Optimal control of an M/G/1 queue with impatient priority customers

An optimal operating policy is characterized for the infinite‐horizon average‐cost case of a single server queueing control problem. The server may be turned on at arrival epochs or off at departure epochs. Two classes of customers, each of them arriving according to an independent Poisson processes, are considered. An arriving 1‐customer enters the system if the server is turned on upon his arrival, or if the server is on and idle. In the former case, the 1‐customer is selected for service ahead of those customers waiting in the system; otherwise he leaves the system immediately. 2‐Customers remain in the system until they complete their service requirements. Under a linear cost structure, this paper shows that a stationary optimal policy exists such that either (1) leaves the server on at all times, or (2) turns the server off when the system is empty. In the latter case, we show that the stationary optimal policy is a threshold strategy, this feature being commonplace in most of priority queueing systems and inventory models. However, the optimal policy in our model is determined by two thresholds instead of one. © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 48: 201–209, 2001     

Untruthful probabilistic demand forecasts in vendor‐managed revenue‐sharing contracts: Coordinating the chain

Vendor‐managed revenue‐sharing arrangements are common in the newspaper and other industries. Under such arrangements, the supplier decides on the level of inventory while the retailer effectively operates under consignment, sharing the sales revenue with his supplier. We consider the case where the supplier is unable to predict demand, and must base her decisions on the retailer‐supplied probabilistic forecast for demand. We show that the retailer's best choice of a distribution to report to his supplier will not be the true demand distribution, but instead will be a degenerate distribution that surprisingly induces the supplier to provide the system‐optimal inventory quantity. (To maintain credibility, the retailer's reports of daily sales must then be consistent with his supplied forecast.) This result is robust under nonlinear production costs and nonlinear revenue‐sharing. However, if the retailer does not know the supplier's production cost, the forecast “improves” and could even be truthful. That, however, causes the supplier's order quantity to be suboptimal for the overall system. © 2007 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2007     

India's Tortuous Road to Defence-Industrial Self-Reliance

…Rapid indigenisation is the cornerstone of our policy of self-reliance

India MoD Annual Report 1978–9

     

Technical note: Find a hidden “treasure”

This paper deals with a two searchers game and it investigates the problem of how the possibility of finding a hidden object simultaneously by players influences their behavior. Namely, we consider the following two‐sided allocation non‐zero‐sum game on an integer interval [1,n]. Two teams (Player 1 and 2) want to find an immobile object (say, a treasure) hidden at one of n points. Each point i ∈ [1,n] is characterized by a detection parameter λ_i (μ_i) for Player 1 (Player 2) such that p_i(1 ? exp(?λ_ix_i)) (p_i(1 ? exp(?μ_iy_i))) is the probability that Player 1 (Player 2) discovers the hidden object with amount of search effort x_i (y_i) applied at point i where p_i ∈ (0,1) is the probability that the object is hidden at point i. Player 1 (Player 2) undertakes the search by allocating the total amount of effort X(Y). The payoff for Player 1 (Player 2) is 1 if he detects the object but his opponent does not. If both players detect the object they can share it proportionally and even can pay some share to an umpire who takes care that the players do not cheat each other, namely Player 1 gets q₁ and Player 2 gets q₂ where q₁ + q₂ ≤ 1. The Nash equilibrium of this game is found and numerical examples are given. © 2006 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2007     

Analysis of decentralized multi‐product pull systems with lost sales

We study a pull‐type, flexible, multi‐product, and multi‐stage production/inventory system with decentralized two‐card kanban control policies. Each stage involves a processor and two buffers with finite target levels. Production stages, arranged in series, can process several product types one at a time. Transportation of semi‐finished parts from one stage to another is performed in fixed lot sizes. The exact analysis is mathematically intractable even for smaller systems. We present a robust approximation algorithm to model two‐card kanban systems with batch transfers under arbitrary complexity. The algorithm uses phase‐type modeling to find effective processing times and busy period analysis to identify delays among product types in resource contention. Our algorithm reduces the effort required for estimating performance measures by a considerable margin and resolves the state–space explosion problem of analytical approaches. Using this analytical tool, we present new findings for a better understanding of some tactical and operational issues. We show that flow of material in small procurement sizes smoothes flow of information within the system, but also necessitates more frequent shipments between stages, raising the risk of late delivery. Balancing the risk of information delays vis‐à‐vis shipment delays is critical for the success of two‐card kanban systems. Although product variety causes time wasted in setup operations, it also facilitates relatively short production cycles enabling processors to switch from one product type to another more rapidly. The latter point is crucial especially in high‐demand environments. Increasing production line size prevents quick response to customer demand, but it may improve system performance if the vendor lead‐time is long or subject to high variation. Finally, variability in transportation and processing times causes the most damage if it arises at stages closer to the customer. © 2007 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2007