The French Army ‘Centre for Training and Preparation in Counter-Guerrilla Warfare’ (CIPCG) at Arzew

Psychological warfare had been used by the French army in the Indochina War (1946–54), and had spawned a sub-caste of French officers who moulded it and counter-insurgent propaganda into a doctrine known as guerre révolutionnaire (revolutionary war). In Algeria, in 1956, the army established a specialist training centre, the CIPCG, at Arzew on the Algerian coast, to provide courses for all officers arriving ‘in country’. By this, the French command sought to ensure that field officers possessed an approach to pacification and the political dimension to their missions well suited to the terrain and socio-political make-up of Algeria. The real ‘revolutionary war’ zealots were kept away from the directing staff, although some delivered guest lectures. Despite complaints from commanders of field units at losing experienced officers to the CIPCG instructing staff, Arzew students testified that the courses aided them in their missions. Some 10,000 French officers undertook courses at the CIPCG before it was downgraded and then disbanded after Pierre Messmer, a Gaullist, became Minister for the Armed Forces in 1960.     

The National resistance army (NRA) as a guerrilla force

Africa has had no shortage of guerrilla movements since 1975. However, very few have been successful that have not fought against European colonial rule or white minority regimes. Fundamentally, without external support, these movements have been almost universally failures. One major exception to this rule was the National Resistance Army of Uganda, which overthrew the regime led by General Tito Okello in 1986. What made the National Resistance Army a success and distinct from other guerrilla armies were its sound leadership, its superior organization and its creative strategy.     

Reviews

A. Hamish Ion and E.J. Errington (eds.), Great Powers and Little Wars: the Limits of Power. Westport, CT: Praeger, 1993. Pp.246, select biblio, index. $49.95. ISBN 0275–93965–0

John M. Rothgeb, Jr., Defining Power: Influence and Force in the Contemporary International System. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993. Pp.205. $39.95 (hbk); $18.70 (pbk). ISBN 0312–086–822 and 061–056

Brian L. Job (ed.), The Insecurity Dilemma: National Security in Third World States. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1992, Pp.257. $37. ISBN 1–55587–267–0

Edwin G. Corr and Stephen Sloan (eds.), Low‐Intensity Conflict: Old Threats in a New World. Westview Studies in Regional Security, Boulder, CO: Westview, 1992. Pp.310, maps, figures, index. $55 (hbk); $18.85 (pbk). ISBN 0–8133–8593–8 and 8594–6     

Israel's Northern eyes and shield: The strategic value of the Golan Heights revisited

According to common wisdom, the Golan provides Israel with an ideal platform for its warning stations as well as the best available defense line against a massive Syrian ground attack. Challenging this belief, this article compares the present situation with an alternative defined by (a) a complete Israeli withdrawal from the Golan, (b) a complete demilitarization of the evacuated territory, and (c) considerable limitations on Syrian military presence in the area between the Golan and Damascus. The article reaches two conclusions. First, that a combination of means, primarily airborne and space‐based platforms, can effectively answer Israel's northern intelligence needs. Second, the security arrangements set above, combined with recent revolutionary military technologies and its relative advantage in this domain, offer Israel an effective ‐ in some respects even a better ‐ alternative, to the present defense line.     

Winning hearts and minds: legitimacy in the Namibian war for independence

Efforts at winning hearts and minds (WHAM) impact on and are affected by perceptions of legitimacy. In the Namibian war for independence (1966–1989) efforts of the South African counterinsurgent forces at winning hearts and minds focused mainly on persuading the population to cooperate in exchange for material benefits and services. The article demonstrates that this successfully contributed to a dimension of legitimacy that is conceptualized as pragmatic legitimacy. However, other dimensions of legitimacy are identified in which the South Africans were lacking, that is in moral, legal, and identity-based legitimacy. Furthermore, in areas where control was contested and where the population could not be shielded from insurgent intimidation, it is argued that the effects of coercion outweighed legitimacy altogether.     

