Book Reviews

Strategic Air Defense. Edited by Stephen J. Cimbala. Scholarly Resources, Wilmington, DE (1989), ISBN 0–8420–2285–6, $40.00

NATO's Defence of the North. Brassey's Atlantic Commentaries No. 1. Edited by Eric Grove. Brassey's, London (1989), ISBN 0–08–037339–9, £7.50

Maritime Strategy and the Balance of Power: Britain and America in the Twentieth Century. Edited by John B. Hattendorf and Robert S. Jordan. Macmillan, London (1989), ISBN 0–333–43789–6, £45.00

Superpowers at Sea: an Assessment of the Naval Arms Race. By Richard Fieldhouse and Shunji Taoka. SIPRI, Oxford (1989), ISBN 0–19–829135–3

Security at Sea: Naval Arms Control. Edited by Richard Fieldhouse. Oxford University Press, Oxford (1990), ISBN 0–19–829130–2, £25.00

Strategy in the Southern Oceans: a South American View. By Virginia Gamba‐Stonehouse. Pinter, London (1989), ISBN 0–86187–017–4, £30.00

The Defence Industrial Base and the West. Edited by D. G. Haglund. Routledge, London (1989), ISBN 0–415–00923–5, £30.00

Defense and Détente: US and West German Perspectives on Defense Policy. Edited by Joseph I. Coffey and Klaus von Schubert. Westview Press, Boulder, CO, ISBN 0–8133–7722–6, $36.50     

Design and estimation for small sample sensitivity testing

In sensitivity testing for the Department of Defense, the high cost of experimental units necessitates the use of small sample sizes and accentuates the importance of design. This article compares five data collection-estimation procedures. Four of these are modifications of the Robbins-Monro method, and the other is the Langlie. The simulation study is designed as a factorial experiment with response function, sample size, initial design point, gate width, and noise as factors. The estimated V₅₀ and its MSE are the responses compared to assess the small sample behavior of each method. Although there is no single clear-cut winner, the Delayed Robbins-Monro (DRM) with maximum likelihood estimation and the Estimated Quantal Response Curve (Wu [21]) are shown to perform well over a broad variety of conditions.     

One size does not fit all: personalized incentives in military compensation

A critical element in implementing a compensation scheme including nonmonetary incentives (NMIs) is recognizing that preferences vary widely across Service members. There are at least three sources of variability: across different population classes, across individuals within a population class, and across NMI packages for a particular individual. Surveys across different military communities, ranks, and years of Service show the difficulty of identifying any NMI that has significant value for even 50% of the active duty force. At the same time, approximately 80% of the surveyed Service members expressed a significant positive value for at least one NMI. Therefore, one-size-fits-all incentive packages will not be nearly as effective as more personalized incentive packages. The authors discuss variability in Service member NMI preferences and outline an approach to implementing personalized NMI packages in military compensation through a sealed-bid reverse auction, where Service members select individual NMIs from a “cafeteria-style” menu of options.     

On the Road to the 2015 NPT Review Conference

The second session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2015 Review Conference (RevCon) of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) highlighted two issues in particular—progress toward a Middle East Weapons of Mass Destruction–Free Zone and the Joint Statement on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons—that may not only greatly affect the health and vitality of the NPT and the 2015 RevCon, but possibly also have implications for the international nonproliferation regime as a whole. Dr. William Potter, director of the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, interviewed Ambassador Cornel Feruta, chairman of the 2013 PrepCom, to discuss these and other issues related to the meeting and the future of the treaty and its review process.     

A historical overview of US counter-insurgency

Say not the struggle naught availeth,

The labour and the wounds are vain,

The enemy faints not, nor faileth,

And as things have been, things remain.

Arthur Hugh Clough     

A Question of ‘Government’ Control: Afghanistan DDR Programs Since 2001

Since the fall of the Taliban in late 2001, the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA), the United States, the United Nations, and the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) have funded and led three different Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) programs. Despite a significant investment in time and treasure, all of them have failed to significantly reduce the number of insurgents or arbaki (militia). This article explores why these programs failed despite incorporating ideas from the prominent DDR schools of thought. Utilizing Stathis Kalyvas’ theory of The Logic of Violence in Civil War as a lens, this article argues that GIRoA and ISAF did not have sufficient control of territory to entice insurgents or arbaki to reconcile and/or reintegrate with the government. Further, in areas GIRoA nominally controlled in northern and western Afghanistan, regional powerbrokers who controlled these areas balked at these programs.