MAD: Mathematical analysis of downtime

The MAD model presents a mathematic treatment of the relationship between aircraft reliability and maintainability, system manning and inspection policies, scheduling and sortie length, and aircraft downtime. Log normal distributions are postulated for subsystem repair times and simultaneous repair of malfunctions is assumed. The aircraft downtime for maintenance is computed with the distribution of the largest of k log normal distributions. Waiting time for maintenance men is calculated either by using a multiple-channel queuing model or by generating the distribution of the number of maintenance men required and comparing this to the number of men available to determine the probability of waiting at each inspection.     

The fixed charge problem

A fundamental unsolved problem in the programming area is one in which various activities have fixed charges (e.g., set-up time charges) if operating at a positive level. Properties of a general solution to this type problem are discussed in this paper. Under special circumstances it is shown that a fixed charge problem can be reduced to an ordinary linear programming problem.     

Troubled triangle: Russia,Ukraine and the United States

A potentially productive triangular arrangement among Russia, Ukraine, and the United States emerged in 1994 from efforts to constrain nuclear weapons diffusion. By 2001, this promising initiative was nearly moribund, owing to the inability or unwillingness of the parties to fulfill the commitments of subsequent agreements. The domestic and external causes of this failure are many and clear. Yet the advantages to each of reengaging in a trilateral relationship are also plain. This means fulfilling their unfinished agenda by learning from past mistakes, adopting realistic premises and goals, and pursuing ‘bottom up’ as well as ‘top down’ strategies.     

Did the Panamanian Defense Forces conduct infiltration operations at the Arraijan Tank Farm in 1988?

This article reviews the circumstances surrounding a relatively obscure and almost forgotten US Marine Corps and Army security enhancement operation undertaken in Panama that commenced in early April of 1988. Marines were sent to Panama to protect oil and ammunition storage facilities from potential saboteurs. By April 1989 they had reported sighting armed, uniformed intruders on at least 43 occasions and receiving gunfire or discharging their own weapons during 16 incidents. Yet despite the repeated barrages of small arms fire over the course of a year, they failed to recover enemy ammunition, bodies or body parts and their own equipment and positions displayed no signs of suffering from hostile fire. This article analyzes the events from the point of view of a veteran of the operation and highlights the role that psychological operations may have played in generating the situation.