Defence Transformation in South Africa: Sharing the experience with the Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo

“There is nothing more difficult to carry out, nor more doubtful of success, nor more dangerous to handle than to initiate a new order of things. For the reformer has enemies in all who profit by the old order, and only lukewarm defenders in all those who would profit by the new order”—Machiavelli

This essay was written after a team of the Institute for Security Studies visited the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) to share their experiences of the challenges of defence transformation with Congolese officials and members of civil society.

It discusses the South African defence transformation process and experience in detail and highlights the imperative for visionary leadership, commitment and communication as prerequisites for successful transformation. The DRC faces a unique opportunity to design and create an optimal national defence force for itself, which will reflect its new and evolving national policy on defence, and therefore the needs of the nation. This poses an exciting challenge and true opportunity to move beyond survival into a new age. The essay aims to make a contribution to this process.     

‘God willing,I will be back’: Gauging the Truth and Reconciliation Commission's capacity to deter economic crimes in Liberia

Recently, in July 2012, the high-profile and bitterly fought nine-month race for the post of Chair of the African Union (AU) Commission, between Dr Jean Ping of Gabon, and his main challenger, Dr Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, culminated in the latter's victory. Her victory came after the deadlock at the Eighteenth AU Summit in January 2012. Borne out of the considered need for a quick fix through reliance on a vote of expediency, the election of Dr Dlamini-Zuma represented a political resolution to the crisis that arose due to the earlier ongoing electoral deadlock. Far from being a competitive election by design, the 2012 AU Commission election by default became transformed into an intensely fought campaign that put the AU in the limelight. This article briefly introduces the electoral process, explains in detail the voting behaviour of AU member states, and offers five specific reasons for the victory of Dr Dlamini-Zuma. On the surface the election looks very competitive, but the article explains why this is not the case. To create greater competition for these posts, the AU needs to overhaul the nomination process and the voting procedure. In this regard, the article proffers detailed analysis and proposes a radical revision of the existing criteria for the nomination. The article also proposes specific recommendations for the amendment of the rules of procedure of the AU Assembly to allow for a qualified majority as a deadlock breaker in the fifth round. It also assesses whether the integrity of the AU Commission election was damaged during the campaigning and voting process. In this regard, it recommends the development of a code of conduct for future elections at the AU.     

Clash of counterterrorism-assistance-seeking states and their super power sponsors: Implications on the war against Boko Haram

ABSTRACT

Decade-long security cooperation and counterterrorism engagements in Nigeria have failed to bring down Boko Haram or at least weaken its terrorist structures and transnational spread. I argue that disconnects between counterterrorism-assistance seeking states and their superpower sponsors are implicated in the intractability of Boko Haram's insurgency in Nigeria. Why is the U.S. counterterrorism intervention to individual MNJTF countries (i.e. troop contribution, military funding and intelligence support) ‘lopsided’, ‘fragmented’ and ‘unevenly distributed;’ and how are these implicated in the fight against Boko Haram terrorism? This has impacted negatively on MNJTF countries – lack of cooperation, divisiveness and individualism in coordinating and forging offensives against Boko Haram. These concerns interface several blind spots in the picture of external influences on military’s approach to Boko Haram. I elicit primary data from top military officers. I conclude by predicting the implications and consequences of these counterterrorism complexities, and their potency to defeat or encourage Boko Haram terror.     

Technical and proliferation‐related aspects of the dismantlement of Russian Alfa‐Class nuclear submarines

When does a state become a “nuclear weapon state”? How we choose to answer this question has significant implications for proliferation assessment, analysis, and policy. Traditionally, the standard demarcation line has been a state's first nuclear test, but in recent years analysts have increasingly focused instead on the accumulation of a significant quantity (SQ) of fissile material. The article argues that although the test/no-test indicator clearly has problems, its replacement by the SQ/no-SQ indicator would be highly counterproductive. The article instead proposes supplementing the traditional test/no-test indicator with a theory-driven approach that focuses on the incentives and disincentives to test.