Did the Panamanian Defense Forces conduct infiltration operations at the Arraijan Tank Farm in 1988?

This article reviews the circumstances surrounding a relatively obscure and almost forgotten US Marine Corps and Army security enhancement operation undertaken in Panama that commenced in early April of 1988. Marines were sent to Panama to protect oil and ammunition storage facilities from potential saboteurs. By April 1989 they had reported sighting armed, uniformed intruders on at least 43 occasions and receiving gunfire or discharging their own weapons during 16 incidents. Yet despite the repeated barrages of small arms fire over the course of a year, they failed to recover enemy ammunition, bodies or body parts and their own equipment and positions displayed no signs of suffering from hostile fire. This article analyzes the events from the point of view of a veteran of the operation and highlights the role that psychological operations may have played in generating the situation.     

The Evolution and Significance of the 1972 Incidents at Sea Agreement

As a consequence of the rapid growth of Soviet maritime power during the 1960s, hazardous incidents at sea and in the air became a regular part of the Cold War. Eventually, both Washington and Moscow came to recognize the importance of an agreement limiting this perilous set of interactions, resulting in the Incidents at Sea Agreement that was signed in May 1972. The set of rules and procedures agreed upon helped to calm tensions in subsequent crises and provides ample lessons for placing reasonable limits on other tense maritime rivalries.     

Contents and Author Index,Volume 19, 2012

The U.S. Congress, charged with overseeing U.S. nuclear weapons policy and programs, usually addresses such policies and programs through the annual authorization and appropriations process, focusing mostly on questions of how many and what types of weapons the United States should deploy, with little attention paid to questions about nuclear weapons strategy, doctrine, and policy. The oversight process has brought about some significant changes in the plans for U.S. nuclear weapons, including the elimination of funding for the Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator study and the shift of that funding into a study of the Reliable Replacement Warhead. But with the focus on authorizations and appropriations, along with the divided jurisdiction over nuclear weapons policy and programs in congressional committees, Congress has not, either recently or during the Cold War and post–Cold War eras, conducted a more comprehensive review of U.S. nuclear weapons strategy, policy, or force structure. Changes in committee jurisdictions could affect the oversight process, but as long as nuclear weapons policy and programs remain a relatively low priority for most members of Congress, and the country at large, it is unlikely that Congress will pursue such a comprehensive debate.     

INDIA AND THE NEW LOOK OF U.S. NONPROLIFERATION POLICY

U.S. nuclear export policy has undergone major transformations since 1945, and the most recent change, as expressed in the July 18, 2005, India-U.S. Joint Statement, represents an especially significant shift in policy. The document reverses more than a quarter century of U.S. declaratory policy, suggesting that the current U.S. administration regards nuclear proliferation to be both inevitable and not necessarily a bad thing. This article investigates this policy shift, looking at the history of U.S. nuclear export policy and the potential ramifications of the new policy on the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The author also touches on the potential effects of the Joint Statement on Indian-Pakistani relations. Finally, it is suggested that it is not too late for India and the United States to change the new policy with more consideration for the NPT and the Nuclear Suppliers Group Initiative.     

Defense Expenditure and Income Inequality: Evidence on Co-integration and Causality for China

There are conflicting views as to the relationship between a nation’s defense expenditure (DE) and its population’s income inequality (INEQ). DE, always an important part of government budget, can easily crowd out transfer payments, necessary to improve INEQ; however, these payments may also create a demand that may raise the income levels of the lower income earners. Consequently, the relationship between DE and INEQ is an important question. This paper examines the relationship between DE and INEQ in China for the period of 1989–2012. Utilizing basic cointegration and causality tests, our objective is to add to the literature by providing evidence that China’s DE, in fact, do have an impact on INEQ.     

ON ETHNIC CONFLICT AND THE ORIGINS OF TRANSNATIONAL TERRORISM

Using the ITERATE dataset, we explore the origins of transnational terrorist activity, from 1982 through 1997, in 118 countries. We model terrorism, not as a function of a nation’s ethnic, religious or linguistic fractionalization, but as an independent measure of perceived ethnic tensions. When we control for institutional quality, evidence that political rights and civil liberties mitigate the terrorism‐producing effects of ethnic tensions exists only since 1990. Economic freedoms, on the other hand, robustly reduce the number of terrorist attacks originating in ethnically tense societies.