaucracy Does Its Thing: US Performance and the Institutional Dimension of Strategy in Afghanistan

It is not too soon to draw cautionary lessons from the inconclusive results of US performance during more than 11 years of Operation ‘Enduring Freedom’ in Afghanistan. As in Vietnam, fundamental difficulties persist in adapting enduring institutions to the requirements of strategy. At the heart of the matter is tension between the assumptions that underlie counterinsurgency as practiced in Afghanistan and organization of the US Armed Forces, State Department, and Agency for International Development. Knowledge of basic principles and necessary changes is available to answer the question, could the US have done better?     

The Harmful and Residual Effects on Civilians by Bombing Dual-purpose Facilities

This article addresses what we owe to the civilians of a state with which we are militarily engaged. The old notion of noncombatant immunity needs to be rethought within the context of both human rights and into the postwar phase. No doubt, civilians will be killed in war. However, much more can be done during and after the fighting to protect civilians’ basic human rights from the ills of war. I argue for making belligerents accountable ex post by requiring them to repair destroyed dual-purpose facilities that are essential for securing basic human rights of the civilian populace. I argue also that a belligerent’s targeting decisions should be reviewed ex post by an impartial commission.     

The future challenges of NATO: An economic viewpoint

This article identifies and evaluates likely challenges facing NATO today and into the next millennium. These contingencies include ethnic‐based civil wars in Europe, transnational terrorism, rogue states, increased world income inequality, out‐of‐area conflicts, and environmental and resource security. Using concepts and tools from collective action, I assess these challenges and suggest effective policies for addressing them. NATO still has a crucial role to play in maintaining world security in the post‐Cold War era.     

Chalk vs Guns: Some economic consequences of an announced French scenario 1

This paper explores whether defense contractors' manufacturing technology advantages over purely commercial firms might be associated with differences in their workforce and organizational practices. It uses unique original data collected specifically to test workforce and organizational complementarities in implementation of advanced manufacturing technology in small manufacturers. Findings are that defense contractors: (1) have higher and deeper rates of advanced manufacturing technology use; (2) have greater perceived success in achieving manufacturing goals; (3) are more likely practitioners across a diverse spectrum of advanced workforce and organizational practices. Then, (4) econometrically, the defense contractors' higher reported levels of achievement in implementing advanced manufacturing technologies are positively associated with those organizational and workforce practice differences.     

9/11: WHAT DID WE KNOW AND WHEN DID WE KNOW IT?

In February 1998, Osama Bin Laden published a signed statement calling for a fatwa against the United States for its having ‘declared war against God’. As we now know, the fatwa resulted in the unprecedented attack of 9/11. The issue of whether or not 9/11 was in any way predictable culminated in the public debate between Richard Clarke, former CIA Director George Tenet and the White House. This paper examines whether there was any evidence of a structural change in the terrorism data at or after February 1998 but prior to June 2001, controlling for the possibility of other breaks in earlier periods. In doing so, we use the standard Bai–Perron procedure and our sequential importance sampling (SIS) Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) method for identifying an unknown number of breaks at unknown dates. We conclude that sophisticated statistical time‐series analysis would not have predicted 9/11.     

NATO BENEFITS,BURDENS AND BORDERS: COMMENT

This note refutes criticism raised by Solomon about past tests used to ascertain the concordance between NATO benefits and burdens. In so doing, a case is made for keeping the benefit proxy based on exposed borders. Moreover, a truer sensitivity analysis than that offered by Solomon is suggested.