Iraq's role in the 1973 Arab‐Israeli War

The events of the 1973 Arab‐Israeli War serve as an early indicator of Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein's willingness to use military power to address foreign policy concerns. In that war, Iraq intervened on the Syrian front with an armored division, other supporting units, and over 100 aircraft. This intervention, which occurred despite severe political and military difficulties, was larger than any previous Iraqi contribution to the anti‐Israeli struggle. Baghdad later asserted that Iraqi forces had saved Damascus from possible Israeli occupation, and these claims have been widely repeated by a variety of authors of different nationalities with various degrees of agreement or skepticism. Nevertheless, Iraqi claims to have saved Damascus from Israeli capture are false since the Israelis did not view the seizure of the city as important to their strategy for victory. Rather, the Iraqi presence on the Golan Heights was useful to the Arab war effort as one of many factors helping to delay the Israeli advance and prevent some important Syrian targets from being placed within artillery range of the Israeli force. Iraqi military shortcomings were well highlighted in this conflict, and many were repeated in the early stages of the war with Iran.     

Evaluating insurgent/counterinsurgent performance

Evaluating Insurgent/Counterinsurgent Performance ‘starts on the streets’, so to speak. Specifically, the five rules of assessment are common sense: (1) become familiar with the area in question; (2) slice up the analytical target into manageable slices; (3) carry out longitudinal studies; (4) look at the role played by ideas in this political warfare; and (5) assess the relationship between structural and purposive elements. Though various efforts have been made to quantify outcome, these have not been particularly successful and encourage emphasis upon process at the expense of analysis. The most common flaw in assessments is to view insurgency in static perspective. Societal causes are a necessary but not sufficient factor in upheaval. Once the insurgency becomes a going concern, organizational dynamics become important. Similar factors obtain on the counter‐insurgent side. In the end, both compete for domination of human terrain.     

Colombian Military Support for ‘Democratic Security’

Building upon a far-reaching reform movement carried out during the administration of Andres Pastrana (1998–2002), the Colombian military emerged in the Alvaro Uribe first term (2002–06) as a powerful, flexible organization capable of implementing a national strategy for successful counterinsurgency. Sweeping organizational change was accompanied by advances in operational art and tactics, as well as the promotion of new leadership tested in combat. A growing maturity in civil–military relations enabled national advances in democratic politics, economic progress and state integration, the latter to a degree unprecedented in Colombian history.     

Soldiers,the Frontier and the Politics of Command in British India

The defence of India in general and the North West Frontier in particular was central to strategic debate within the late Victorian army, creating one of the fault lines between rival factions competing for key commands and appointments. After a discussion of the varying strategic options debated within the British and Indian armies, the article examines the impact of Indian defence upon the ‘politics of command’ with particular reference to the appointment of Commanders-in-Chief in India between 1876 and 1892.     

Reviews

Douglas S. Derrer, We Are All the Target: A Handbook of Terrorism Avoidance and Hostage Survival. Annapolis, MD: US Naval Institute Press, 1992. Pp. x+135, notes, index. $14.95. ISBN 01–55750–150–5

Ian Knight, Zulu: Isandlwana and Rorke's Drift, 22–23 January 1879. London: Windrow & Greene, 1992. Pp.136, 150 illus., incl 8 colour plates, maps, biblio. £35. ISBN 1–872004–23–7

Ian Knight, By the Orders of the Great White Queen: Campaigning in Zululand through the Eyes of the British Soldiers, 1879. London: Greenhill Books and Novato: Presidio Press, 1992. Pp. 272, 17 illus., 1 map. £18.95. ISBN 1–85367–122–3

Manfried Rauchensteiner and Erwin A. Schmidl (eds.), Formen des Krieges: vom Mittelalter zum ‘Low‐intensity’ Conflict’. Graz : Verlag Styria, 1991. Pp.208. DM35. ISBN 3–22–12139–7

Harold J. Kearsley, Maritime Power and the Twenty‐First Century. Dartmouth: Dartmouth Publishing Company, Limited, 1992. Pp.xv + 203, 13 diagrams, index. £32.50. ISBN 1–85521–288–9     

Reviews

A. Hamish Ion and E.J. Errington (eds.), Great Powers and Little Wars: the Limits of Power. Westport, CT: Praeger, 1993. Pp.246, select biblio, index. $49.95. ISBN 0275–93965–0

John M. Rothgeb, Jr., Defining Power: Influence and Force in the Contemporary International System. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993. Pp.205. $39.95 (hbk); $18.70 (pbk). ISBN 0312–086–822 and 061–056

Brian L. Job (ed.), The Insecurity Dilemma: National Security in Third World States. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1992, Pp.257. $37. ISBN 1–55587–267–0

Edwin G. Corr and Stephen Sloan (eds.), Low‐Intensity Conflict: Old Threats in a New World. Westview Studies in Regional Security, Boulder, CO: Westview, 1992. Pp.310, maps, figures, index. $55 (hbk); $18.85 (pbk). ISBN 0–8133–8593–8 and 8594–6     

Design of accelerated life testing plans under multiple stresses

Accelerated life testing (ALT) using multiple stresses is commonly used in practice to resemble the operating stresses at normal operating conditions and obtain failure observations in a much shorter time. However, to date, there is little research into the theory of planning ALT for reliability estimation with multiple stresses. ALT with multiple stresses can result in a large number of stress‐level combinations which presents a challenge for implementation. In this article, we propose an approach for the design of ALT plans with multiple stresses and formulate multistress test plans based on different objectives and practical constraints. We develop a simulated annealing algorithm to efficiently determine the testing plan parameters. We demonstrate the proposed method with examples based on an actual test conducted using three stress types. The obtained optimal test plans are compared with those based on fractional factorial design. © 2013 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 60: 468–478, 2013