CHOOSING GENOCIDE: ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES ON THE DISTURBING RATIONALITY OF RACE MURDER

An economic theory of genocide is presented with application to Rwanda‐1994. The theory considers ‘macro’ conditions under which an authority group chooses genocide and ‘micro’ conditions that facilitate the spread of genocide. From the macro perspective, a bargaining model highlights four rational explanations for an authority’s choice of genocide: prevention of loss of power, indivisibility, elimination of a persistent rival, and political bias. From the micro perspective, an evolutionary game model shows how supporters of genocide gain the upper hand in group dynamics over resisters and bystanders. The theory and application suggest that the conditions for genocide are not exceptional.     

Market reactions to regulations on minerals from the democratic republic of the Congo

Using an event study approach to analyze stock market data from the United States, I investigate how regulations on conflict minerals sourced in the Democratic Republic of the Congo were perceived by investors. I find that for a subset of mining companies, stock returns were abnormally high when regulations in the US became more likely. I also find that returns were higher for communications equipment manufacturing companies when strong regulations in the DRC were announced. I argue that these responses were due to the competitive environments faced by each of these company types. These findings relate to debates surrounding the effects of the conflict mineral regulations. While some critics argue that reporting requirements were tantamount to a ban on minerals from the DRC, I find that stock returns for a subset of companies were sensitive to legislation in the DRC after legislation became law in the US, suggesting that market participants did not expect a complete trade ban on regulated mining and trading activities.     

Conflict circuit breakers in the Great Lakes Region of Africa

Conflict resolution in the African Great Lakes Region has been linked to the protocols and projects agreed upon at the Second International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR). The ICGLR created a continental-wide framework of conflict circuit breakers focused on resolving the structural and surface situational causes of the 1996 to 2003 armed conflicts that drew in at least six nations and destabilised the entire region. The implementation of these protocols and projects will serve as a test for the African Great Lakes Region to move away from conflict and into a cooperation and development phase; however, the effort to bring peace, stability and development will face obstacles not only in the security sector, but also in developing infrastructure, civil society, and good governance. In summary, this article contends that peace in the Great Lakes Region will depend equally on two factors: internal governance and building civil society institutions, and focused regional interlocking circuit-breaking institutions.     

Helpless or Deliberate Bystander: American Policy towards South Vietnam's Military Coups, 1954–1975

The USA's role in fomenting and responding to military coups remains an understudied and politically contentious subject despite it being a recurring foreign policy problem exemplified most recently in both Egypt and Mali. To the extent this topic has been addressed in any depth by scholars, it is mainly limited to an examination of a small number of coups that occurred during the Cold War that the CIA was accused of sponsoring. However, this emphasis on well-known cases to the exclusion of lesser-known cases has resulted in a biased view of omnipotent US power. This limitation is reflected in the case of South Vietnam, in which the focus has been placed on the 1963 coup that overthrew President Ngo Dinh Diem, whereas the numerous other coups that occurred have received little or no attention. In this article, a more inclusive approach will be taken in which US policy will be examined with respect to all of the main coups and coup attempts that occurred during the period 1954–1975.     

End effects in capacity expansion models with finite horizons

Capacity expansion models are typically formulated in the context of some finite horizon. Because the firm lasts longer than the horizon, a bias can enter into the optimal solution from the model horizon chosen. Recently, Grinold [8] has proposed a “dual-equilibrium method” for ameliorating possible distortions. Although the dual-equilibrium method has superior analytical properties to other methods, it is conceptually more complex. In this paper it is shown that there are situations where the “primal-equilibrium” approach of Manne [15] provides equivalent results and that the use of annualized capital costs in the objective function, although somewhat less efficient, results in a similar model.