WHY IRAN WANTS THE BOMB AND WHAT IT MEANS FOR US POLICY

Understanding why the Iranian regime wants to possess nuclear weapons is essential to formulating the best policy to prevent (or perhaps to simply manage) the emergence of a nuclear-armed Iran. Three general theories—realism, liberalism, and constructivism—provide a framework for looking at Iran's nuclear motivations. However, contrary to many analyses, the regime's desire to possess nuclear arms stems not from neorealist defensive concerns, but rather from offensive goals driven by domestic politics. The use of extremist Islamism by the Iranian regime to justify its autocratic rule is the primary motivating factor. Accordingly, the outlook for diplomatically addressing the Iranian regime's nuclear aspirations appears dim.     

State fragility and violent uprisings in Nigeria

Abstract

The emergence of the Islamic sect, Boko Haram, and its transformation into a terrorist organisation has dominated recent discourse in the fields of political science and security studies, both within and without the socio-politico enclave known as Nigeria. Much of the discussion has centred on the extra-judicial execution of its founder, Mohammed Yusuf, which purportedly intensified the radicalisation of the group, and whether or not the sect receives operational and/or financial support from foreign terrorist associations. The interest of others has been to forecast the possibility of the internationalisation of the group's activities. This paper aligns with those whose interest is to identify and proffer ways of resolving factors that predisposed the Nigerian state to the levels of violence perpetrated by Boko Haram, with a view to averting much greater crises in the future. It adopts some historicism in demonstrating that the responsibility for the deepening insecurity in the country resides in the Nigerian state structure, which has often been seen as willing to sacrifice the well-being of the many for the benefit of a few. On the whole, the paper utilises state fragility as the framework of analysis by identifying the incapacity of the state in effective service delivery, which has as a result created a situation of mass unemployment and extreme poverty that has fanned the Boko Haram uprising. It concludes that a sustainable solution to the crisis lies in addressing the root causes of inequality, unemployment and poverty, with which most Nigerians, particularly in the north, subsist.     

Re-thinking the Unthinkable: Arms Control in the Twenty-First Century

ABSTRACT

Since the end of the Cold War, arms control proponents tried to make the case for deep nuclear reductions and other forms of security cooperation as necessary for strategic stability. While different versions of strategic stability analysis did sometimes produce innovative proposals, constructive negotiations, and successful ratification campaigns in the past, this analytical framework has become more of a hindrance than a help. Treating arms control as a predominantly technical way to make deterrence more stable by changing force structure characteristics, military operations, relative numbers of weapons on either side, or total number of nuclear weapons gives short shrift to political factors, including the fundamental assumptions about world politics that inform different arms control logics, the quality of political relations among leading states, and the political processes that affect negotiation, ratification, and implementation. This article compares two logics for arms control as a means to enhance strategic stability, one developed by the Cambridge community in the 1960s and one used by the Reagan administration and its successors, with current perspectives on strategic stability in which flexibility and freedom of action are preferable to predictability and arms control. It also contrasts what the Barack Obama administration has tried to achieve through strategic stability dialogues with Russia and China with how they envision security cooperation. It then presents an approach developed during the Cold War by Hedley Bull for thinking about both the technical and the political dimensions of arms control, and suggests that the logic of Cooperative Security (which shares important features with Bull's approach) is a more appropriate and productive way to think about arms control in the twenty-first century than strategic stability analysis is.     

U.S. policy on preventive war and preemption

In the aftermath of September 11, 2001 and Hurricane Katrina, the United States government has spent tens of billions of dollars to improve the nation's ability to respond to a natural disaster or terrorist attack, but the emphasis on immediate first response has left many long-term environmental, political, and technological challenges unaddressed. Although a dirty bomb attack is unlikely to yield the same amount of physical devastation and death as caused by Katrina or a nuclear weapon, the social, psychological, and economic impact would be enormous. At present, however, the United States lacks the technology necessary to decontaminate a large, densely populated urban area under time, political, and economic constraints. This article reviews past cleanup experiences and current decontamination capabilities to consider the long-term implications of a dirty bomb, identifies weaknesses in America's existing response capabilities, notes possible areas of political friction, and considers the implications of the failure to adequately prepare. Having the appropriate decontamination techniques established and long-term plans in place before an incident occurs will significantly improve the government's ability to protect public and environmental security, establish a viable decontamination strategy, allow residents to return to their homes, and get the local economy back on its feet.     

IF YOU WANT IT DONE RIGHT,DO IT YOURSELF

Some have argued that the transatlantic rancor over the Iraq war made cooperation, especially on nonproliferation, unlikely. In contrast, this article, documents post-invasion instances of nonproliferation cooperation, with particular emphasis on the Proliferation Security Initiative and the EU-3 Initiative—the British, French, and German negotiations with Iran over its suspected nuclear activities. In addition to documenting French and British participation in these initiatives, the article analyzes why they have chosen to participate and argues that France and Britain have participated in both efforts because they are committed to avoiding future Iraq-like preventive wars.