Globalisation in the defence industry: An exploration of the paradigm for us and European defence firms and the implications for being global players

This paper explores some of the key issues associated with the restructuring of the defence industry. A comparison is made between the US and the European Defence Industrial Bases in terms of the drivers for change and the paradigms within which change has taken place. Having shown that some very important differences exist, the paper then explores the approaches that have been adopted for industry consolidation and references them to the academic literature on mergers and acquisitions (M&As) and strategic alliances (SAs). Given that most of the key defence players recognise the need to be global players, the paper presents an argument that the European firms’ experience of operating with a wide range of forms of corporate alliance will serve them in good stead for operating on a global defence scale. US firms, in contrast, have focused largely on M&A activity.     

The European Union: Just an alliance or a military alliance?

Over centuries there have been different definitions and criteria for alliances. Within this, however, there are categories entitled ‘military alliances’. The article arrives at 11 different criteria for categorisation of alliances and applies them to the different facets of the European Union. It concludes that, on the broadest terms, the EU does meet the criteria for an alliance but that the jury is still out on some aspect of the European Union being a military alliance. This conclusion has consequences for the foreign, security and defence policies of several member states and, indeed, for the future of the European Union itself.     

A Lanchester-type aggregated-force model of conventional ground combat

This article develops a Lanchester-type model of large-scale conventional ground combat between two opposing forces in a “sector”. It is shown that nonlinear Helmbold-type equations of warfare with operational losses may be used to represent the loss-rate curves that have been used in many aggregated-force models. These nonlinear differential equations are used to model the attrition of combat capability (as quantified by a so-called firepower index) in conjunction with a rate-of-advance equation that relates motion of the contact zone (or FEBA) between the opposing forces to the force ratio and tactical decisions of the combatants. This simplified auxiliary model is then used to develop some important insights into the dynamics of FEBA movement used in large-scale aggregated-force models. Different types of behavior for FEBA movement over time are shown to correspond to different ranges of values for the initial force ratio, for example, an attack will “stall out” for a range of initial force ratios above a specific threshold value, but it will “break out” for force ratios above a second specific threshold value. Such FEBA-movement predictions are essentially based on being able to forecast changes over time in the force ratio.     

Approximate probability distributions for the extreme spread

The extreme spread, or greatest distance between all pairs of impact points on a target, is often used as a rapid measure of dispersion or precision of shot groups on a target. It is therefore desirable to know its statistical properties. Since the exact theoretical distribution has not yet been worked out, this paper examines the accuracy of several approximations which are checked against large sample monte carlo values. We find in particular that for the sample sizes considered the extreme spread can be approximated well by a Chi variate.     

Target selection in lanchester combat: Heterogeneous forces and time-dependent attrition-rate coefficients

We develop solutions to two fire distribution problems for a homogeneous force in Lanchester combat against heterogeneous enemy forces. The combat continues over a period of time with a choice of tactics available to the homogeneous force and subject to change with time. In these idealized combat situations the lethality of each force's fire (as expressed by the Lanchester attrition-rate coefficient) depends upon time. Optimal fire distribution rules are developed through the combination of Lanchester-type equations for combat attrition and deterministic optimal control theory (Pontryagin maximum principle). Additionally, the theory of state variable inequality constraints is used to treat the nonnegativity of force levels. The synthesis of optimal fire distribution policies was facilitated by exploiting special mathematical structures in these problems.     

Some simple victory-prediction conditions for lanchester-type combat between two homogeneous forces with supporting fires

This paper develops new “simple” victory-prediction conditions for a linear Lanchester-type model of combat between two homogeneous forces with superimposed effects of supporting fires not subject to attrition. These simple victory-prediction conditions involve only the initial conditions of battle and certain assumptions about the nature of temporal variations in the attrition-rate coefficients. They are developed for a fixed-force-ratio-breakpoint battle by studying the force-ratio equation for the linear combat model. An important consideration is shown to be required for developing such simple victory-prediction conditions: victory is not guaranteed in a fixed-force-ratio-breakpoint battle even when the force ratio is always changing to the advantage of one of the combatants. One must specify additional conditions to hold for the cumulative fire effectivenesses of the primary weapon systems in order to develop correct victory-prediction conditions. The inadequacy of previous victory-prediction results is explained by examining (for the linear combat model without the supporting fires) new “exact” victory-prediction conditions, which show that even the range of possible battle outcomes may be significantly different for variable-coefficient and constant-coefficients models.     

An examination of the effects of the criterion functional on optimal fire-support policies

This paper examines the dependence of the structure of optimal time-sequential fire-support policies on the quantification of military objectives by considering four specific problems, each corresponding to a different quantification of objectives (i.e. criterion functional). We consider the optimal time-sequential allocation of supporting fires during the “approach to contact” of friendly infantry against enemy defensive positions. The combat dynamics are modelled by deterministic Lanchester-type equations of warfare, and the optimal fire-support policy for each one-sided combat optimization problem is developed via optimal control theory. The problems are all nonconvex, and local optima are a particular difficulty in one of them. For the same combat dynamics, the splitting of supporting fires between two enemy forces in any optimal policy (i.e. the optimality of singular subarcs) is shown to depend only on whether the terminal payoff reflects the objective of attaining an “overall” military advantage or a “local” one. Additionally, switching times for changes in the ranking of target priorities are shown to be different (sometimes significantly) when the decision criterion is the difference and the ratio of the military worths (computed according to linear utilities) of total infantry survivors and also the difference and the ratio of the military worths (computed according to linear utilities) of total infantry survivors and also the difference and the ratio of the military worths of the combatants' total infantry losses. Thus, the optimal fire-support policy for this attack scenario is shown to be significantly influenced by the quantification of military objectives.     

Conflict,technology, and the impact of industrialization: The Great War 1914–18

In major respects, World War I appeared markedly unlike even quite recent wars. What, by and large, caused the difference was not quality of command or changing morale. It was industrial mobilisation and technological advancement. The emergence of new weapons, and of new methods of producing them in volume and at speed, played a crucial role in changing the nature of war.

Certainly, the peculiar qualities of the Great War of 1914–18 were not determined solely by technology. Quite other factors, such as the profundity of the issues at stake ('This war is life and death'), and the relative equality in resources and determination between the principal rivals, also profoundly influenced the nature of the conflict. Yet in delineating the dominant aspects of that struggle, the contribution made by industrialization and technology and a culture of inventiveness must loom large.

Admittedly, in some respects, the transformation of weaponry under the impact of industrialisation did not necessarily produce a new kind of war. The battleship of 1914 was hugely unlike the battleship of 1805, yet the Great War at sea was not strikingly different from the naval war against Napoleon. War in the air was an entirely new phenomenon, yet the aircraft had not reached a state of development where it could fundamentally alter the face of battle.

But in the case of the land war, new weapons and new volumes of weaponry did indeed make a vast difference to the nature and consequence of military operations. In large measure they generated the features by which this struggle is best remembered: stalemate, immobility, great battles of attrition, and ‘futility’.