The long term effects of an aging fleet on operational availability and cost: evidence from the U.S. coast guard

This paper empirically examines whether the aging of a fleet affects operational availability and operating cost using a unique data-set on the 117 47-foot Motor Lifeboats (MLBs) of the United States Coast Guard (USCG). Procured from 1997 to 2003, the 47-foot MLB is the standard lifeboat of the USCG and all 117 MLBs remain in service. The aging of the MLB fleet has resulted in higher annual operating costs and lower operational availability, although the nature of this relationship remains unclear. Our estimation strategy utilizes an error components estimator to examine these issues. We employ three variants of the dependent variables (i.e. the standard logarithmic transformation as is most commonly seen in the literature, inverse hyperbolic sine [IHS], and level outcomes). The point estimates from the standard logarithmic model finds operational availability for the MLBs decreases at a rate between 0.83 and 1.8% per year and cost increases at a rate between 0.33 and 7.81% per year. Similar effects are shown with the IHS and level outcome specifications. In terms of nonlinearity effects, we find the most pronounced changes in operational availability and cost occur for MLBs aged 15 years or more (in comparison to younger MLBs).     

Does Military Spending Really Matter for Economic Growth in China and G7 Countries: The Roles of Dependency and Heterogeneity

This study revisits the causal linkages between military spending and economic growth in China and G7 countries (i.e. Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the UK, and the USA) by focusing country-specific analysis for the period 1988–2010. The panel causality analysis, which accounts for both cross-country dependency and heterogeneity across countries, is employed in this study. Our results find evidence of the neutrality hypothesis for Italy, France, and Germany, the military spending–growth detriment hypothesis for both Canada and the UK, and one-way Granger causality running from economic growth to military spending for China. Furthermore, we find a feedback between military spending and economic growth in both Japan and the USA. Thus, our results do not support that one size fits all.     

Use it or lose it: On the incentives to spend annual defence operating budgets

In most western countries, there is a strong incentive for defence department budget-holders to expend all of the funds they are authorized to spend in a fiscal year. In this paper, we question whether this emphasis makes sense. We develop a model of a defence department’s operating expenditure assuming a fixed level of funding for a year and uncertain costs. The results of the model suggest that the incentive for departmental managers to expend all authorized funds is inefficient. We explore the implications of the model for the Department of National Defence (DND) in Canada in light of the recent criticism of DND lapsed funding by the Auditor-General of Canada.     

Preserving defense technologies: A strategy for economic conversion†

This paper presents a model for converting legacy defense production facilities into private‐sector economic resources. Specifically, this paper will examine as a case study the first successful conversion of a former U.S. Department of Energy nuclear weapons production installation, including reasons for its success, its costs and benefits, and lessons for public policy. It is envisioned that this model may be useful for mitigating local economic hardship resulting from defense “downsizing” and for privatizing production capacities critical for national defense.     

THE FATE OF DISPUTED TERRITORIES: AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

This paper presents a simple model to characterize the outcome of a land dispute between two rival parties using a Stackelberg game. Unlike Gershenson and Grossman (2000 Gershenson, D. and Grossman, H.I. 2000. Civil conflict: ended or never ending?. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 44(6): 807–821.  [Google Scholar]), we assume that the opposing parties have access to different technologies for challenging and defending in conflict. We derive the conditions under which territorial conflict between the two parties is less likely to persist indefinitely. Allowing for an exogenous destruction term as in Garfinkel and Skaperdas (2000 Garfinkel, M. and Skaperdas, S. 2000. Conflict without misperceptions or incomplete information: how the future matters. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 44(6): 793–807. [Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]), we show that, when the nature of conflict becomes more destructive, the likelihood of a peaceful outcome, in which the territory’s initial possessor deters the challenging party, increases if the initial possessor holds more intrinsic value for the disputed land. Following Siqueira (2003 Siqueira, K. 2003. Conflict and third‐party intervention. Defence and Peace Economics, 14(6): 389–400. [Taylor & Francis Online], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]), our model has policy implications for peace through third‐party intervention.     

EXPORT CONTROLS AND INTERNATIONAL SAFEGUARDS

Export controls and international safeguards are central to ensuring international confidence in the peaceful uses of nuclear materials and technologies and to achieving adequate oversight on the transfer and use of nuclear materials, technology, and equipment required for the development of proliferation-sensitive parts of the nuclear fuel cycle. Although the independent strengths of export controls and international safeguards rely largely on universal adherence, there may be opportunities to exploit the shared strengths of these systems. This article provides background information on the separate evolution of export controls and international safeguards, considers how these two elements of the nonproliferation regime interact, and identifies some possible avenues that could, over time, lead to wholly integrated activities.     

Book reviews

Frank Zimmer, Bismarcks Kampf gegen Kaiser Franz Joseph Konigsgratz und seine Folgen. Graz, Vienna, Cologne: Styria Verlag 1996. Pp.203,49 illus., 1 map. OS 350/DM 49. ISBN 3–222–12377–2.

Saul Zadka, Blood in Zion: How the Jewish Guerrillas drove the British out of Palestine. London and Washington: Brassey's, 1995. Pp.227, chron., illus., index. £19.95. ISBN 1–85753–136–1.

Theodore L. Gatchel, At the Water's Edge: Defending against the Modern Amphibious Assault. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1996. Pp.xvi+217, notes, biblio, index. $36.95. ISBN 1–55750–308–7.

Max G. Manwaring and William J. Olson (eds.) Managing Contemporary Conflict: Pillars of Success. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1996. Pp.269, no index. $65 (cloth); $25 (paper). ISBN 0–8133–8969 and 9978–5

Chris Seiple, The US Military/NGO Relationship in Humanitarian Interventions, Carlisle Barracks, PA: The

Richard L. Millett and Michael Gold‐Biss (eds.) Beyond Praetorianism: The Latin American Military in Transition. University of Miami: North/South Center Press; Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1996. Pp.xv +317, index. $24.95. ISBN 1–5745–000–9.

Rudolph C. Barnes Jr, Military Legitimacy: Might and Right in the New Millennium. London and Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 1996. Pp.199, select biblio., index. £27.50/$39.50, ISBN 0–714–4624–5.     

装备保障抽组力量物资装载模型

对装备保障抽组力量的物资装载问题进行了数学描述,建立了以实现全部物资尽量分散装载为目标,以同类物资集中装载、车辆承载物资总体积不超过车辆有效容积、车辆承载物资总重量不超过车辆标记载重量、物资必须装载且不被重复装载等为主要约束的数学模型,并进行了求解.最后通过实例解算验证了模型的有效性.