Britain and Hiroshima

Most historical accounts of the atomic bombings of Japan show little interest in Britain's explicit authorization for the attacks. Meanwhile, the few historians who have attempted to explain it rely on a unitary, rational actor model of the British state that is misleading. This article demonstrates that high-ranking British officials became anxious early on about the strategic consequences of a peremptory use of the new weapon. Therefore, especially over the course of 1944 they sought to engage Washington on the linked questions of the bomb's wartime use and its postwar control. However, these officials' initiatives were rebuffed by Prime Minister Winston Churchill, who paved the way to the bombings based on a fervent desire for Anglo-American integration, and on a dim understanding of the bomb's revolutionary potential.     

The Wilson government and the demise of TSR‐2, October 1964 – April 1965

Domestic factors play an important role in the formulation and evolution of a country's foreign and security policy. This is clearly seen in the case study of a Soviet successor state, Ukraine. The article brings together in seven sections theory with the key domestic factors that influence Ukrainian security policy, such as economics, energy, national identity, elites and political parties. The article provides an insight into how these domestic factors influence the course of Ukrainian security policy which is striking a balance between the twin extremes of Soviet re‐integration, which would be tantamount to the loss of independence, and nationalist maximalism which seeks to place as much distance as possible between Ukraine and Russia.     

The Rebirth of Insurgency in Peru

Peru has battled two major insurgent movements since 1980. Around 25,000 Peruvians have died in this war between the government against the Shining Path and the MRTA. The Peruvian military has been incapable of achieving total victory after several major operations and the capture of just about every major rebel leader. Even worse, after a few years of almost no activity, Shining Path seems to be re-emerging. The last remaining members of this insurgent group have made alliances with foreign terrorist groups, used drug traffic to fund their fight and sweet talked people who are very disappointed and mad at the current Toledo administration, to gain more supporters. Major changes have to occur to prevent both groups from becoming threats to national security and society as a whole, taking the country back to times when around half of the nation was declared to be under terrorist control. The defense budget must be increased to open new bases, buy new equipment and train soldiers better to fight the insurgents more effectively. At the same time, major social changes need to occur; Toledo and his government must gain the trust and sympathy of Peruvians again by working for and with them.     

Lanchester for cyber: The mixed epidemic‐combat model

Future conflict between armed forces will occur both in the physical domain as well as the information domain. The linkage of these domains is not yet fully understood. We study the dynamics of a force subject to kinetic effects as well as a specific network effect–spreading malware. In the course of our study, we unify two well‐studied models: the Lanchester model of armed conflict and deterministic models of epidemiology. We develop basic results, including a rule for determining when explicit modeling of network propagation is required. We then generalize the model to a force subdivided by both physical and network topology, and demonstrate the specific case where the force is divided between front‐ and rear‐echelons. © 2013 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2013     

Book reviews

Norman Cigar, Genocide in Bosnia: The Policy of “Ethnic Cleansing”. College Station, Texas: Texas A&M University Press, 1995. Pp.xiv + 247; app., map, notes, cartoon.

Maria Jose Moyano, Argentina's Lost Patrol: Armed Struggle, 1969–1979. New Haven: Connecticut Yale University Press, 1995. Pp.xiii + 226, biblio., abbreviations, 10 figures, 1 map, tables, index; $25/£16.95. ISBN 0–300–01622–6.

Donald E. Schulz and Deborah Sundloff Schulz, The United States, Honduras, and the Crisis in Central America, Westview Thematic Studies in Latin America, Boulder, Co: Westview, 1994. Pp.368, map, figure, select biblio., abbreviations, index. $52.50/£37.50; (cloth) $17.95/£11.95 (paper). ISBN 0–8133–1324–4 and 1323–6.

Joseph H. Alexander and Merrill L. Bartlett, Sea Soldiers in the Cold War: Amphibious Warfare 1945–1991. Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 1995. Pp.iii + 178, 1 map, 29 illus, biblio, index. $32.95. ISBN

Gary P. Cox, The Halt in the Mud: French Strategic Planning from Waterloo to Sedan. Westview Press, 1994. Pp.258, maps, notes, biblio, index. £33.50. ISBN 0–133–1536–0.     

Whatever happened to South America's splendid little wars?

South America has gained international media attention due to its ongoing arms race, with politicians and analysts warning about the possibility of war. Nevertheless, since the Chaco War in the 1930s, the region has seldom faced major inter-state wars, all of which have been short-lived and with relatively few casualties. This article will discuss in greater detail the ongoing arms race in South America, portraying it as a race ‘of levels’, with not all countries carrying out massive weaponry purchases. Finally, I will discuss regional geopolitics, geosecurity and integration as part of an analysis regarding the unlikelihood of war.     

It's all the rage: why mechanization doesn't explain COIN outcomes

A recent article, ‘Rage Against the Machines’, does a disservice to the debate over what explains counterinsurgency (COIN) success. While it establishes a negative correlation between the diffusion of military mechanization in the state system and COIN success, its theoretical argument does not hold up under close scrutiny and its micro-case comparison of two units in Iraq during 2003–2004 ignores obvious counter-examples and factors that influence COIN success, such as leadership. A deeper inquiry would have revealed that there is much more to COIN success than simply not having access to vehicles.     

Ho Chi Minh and the origins of the Vietnamese doctrine of guerrilla tactics

In a very important sense, the Vietnamese military history of the communist era began in 1941, when Ho Chi Minh prepared ‘Guerrilla Tactics’ (Cach Danh Du Kich).1 ?1. Ministry of Defense Center for the Military Encyclopedia Ministry of Defense Center for the Military Encyclopedia. 1996. Tu Dien Bach Hoa Quan Su Vietnam, Hanoi: People's Army Publishing Company.  [Google Scholar], Tu Dien Bach Hoa Quan Su Vietnam, 69. The publication of this essay, which was a manual on the tactics, techniques, and procedures of guerrilla warfare, preceded the founding of the first armed propaganda unit (Tuyen Truyen Doi Vo Trang) on 22 December 1944, which later became the People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN, Quan Doi Nhan Dan); as well as the revolutionary writings of Truong Chinh (1946–1947) and Vo Nguyen Giap (1959). The fact that ‘Tactics’ was published by the Viet Minh reinforces the claim made by the PAVN that it was the first authoritative Vietnamese writing on this important subject.