Machine scheduling with an availability constraint and job delivery coordination

In this paper we study the scheduling problem that considers both production and job delivery at the same time with machine availability considerations. Only one vehicle is available to deliver jobs in a fixed transportation time to a distribution center. The vehicle can load at most K jobs as a delivery batch in one shipment due to the vehicle capacity constraint. The objective is to minimize the arrival time of the last delivery batch to the distribution center. Since machines may not always be available over the production period in real life due to preventive maintenance, we incorporate machine availability into the models. Three scenarios of the problem are studied. For the problem in which the jobs are processed on a single machine and the jobs interrupted by the unavailable machine interval are resumable, we provide a polynomial algorithm to solve the problem optimally. For the problem in which the jobs are processed on a single machine and the interrupted jobs are nonresumable, we first show that the problem is NP‐hard. We then propose a heuristic with a worst‐case error bound of 1/2 and show that the bound is tight. For the problem in which the jobs are processed on either one of two parallel machines, where only one machine has an unavailable interval and the interrupted jobs are resumable, we propose a heuristic with a worst‐case error bound of 2/3. © 2006 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2007     

Selling to strategic and loss‐averse consumers: Stocking,procurement, and product design policies

Motivated by the presence of loss‐averse decision making behavior in practice, this article considers a supply chain consisting of a firm and strategic consumers who possess an S‐shaped loss‐averse utility function. In the model, consumers decide the purchase timing and the firm chooses the inventory level. We find that the loss‐averse consumers' strategic purchasing behavior is determined by their perceived gain and loss from strategic purchase delay, and the given rationing risk. Thus, the firm that is cognizant of this property tailors its inventory stocking policy based on the consumers' loss‐averse behavior such as their perceived values of gain and loss, and their sensitivity to them. We also demonstrate that the firm's equilibrium inventory stocking policy reflects both the economic logic of the traditional newsvendor inventory model, and the loss‐averse behavior of consumers. The equilibrium order quantity is significantly different from those derived from models that assume that the consumers are risk neutral and homogeneous in their valuations. We show that the firm that ignores strategic consumer's loss‐aversion behavior tends to keep an unnecessarily high inventory level that leads to excessive leftovers. Our numerical experiments further reveal that in some extreme cases the firm that ignores strategic consumer's loss‐aversion behavior generates almost 92% more leftovers than the firm that possesses consumers’ loss‐aversion information and takes it into account when making managerial decisions. To mitigate the consumer's forward‐looking behavior, we propose the adoption of the practice of agile supply chain management, which possesses the following attributes: (i) procuring inventory after observing real‐time demand information, (ii) enhanced design (which maintains the current production mix but improves the product performance to a higher level), and (iii) customized design (which maintains the current performance level but increases the variety of the current production line to meet consumers’ specific demands). We show that such a practice can induce the consumer to make early purchases by increasing their rationing risk, increasing the product value, or diversifying the product line. © 2015 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 62: 435–453, 2015     

Wisdom without tears: Statecraft and the uses of history

The world is mired in history again, as historical modes of competition return and historical grievances fuel the policies of multiple revisionist actors. If the end of history has ended, then it follows that the time is ripe for an engagement with history’s wisdom. We argue that the making of American statecraft—the deliberate, coordinated use of national power to achieve important objectives—can be significantly enhanced by a better understanding of the past. This essay, which draws on the extensive literature on history and statecraft, U.S. foreign policy, and the author’s own research and experiences, offers a defense of the use of history to improve statecraft, as well as a typology of ten distinct ways in which an understanding of history can improve government policy.     

Target Analysis of Shining Path Insurgents in Peru: An Example of US Army Psychological Operations

This article analyzes the assumptions of US and Peruvian military personnel regarding insurgent susceptibilities to psychological operations in 1988. The discussion is based on both archival material and the experiences of the author, who was a member of the joint US-Peruvian team. The paper provides insight into the workings of US Army psychological operations as they were conducted in the 1980s and outlines both the strengths and weaknesses of the approach taken.     

The origins of the cancellation of Canada's Avro CF-105 arrow fighter program: A failure of strategy

The story of the demise of Canada's remarkable CF-105 Arrow jet-fighter interceptor has been told and retold by numerous Canadian writers. As told by most, it is a tragic tale. Canadian Prime Minister John Diefenbaker, in an act as unforgivable as it was incomprehensible, not only destroyed a highly promising all-Canadian state-of-the-art aircraft but ruined all hopes of Canada ever being an important player in the North American defense industry. This article offers a contrasting interpretation — locating the problems leading to the aircraft's cancellation further back in history, and in particular in serious and determinative failures in strategic thinking and analysis by senior Canadian military officials at the time of the Arrow program's birth in 1953.